Arriola-Morales v. Holder ( 2014 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT February 28, 2014
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
EDGAR LEONEL ARRIOLA-MORALES,
Petitioner,
v. No. 13-9542
(Petition for Review)
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., United States
Attorney General,
Respondent.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Before KELLY, ANDERSON, and MATHESON, Circuit Judges.
Edgar Leonel Arriola-Morales petitions for review of the Board of
Immigration Appeals’ (BIA or Board) denial of his motion to reopen. Exercising
jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a), we deny the petition for review.
Mr. Arriola-Morales is a native and citizen of Guatemala who was brought to
the United States by his parents in 1986 at age 2. The Department of Homeland
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Security initiated removal proceedings in 2006 and ultimately charged
Mr. Arriola-Morales as removable on two grounds: (1) that he had overstayed his
visitor’s visa as of 1987, see 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B), and (2) that he had been
convicted of a controlled substance offense, see id. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i). The
immigration judge (IJ) found that Mr. Arriola-Morales’s two convictions in 2004—
one for possession of marijuana and one for possession of drug paraphernalia—were
not “a single offense involving possession for one’s own use of 30 grams or less of
marijuana,” making him ineligible for that exception to removability under
§ 1227(a)(2)(B)(i). According to the IJ’ order, he admitted the factual allegations
and conceded both bases for removal.
Mr. Arriola-Morales sought special rule cancellation of removal under the
Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act, Pub. L. No. 105-100,
§§ 201-04, 111 Stat. 2160 (1997) (NACARA). See generally, 8 C.F.R.
§§ 1240.60-1240.70. The IJ found that he was eligible for NACARA relief only
under 8 C.F.R. § 1240.66(c) because his controlled-substance convictions made him
both inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) and removable under
§ 1227(a)(2)(B)(i). See 8 C.F.R. § 1240.66(c)(1). Section 1240.66(c)(2) requires an
alien to show ten years of continuous physical presence in the United States
“immediately following the commission of an act, or the assumption of a status
constituting a ground for removal.” The IJ concluded Mr. Arriola-Morales could not
satisfy this requirement because ten years had not elapsed since his 2004 criminal
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convictions. The IJ therefore denied his application for special rule cancellation of
removal. The BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision without opinion.
Mr. Arriola-Morales did not file a petition for review, but he did file a timely
motion to reopen with the BIA. He sought to reopen his case in light of the Board’s
intervening decision in Matter of Davey, 26 I. & N. Dec. 37 (BIA 2012). In Davey,
the BIA construed the exception to removability in § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) for a “single
offense involving possession for one’s own use of 30 grams or less of marijuana.” It
decided this language “refers not to a common generic crime but rather to a specific
type of conduct (possession for one’s own use) committed on a specific number of
occasions (a ‘single’ offense) and involving a specific quantity (30 grams or less) of
a specific substance (marijuana).” Id. at *39. It therefore concluded that the two
generic offenses the alien committed simultaneously in Davey—specifically,
possession of marijuana and possession of drug paraphernalia—“amounted to a
‘single offense’ . . . because they were constituent parts of a single act of simple
marijuana possession.” Id. The BIA said it could “conceive of no reason why
Congress would except an alien from deportability for actually possessing a small
amount of marijuana for personal use, yet deny such leniency simply because, for
example, the marijuana was found in a baggie.” Id. at *41.
Mr. Arriola-Morales asserted in his motion to reopen that, like the alien in
Davey, his 2004 convictions arose from a single incident in which he possessed both
marijuana and drug paraphernalia. Therefore, applying Davey, he argued that he was
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not removable under § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) because his convictions amounted to “a
single offense involving possession for one’s own use of 30 grams or less of
marijuana.”
The BIA denied the motion, concluding “that further consideration of this case
in light of Matter of Davey . . . would [not] alter the disposition reached as to either
the respondent’s removability, or his eligibility for . . . NACARA relief.” Admin. R.
at 3. The Board first determined that, even if Mr. Arriola-Morales was not removable
under § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) because his two convictions were a “single offense,” he
remained removable under § 1227(a)(1)(B) for overstaying his visa. It then decided
that, notwithstanding his argument based on Davey, his 2004 convictions still
rendered him inadmissible under § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) as an alien with a controlled
substance conviction. And given that basis for inadmissibility, he was still required
to demonstrate ten years of continuous physical presence in the United States since
the date of his convictions, yet he remained unable to do so.
We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for an abuse of discretion.
Infanzon v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 1359, 1362 (10th Cir. 2004). “The BIA abuses its
discretion when its decision provides no rational explanation, inexplicably departs
from established policies, is devoid of any reasoning, or contains only summary or
conclusory statements.” Id. (internal quotation mark omitted).
In his petition for review, Mr. Arriola-Morales argues that the BIA should
have reopened his case to consider his claim that his two 2004 convictions are a
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“single offense” under Davey. But he acknowledges the Board’s conclusion that it
was unnecessary to decide that issue because he remains removable under
§ 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) and inadmissible under § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II). Focusing on his
inadmissibility, he then contends that he is eligible for the “one crime” exception in
§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II). Under that section, certain grounds for inadmissibility do not
apply to “an alien who committed only one crime” if the maximum penalty does not
exceed one year and the alien’s sentence did not exceed six months.
Mr. Arriola-Morales maintains that the BIA should have applied Davey’s liberal
construction of the term “single offense” to the term “one crime” as used in § 1182.
But, as the government points out, the “one crime” exception applies only to
inadmissibility based on a crime involving moral turpitude, and not to inadmissibility
based on a controlled substance violation. See id. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(ii) (providing that
“Clause (i)(I),” which refers to “crime[s] involving moral turpitude,” “shall not apply
to an alien who committed only one crime”).
Mr. Arriola-Morales does not otherwise show error in the BIA’s denial of his
motion to reopen. The petition for review is denied.
Entered for the Court
Stephen H. Anderson
Circuit Judge
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