Jacobs v. Ulibarri , 233 F. App'x 790 ( 2007 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
April 23, 2007
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
SHAW N LO UIS JACO BS,
Petitioner - A ppellant,
v. No. 06-2357
RICK LOONEY, W arden; * (D.C. No. CIV-06-469 W J/LCS)
A TTO RN EY G EN ER AL FO R THE (D .N.M .)
STA TE OF N EW M EX IC O,
Respondent - Appellee.
ORDER DENYING A
CERTIFICATE O F APPEALABILITY
Before L UC ER O, HA RTZ and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges.
Shawn Jacobs, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks a certificate of
appealability (“COA”) to appeal the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254habeas petition. For substantially the same reasons set forth by the district court,
we D EN Y a COA and DISM ISS.
On his guilty plea, Jacobs was convicted of receiving or transferring a
stolen vehicle on January 25, 1995. On M arch 29, 2006, Jacobs filed a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus in New M exico state court, which was dismissed as
*
Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2), we grant Jacobs’ motion to correct
the respondent’s name and substitute Rick Looney for Robert Ulibarri as the
appellee in this action.
untimely. After the New M exico Supreme Court denied Jacobs’ subsequent
motion for writ of certiorari, he filed a § 2254 petition in federal district court on
June 5, 2006. A magistrate judge reviewed Jacobs’ petition and concluded it was
time-barred. In his Proposed Findings and Recommended Disposition
(“Recommended Disposition”) filed October 20, 2006, the magistrate judge
explicitly informed the parties they must file any objections within ten days of
service. After receiving no objections, the district court adopted the
Recommended Disposition and dismissed Jacobs’ motion with prejudice. Jacobs
then filed an objection to the Recommended Disposition on December 26, 2006,
contending he did not receive a copy until December 21, 2006. No action was
taken on this objection, and the district court subsequently denied Jacobs a COA.
Jacobs now requests a COA from this court. 1
The State argues that Jacobs’ failure to timely object to the Recommended
Disposition bars him from appealing the final decision of the district court. W e
disagree. Ordinarily, “the failure to make timely objection to the magistrate’s
findings or recommendations waives appellate review of both factual and legal
1
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA ”)
conditions a petitioner’s right to appeal a denial of habeas relief under § 2254
upon a grant of a COA. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). A COA may issue “only if
the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional
right.” § 2253(c)(2). This requires Jacobs to show “that reasonable jurists could
debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been
resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to
deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Slack v. M cDaniel, 529 U.S. 473,
484 (2000) (quotations omitted).
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questions,” however, this rule “need not be applied when the interests of justice
so dictate.” W irsching v. Colorado, 360 F.3d 1191, 1197 (10th Cir. 2004)
(citation and quotation omitted). In W irsching, we declined to apply the waiver
rule in light of a pro se litigant’s “facially plausible” “allegation that he did not
receive the magistrate’s report and recommendation.” Id. at 1198. In crediting
this allegation, we noted the plaintiff had been “a fairly tenacious litigant,” filing
a pro se complaint, motions to appoint counsel, and responses to the defendants’
motions to dismiss and for summary judgment. Id. Jacobs has shown similar
diligence w ith respect to this habeas action, submitting briefs and petitions,
responding to the State’s memoranda, providing notice of his change of address,
and filing a motion to correct the respondent’s name. Because Jacobs’ assertion
that he did not receive a copy of the Recommended Disposition until December
21, 2006 is facially plausible, we conclude the interests of justice support an
exception to our firm waiver rule. W e will therefore consider his application for
a COA .
Nonetheless, we agree with the lower court that Jacobs’ § 2254 petition is
time-barred. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) sets forth the statute of limitations for § 2254
petitions as follow s:
(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a
writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the
judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the
latest of –
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(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the
conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking
such review ;
. . . or
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims
presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due
diligence.
Jacobs’ conviction became final prior to the effective date of AEDPA.
Accordingly, he had until April 24, 1997, to either file his habeas petition or toll
the statute of limitations by filing an application for state post-conviction relief.
See Serrano v. W illiams, 383 F.3d 1181, 1183 (10th Cir. 2004). Jacobs did
neither. He filed his habeas petition in federal court on June 5, 2006, and his first
application for state post-conviction relief on M arch 29, 2006 – almost nine years
after the limitations period had run.
W e further conclude that Jacobs has not met the requirements for equitable
tolling. Equitable tolling “is only available w hen an inmate diligently pursues his
claims and demonstrates that the failure to timely file was caused by
extraordinary circumstances beyond his control.” M arsh v. Soares, 223 F.3d
1217, 1220 (10th Cir. 2000). Nothing in the record indicates that Jacobs faced
extraordinary circumstances that prevented him from pursuing his claims. As
such, equitable tolling would be improper in this case.
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For the reasons set forth above, Jacobs’ request for a COA is DENIED and
his appeal is DISM ISSED. His motion to correct the respondent’s name is
GRANTED.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Carlos F. Lucero
Circuit Judge
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