United States v. Chambers , 383 F. App'x 719 ( 2010 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
June 16, 2010
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
No. 09-8086
v.
(D.C. No. 2:09-CR-00070-ABJ-1)
(D. Wyo.)
CHRISTOPHER CHEYENNE
CHAMBERS,
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRISCOE, Chief Judge, CUDAHY ** and TACHA, Circuit Judges.
Officer Michael Hall of the Powell, Wyoming Police Department stopped
Christopher Chambers because he was driving without tail lights and without all of
his brake lights functioning. During his initial conversation with Chambers, Officer
Hall saw several knives in Chambers’ vehicle. During the subsequent search of the
vehicle, Officer Hall found a pistol and drug paraphernalia. Because Chambers was
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
**
Honorable Richard D. Cudahy, of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals,
sitting by designation.
a felon, Officer Hall arrested him. The entire stop lasted approximately 14 minutes
and 30 seconds. In this appeal, Chambers asks us to determine whether the officer’s
search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
Chambers was charged by indictment with two counts: of being (1) a felon in
possession; and (2) an unlawful user of a controlled substance in possession of a
firearm. Chambers filed a motion to suppress based on Officer Hall’s search of his
vehicle. At the hearing on the motion, the district court found that the officer had
reasonable safety concerns about the knives in Chambers’ car. The district court
therefore upheld the search as a protective sweep. It issued a written order denying
Chambers’ motion for the reasons stated on the record. Chambers entered a
conditional plea of guilty to the felon in possession count; count two was dismissed.
He was sentenced to 15 years’ incarceration and three years of supervised release.
***
The search in question occurred around midnight in June 2008. Officer Hall
saw Chambers’ two-door sport-utility vehicle turn out of a bar parking lot with no
working tail lights and only one working brake light. Officer Hall stopped Chambers’
vehicle and asked Chambers about the lights and his license, registration and
insurance. 1 Chambers did not have the vehicle’s registration or a current insurance
1
The traffic stop, including the officers’ post-search conversation, was
recorded on the officer’s squad car camera and by Officer Hall’s microphone.
Some of the facts recited here are derived from the video, which is part of the
record.
-2-
card.
As he was standing next to Chambers’ door to discuss the problems with
Chambers’ lights, Officer Hall saw two six- to seven-inch knives in the front center
console area, next to Chambers’ arm. He asked Chambers to step out of the vehicle
without the knives, Chambers reached for one, Officer Hall put his hand on his
service weapon and then Chambers complied. Officer Hall directed Chambers to sit
on the curb behind the vehicle. Officer Hall searched Chambers’ vehicle for
accessible weapons so that, eventually, Officer Hall could return Chambers to his
vehicle with the knives placed where Chambers couldn’t easily grab them as he got
back in.
Officer Hall did not frisk Chambers, but asked Chambers if he had weapons
on him and asked Chambers to pull back his shirt so Officer Hall could look at his
waist area; Officer Hall saw no weapons. With Chambers sitting on the curb, Officer
Hall returned to the car and found additional knives. Officer Hall interrupted the
search to call for back up and to verify that Chambers’ license was valid. He learned
that Chambers was on probation for a methamphetamine-related felony and that his
terms of probation included a curfew, which he was violating, and a prohibition on
the use of drugs or alcohol.
Officer James Kelly arrived and administered a portable breath test to
Chambers that came back negative. Officer Hall continued his search. After
completing his search of the front part of the vehicle, Officer Hall then moved the
-3-
passenger’s seat and, behind it, within reach of the driver’s seat, he saw an open
plastic shopping bag, containing a blue bag with a mesh section. Through the blue
mesh bag, Officer Hall saw the handle of a firearm. Officer Hall confirmed with
Chambers that the bag contained a pistol (Chambers initially expressed surprise that
there was a pistol). Officer Hall also saw syringes, glass pipes or tubes in the blue
bag. He told Chambers he was placing him in investigative detention. Chambers ran.
The officers caught him and arrested him.
Chambers now appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress. He
argues that his continued detention while Officer Hall cleared Chambers’ vehicle of
knives was unrelated to the traffic stop, exceeded the reasonable scope of the original
stop and was not based on an articulable, reasonable suspicion that a crime was in
progress. 2 We uphold the district court’s determination. 3
***
In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we review factual findings of
the district court for clear error, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the government, and review de novo the reasonableness of the government’s actions
under the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., United States v. Fox, 600 F.3d 1253, 1257
2
The reasonableness of the initial stop was not at issue before the district
court.
3
Because we conclude that the officer’s search was legitimately based on a
protective search, we do not reach the parties’ arguments about a search justified
by Chambers’ status as a probationer.
-4-
(10th Cir. 2010).
The search of the passenger compartment of an automobile, limited to
those areas in which a weapon may be placed or hidden, is permissible
if the police officer possesses a reasonable belief based on “specific and
articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from
those facts, reasonably warrant” the officers in believing that the
suspect is dangerous and the suspect may gain immediate control of
weapons.
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049 (1983); see also United States v. Palmer, 360
F.3d 1243, 1246 (10th Cir. 2004). Traffic stops are potentially violent encounters
and, therefore, if appropriate facts exist to justify an officer’s concern, a search may
be justified by safety considerations. See, e.g., Ariz. v. Johnson, – U.S. –, 129 S. Ct.
781, 786 (2009) (discussing, inter alia, Md. v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 414 (1997));
United States v. Dennison, 410 F.3d 1203, 1210-11 (10th Cir. 2005) (internal
citations omitted). We conclude that the district court did not err in holding that the
officers had a reasonable suspicion that Chambers was (1) dangerous and (2) may
have gained immediate control of the weapons.
Chambers argues that he was not “dangerous,” inter alia, because Officer Hall
did not pat him down. The D.C. Circuit addressed a similar argument regarding the
officer’s decision to wait to pat down a suspect until after he had placed the
defendant under arrest. See United States v. Christian, 187 F.3d 663, 669 (D.C. Cir.
1999). There, the court rejected the defendant’s argument because the subjective
fears, or lack thereof, of the police officer are irrelevant to whether the encounter is
reasonable for purposes of the Fourth Amendment and because the court does not
-5-
second-guess police officers’ decisions about how best to neutralize threats. See id.
at 669-70; see also Dennison, 410 F.3d at 1213 (rejecting an analogous argument
because the reasonableness inquiry is an objective one). We agree that Officer Hall’s
decision is not inconsistent with a reasonable, objective police officer’s warranted
“belief that his safety or that of others was in danger.” Dennison, 410 F.3d at 1212(quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968)). A vehicle filled with open knives and
a driver’s movement to grab one of the knives after the police officer told him not
to is sufficient basis for a reasonable officer to conclude that placing the driver back
in the vehicle with the weapons where they lay poses a danger to both the officer and
the driver. See, e.g., Palmer, 360 F.3d at 1246 (holding that officers had a reasonable
suspicion that the suspect was “dangerous” because he was speeding in a school zone
and a license check revealed him to be potentially armed and dangerous even though
the police officer did not initially see any weapons in the car); Christian, 187 F.3d
at 669 (“[T]he presence of one weapon may justifiably arouse concern that there may
be more in the vicinity....”).
In addition, the district court properly held that it was reasonable for the
officers to conclude that Chambers could have gained immediate control of the
knives. A suspect may be deemed able to gain access to a weapon even if he is
outside the vehicle containing the weapons and under police control during part of
the search. See, e.g., Long, 464 U.S. at 1051-52; United States v. Vinton, 594 F.3d
14, 20-21 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Palmer, 360 F.3d at 1246-47 (upholding search when
-6-
suspect sitting in patrol car while the officers open his locked glove box); see also
Dennison, 410 F.3d at 1213 (driver was handcuffed and behind the back of his truck
during the search of the truck’s cab but the court found that the suspect might gain
access to the weapons in his vehicle). “The time period during which the detainee
‘may gain immediate control’ is the entire period from the initial stop to the
detainee’s departure.” Palmer, 360 F.3d at 1246 (discussing Long). Chambers’
vehicle had a number of knives, which Chambers acknowledged at oral argument
were all within Chambers’ reach if he were sitting in the driver’s seat. In addition,
unlike some of the defendants discussed above, Chambers was sitting on the curb
without handcuffs and therefore could have stood up and grabbed the unsecured
weapons in the vehicle. The officer’s search was justified as a protective weapons
search.
Chambers argues that the philosophy underpinning Arizona v. Gant affects this
case. Gant held that it is only reasonable to conduct a vehicle search incident to a
lawful arrest if the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the
passenger compartment at the time of the search (or if evidence of the crime might
be found in the vehicle). Gant, – U.S. –, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1718-19 (2009); United
States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1040 (10th Cir. 2009). The goal of a protective
sweep is, in part, to secure a vehicle so that when the defendant is returned to the
vehicle he is not likely to injure the officers. It is that distinction between a search
incident to an arrest and a protective sweep that makes Arizona v. Gant inapplicable.
-7-
See Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1721 (2009) (distinguishing Long); Gant, 129 S. Ct. at
1724 (Scalia, J., concurring) (clarifying that the holding of Long is undisturbed by
Gant); United States v. Vinton, 594 F.3d at 24 n.3 (distinguishing Gant in the case
of a protective sweep search); United States v. Griffin, 589 F.3d 148, 154 n.8 (4th
Cir. 2009) (same). Chambers’ arguments to the contrary are unavailing.
For the foregoing reason, the district court’s order is affirmed.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT,
Richard D. Cudahy
Circuit Judge
-8-