Burgess v. Independent School ( 2003 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
MAY 8 2003
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
SHIRLEY BURGESS;
OWEN HAWZIPTA,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v. No. 02-6208
(D.C. No. 01-CV-1216-C)
INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT (W.D. Okla.)
NO. I-4 OF NOBLE COUNTY
OKLAHOMA, a/k/a Frontier Public
Schools,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before EBEL , HENRY , and MURPHY , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Background
Appellants Shirley Burgess and Owen Hawzipta appeal the district court’s
order granting summary judgment to appellee Independent School District No. I-4
(“the School District”) on their claims that the School District impermissibly
retaliated against them for the exercise of First Amendment rights. Prior to her
termination, Ms. Burgess was the cafeteria manager for the school district, while
Mr. Hawzipta was an art teacher at the high school. The basic underlying facts
are set forth in the district court’s order:
The dispute in this matter arose after students found pornographic
material in a trash dumpster at the school. Hawzipta called the
shipping company and was allegedly told that the high school
principal, Mr. Robinson, had ordered the material. It was eventually
determined that the elementary school principal, Mr. Stidham, had
ordered the material. Mr. Stidham has admitted ordering the
material. Defendant [the School District] terminated Hawzipta for
making false allegations against Mr. Robinson. Hawzipta filed an
action for de novo review of the termination. Following a non-jury
trial the Noble County District Court ordered Hawzipta reinstated.
Hawzipta alleges that when he was reinstated he was not returned to
his former duties as an art teacher but was placed in a position as a
teacher in the in-school suspension program. Burgess asserts she
supported Hawzipta in various meetings and as a result her
employment was terminated.
Aplt. App. at 69-70. Ms. Burgess and Mr. Hawzipta contend that their
termination by the school board, negative performance reviews and/or written
admonishments by Superintendent Shiever, and Mr. Hawzipta’s reinstatement to a
less-desirable position constituted retaliation for the exercise of First Amendment
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rights–namely, expressing their position on the pornography, who had ordered it,
and whether Mr. Hawzipta should have been punished for pointing the finger at
Mr. Robinson. 1
The District Court’s Decision
In granting summary judgment for the School District, the district court
reasoned that to state a claim against the School District under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
appellants would have to show that the retaliation was the result of a longstanding
custom or policy or the action of a final policy maker, citing Jett v. Dallas
Independent School District , 491 U.S. 701, 737 (1989). In Mr. Hawzipta’s case,
the court concluded that Superintendent Shiever was the final policy maker for
purposes of issuing the written admonishments to Mr. Hawzipta. Therefore,
Mr. Hawzipta’s claim did not impermissibly rely on a respondeat superior theory
of liability. The court further concluded, however, that Mr. Hawzipta had not
shown the existence of a federally protected right in that his speech was not on
a matter of public concern.
The district court considered Mr. Hawzipta’s termination and reinstatement
to a less-desirable position only in terms of the due process claim and concluded
that Mr. Hawzipta had no protected property interest in a particular teaching
1
Ms. Burgess also presented the district court with a claim for breach of
contract; however, this claim has been abandoned on appeal.
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assignment. The district court did not consider these actions as they related to the
retaliation claim.
Regarding Ms. Burgess, the court determined that she had failed to show
that the nonrenewal of her contract and/or the written admonishments she
received were part of a policy or custom.
On appeal, Ms. Burgess and Mr. Hawzipta challenge the conclusion that
their speech did not address a matter of public concern and that Ms. Burgess
failed to prove custom or policy. We review a grant of summary judgment
de novo, affirming when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Hysten v. Burlington N. &
Santa Fe Ry. Co., 296 F.3d 1177, 1180 (10th Cir. 2002). We view the evidence
and the inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the party
opposing summary judgment. Hysten, 296 F.3d at 1180.
Ms. Burgess
The legal test for establishing a First Amendment retaliation claim is
(1) did the employee speak on a matter of public concern; (2) did the employee’s
speech interest outweigh the interest of the State as an employer; (3) was the
speech a substantial factor or a motivating factor in the detrimental employment
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decision, and (4) would the employer have taken the same action even in the
absence of the protected speech. Lybrook v. Farmington Mun. Schs. Bd of Educ. ,
232 F.3d 1334, 1338-39 (10th Cir. 2000).
Here, the district court reasoned that the negative performance reviews
given Ms. Burgess and her eventual termination were not part of a policy or
custom or a decision by a final policy maker. This rationale is difficult to
understand in light of the fact that Superintendent Shiever admonished both
Ms. Burgess and Mr. Hawzipta, and the district court did consider these
admonishments to be actions by a final policy maker with respect to
Mr. Hawzipta.
We nonetheless affirm summary judgment for the School District on
Ms. Burgess’ claim on different grounds. While it appears that Ms. Burgess,
who allied herself with Mr. Hawzipta and supported him in conversations with
her acquaintances, was a victim of the political maelstrom surrounding the
pornography issue and Mr. Hawzipta’s termination, it cannot be said that these
actions were taken in retaliation for the exercise of First Amendment rights
because Ms. Burgess did not speak on a matter of public concern.
As we have previously stated, “[i]t is not enough that the subject matter
[of the speech] be of public concern; the content of the expression must also be
of public concern.” Withiam v. Baptist Health Care of Okla., Inc. , 98 F.3d 581,
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583 (10th Cir. 1996). Thus, “[t]o be protected speech, the expression must
‘sufficiently inform the issue as to be helpful to the public in evaluating
the conduct of the government.’” Id. (quoting Wilson v. City of Littleton ,
732 F.2d 765, 768 (10th Cir. 1984)). Here, Ms. Burgess expressed support of
Mr. Hawzipta in private conversations and remained friendly with him throughout
the controversy, but she did not speak at any hearings or meetings, or otherwise
express her views to the larger public. Aplt. App. at 153. While Ms. Burgess
commented on a topic of public interest, there is no evidence indicating that her
comments themselves informed the public debate in any way.
Mr. Hawzipta
Speech on a matter of public concern
Applying the same analysis to Mr. Hawzipta’s claim, however, yields the
opposite result: we conclude that Mr. Hawzipta’s speech touched on a matter of
public concern. After discovering that pornography had been found in the school
dumpster, and that it had apparently been ordered by the high school principal,
Mr. Hawzipta reported his concerns to Superintendent Shiever and demanded an
investigation. He continued to agitate among his co-workers, arguing that action
had to be taken on the issue. The debate over pornography at the school was
covered in local newspapers. When it was determined that the accusation against
Mr. Robinson was false, Mr. Hawzipta was terminated. Later, as part of the
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settlement of a lawsuit by Mr. Robinson over the false accusation, Mr. Hawzipta
was required to take out an ad in a local newspaper apologizing for his
statements.
When Mr. Hawzipta was fired, he contested his termination in court,
ultimately winning reinstatement. By challenging his dismissal and testifying in
court about the fact that he believed the dismissal was inappropriate retaliation
for his speech about the pornography issue, Hawzipta further stirred the pot
regarding the issue of how the school responded to his accusation. Hawzipta’s
challenge of his dismissal thus touched off another round of public debate and
media coverage.
Not only did Mr. Hawzipta’s speech inform the public debate on these
interrelated issues, it is fair to say there would have been no public debate at
all had he not made his provocative statements. We therefore conclude that
Mr. Hawzipta spoke on a matter of public concern.
Detrimental employment decision
The School District alternatively argues, in essence, that there was no
detrimental employment decision because Mr. Hawzipta did not have a property
interest in any particular teaching assignment (i.e., assignment as an art teacher
versus assignment as a monitor in the in-school suspension program).
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The School District does not explain how a property interest/due process
concept is relevant to a First Amendment retaliation claim. The School District
points to no authority stating that retaliation occurs only where an individual is
deprived of a property interest. It is apparent that a school has an inherent right
to terminate employees, reassign them, dispense negative performance reviews,
and eliminate job responsibilities. This does not, however, mean that these
actions can never constitute impermissible retaliation for the exercise of First
Amendment rights.
This point is illustrated by our decision in Schuler v. City of Boulder , 189
F.3d 1304 (10th Cir. 1999). In Schuler , a Boulder Parks & Recreation employee
complained about a janitor who was spying on women in the locker room and who
was only lightly reprimanded when this conduct was discovered. Id. at 1306. Ms.
Schuler’s speech consisted of written complaints to her supervisor, comments to
other employees at a going-away party, a complaint through her union, and
statements to a television news reporter. Id. at 1306-07. 2
In response to these
statements, Ms. Schuler received a written reprimand from a supervisor and a
poor performance review. Id. at 1310. She also had responsibilities removed and
2
Without extensive analysis, we concluded that Ms. Schuler’s speech
touched on a matter of public concern. As in this case, her speech addressed both
a controversial workplace incident and the retaliation against her for speaking out
on that matter.
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was subjected to an unwanted transfer to another position. Id. This court, noting
Supreme Court precedent to the same effect, concluded that “deprivations less
harsh than dismissal [can] nevertheless violate[] a public employee’s rights under
the First Amendment.” Id. at 1309 (citation omitted). We further concluded that
the actions taken against Ms. Schuler were sufficient to defeat the defendant’s
qualified immunity defense on summary judgment. Id. at 1310.
Very similar actions were taken by the School District in the instant case.
Upon termination, Mr. Hawzipta was technically on suspension pending
resolution of his challenge to the termination. The School District nonetheless
hired a permanent replacement art teacher before de novo review of Mr.
Hawzipta’s termination was complete. Once Mr. Hawzipta won the right to be
reinstated, he was assigned to a position which did not engage his specialized
skills and experience as an art teacher and which greatly limited his interaction
with other members of the school community. He suddenly began receiving
negative performance reviews, and his additional duties as coach to the school’s
academic team were eliminated. Under our precedent in Schuler , Mr. Hawzipta
has succeeded in showing that these actions were onerous enough to constitute a
detrimental employment decision.
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Retaliatory motive
In addition to showing that a detrimental employment decision was made,
a plaintiff must show that the speech was a “substantial factor or a motivating
factor” in that decision. Lybrook , 232 F.3d at 1338 (quotation omitted). A jury is
entitled to infer retaliatory motive from the circumstances of the detrimental
employment action. See Ware v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 492 , 881 F.2d 906, 911
(10th Cir. 1989) (jury may rely on circumstantial evidence of retaliatory
motivation), modified on reh’g by 902 F.2d 815 (10th Cir. 1990). Viewing
the events described above in the context of the ongoing and heated conflict
between Mr. Hawzipta and the School District over the School District’s reaction
to the pornography issue, a reasonable jury could conclude that the School
District acted with a retaliatory motive.
Conclusion
The judgment of the United States District Court for the Western District of
Oklahoma is AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED for
further proceedings consistent with this decision.
Entered for the Court
Michael R. Murphy
Circuit Judge
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