Ysais v. State of NM Judicial Standard , 373 F. App'x 863 ( 2010 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
April 16, 2010
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
CHRISTOPHER YNOSENCIO
YSAIS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 09-2109
(D.C. No. 1:08-CV-00449-JB-DJS)
STATE OF NEW MEXICO, (D. N.M.)
JUDICIAL STANDARD
COMMISSION, as an Employee of the
State of New Mexico, and as an
individual; JAMES A. NOEL, in his
official capacity as Executive Director
of Judicial Standard Commission, and
Employee of the State of New Mexico,
and as an individual; DAVID S.
SMOAK, in his official capacity as
Chairman of the Judicial Standard
Commission, and Employee of the
State of New Mexico, and as an
individual; RANDALL D. ROYBAL,
in his official capacity as Deputy
Director/Chief of Staff Attorney of the
Judicial Standard Commission, and
Employee of the State of New Mexico,
and as an individual; BILL
RICHARDSON, in his official
capacity as Governor, and Employee
of State of New Mexico, and as an
individual; THE DISCIPLINARY
BOARD, as an Employee of the State
of New Mexico, and as an individual;
VIRGINIA L. FERRARA, as Chief
Disciplinary Counsel of the
Disciplinary Board, and Employee of
the State of New Mexico, and as an
individual; SECOND JUDICIAL
DISTRICT COURT, and as an
individual; DEBORAH DAVIS
WALKER, in her official capacity as
an Employee of the Second Judicial
District Court, and Employee of State
of New Mexico, and as an individual;
WILLIAM F. LANG, in his official
capacity as an Employee of the Second
Judicial District Court, and Employee
of State of New Mexico, and as an
individual; THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT COURT, and as an
individual; NANCY COLELLA, in her
official capacity as an Employee of
Thirteenth Judicial District Court, and
Employee of the State of New Mexico,
and as an individual; STATE OF NEW
MEXICO COURT OF APPEALS, and
as an individual; A. JOSEPH
ALARID, in his official capacity as an
Employee of the Court of Appeals, and
Employee of State of New Mexico,
and as an individual; CYNTHIA A.
FRY, in her official capacity as an
Employee of the Court of Appeals, and
Employee of State of New Mexico,
and as an individual; CELIA FOY
CASTILLO, in her official capacity as
an Employee of the Court of Appeals,
and Employee of State of New
Mexico, and as an individual,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
(continued...)
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Before LUCERO, PORFILIO, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
This is one of a number of cases filed by Christopher Ynosencio Ysais
seeking to involve the federal courts in his state court child custody matters. The
defendants he sued in this case were in many instances only tangentially involved
with the underlying divorce and custody proceedings from which he alleged
constitutional injury. They included state court judges, state agencies charged
with disciplining attorneys and judges, and state officials. The district court
dismissed Ysais’s complaint, concluding that all the defendants were entitled to
immunity and that he had failed to timely serve defendant Governor Richardson.
He appeals.
In its well-reasoned Memorandum Opinion and Order dated March 31,
2009, the district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss. It concluded
that the state entities and their employees acting in their official capacities were
immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment; that the judges and the hearing
officer Ysais sued were absolutely immune from suit; that Virginia L. Ferrera,
*
(...continued)
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
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Counsel for the Disciplinary Board, was entitled to absolute prosecutorial
immunity; and that Ysais failed to effect proper service of process on Governor
Richardson.
We review de novo (1) the district court’s dismissal of Ysais’s official
capacity claims based on Eleventh Amendment immunity, see Steadfast Ins. Co.
v. Agric. Ins. Co., 507 F.3d 1250, 1253 (10th Cir. 2007); (2) its grant of absolute
immunity to the judges and hearing officer, Gagan v. Norton, 35 F.3d 1473, 1475
(10th Cir. 1994), and (3) its grant of prosecutorial immunity to the Disciplinary
Board counsel, see Arnold v. McClain, 926 F.2d 963, 967 (10th Cir. 1991). We
review dismissals for lack of timely service of process for an abuse of discretion.
Jones v. Frank, 973 F.2d 872, 872 (10th Cir. 1992).
Ysais’s briefing in this court presents many contentions that are irrelevant
to the district court’s determinations concerning immunity and service of process.
Having reviewed his briefs with care, however, and construing them liberally in
light of his pro se status, we discern the following arguments that may be relevant
to the district court’s decision: (1) whether judicial immunity barred his claims
for equitable, declaratory, or injunctive relief; (2) whether the judges involved
acted so plainly without jurisdiction that judicial immunity should have been
denied; (3) whether judicial immunity is constitutional; and (4) whether he should
have been permitted to amend his complaint. None of these arguments has merit.
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1. Equitable, Declaratory, and Injunctive Relief
Judicial officers are explicitly immunized not only against damages but
also against suits for injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Roth v. King,
449 F.3d 1272, 1286-87 (D.C. Cir. 2006). While judicial immunity does not
necessarily foreclose declaratory relief in the appropriate case, Ysais fails to
specify what form declaratory relief would take and his complaint cannot be read
to request declaratory relief in the true legal sense. A declaratory judgment is
meant to define the legal rights and obligations of the parties in anticipation of
some future conduct, not simply to proclaim liability for a past act. See Utah
Animal Rights Coal. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 371 F.3d 1248, 1266 (10th Cir.
2004) (McConnell, J., concurring) (“[A] declaratory judgment action involving
past conduct that will not recur is not justiciable.”). We discern no cognizable
claim for declaratory judgment against judicial officers in Ysais’s complaint.
The Eleventh Amendment bars suits against state agencies, regardless of
whether they seek damages or some other type of relief. Fed. Maritime Comm’n
v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 765 (2002). But it does not bar suits
against a state officer in his official capacity that seek only prospective relief.
Chamber of Commerce v. Edmondson, 594 F.3d 742, 760 (10th Cir. 2010). Here
again, however, Ysais’s complaint does not seek any authentic prospective relief.
The only forward-looking relief he seeks lies in his request that his state custody
proceedings be removed to federal court. But the district court has already denied
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that relief in a separate action by remanding Ysais’s divorce proceeding to state
court. We lack jurisdiction to review its decision to remand. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1447(d).
Assuming prosecutorial immunity permits an exception for injunctive or
declaratory relief, nothing in Ysais’s complaint would justify awarding such
relief. He complains that disciplinary counsel failed to act on or summarily
rejected his complaints against various judges. It is plainly beyond the powers of
the federal courts to order state disciplinary counsel to commence investigative
proceedings. See, e.g., Schroder v. Bush, 263 F.3d 1169, 1175 (10th Cir. 2001)
(noting that prosecutorial discretion is rooted in concept of separation of judicial
and prosecutorial functions); N.M.R.A. 17-105 (outlining prosecutorial duties of
chief disciplinary counsel). Ysais therefore fails to show any entitlement to
prospective relief against disciplinary counsel.
2. Action in Absence of Jurisdiction
To overcome absolute judicial immunity, a plaintiff must demonstrate that
a judge’s actions were either outside the judge’s judicial capacity or were taken in
the complete absence of all jurisdiction. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12
(1991) (per curiam). Ysais’s complaint fails to allege any such actions by the
judges he has sued. While he complains that the state district court continued to
adjudicate his divorce case even after he filed an appeal, the state court’s action
falls short of action taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction. A judge
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acts in the clear absence of all jurisdiction only when he “acts clearly without any
colorable claim of jurisdiction.” Snell v. Tunnell, 920 F.2d 673, 686 (10th Cir.
1990). Moreover, Ysais’s arguments challenging the “domestic relations
exception” to federal jurisdiction are frivolous.
3. Constitutionality of Immunity
Ysais argues that immunity is unconstitutional. He is wrong. Official
immunity is inherently constitutional. See Christensen v. Ward, 916 F.2d 1462,
1465, 1472-73 (10th Cir. 1990) (affirming district court rationale upholding
constitutionality of common law doctrine of immunity).
4. Amendment of Complaint
Ysais argues that the district court should have permitted him to amend his
complaint. He does not disclose how he would have amended it to avoid the
defendants’ immunities or to circumvent the fact that he failed to serve the
complaint on Governor Richardson. Federal courts may dismiss complaints under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) if “it is patently obvious that the
plaintiff could not prevail on the facts alleged, and allowing him an opportunity
to amend his complaint would be futile.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110
(10th Cir. 1991) (quotation omitted). The district court did not err by failing to
permit Ysais to amend his complaint.
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The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. All pending motions are
DENIED.
Entered for the Court
John C. Porfilio
Circuit Judge
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