Rounds v. Corbin ( 2007 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
June 5, 2007
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
JOHN RO UNDS,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
No. 06-1322
v. (D.C. No. 04-CV-2532-W DM -M JW )
(D . Colo.)
D EN N IS C OR BIN ; PA U L
H O LLENBEC K; WILLIA M
ZA LM A N,
Defendants - Appellees.
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before KELLY, M U RPH Y, and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges. **
Plaintiff-Appellant John Rounds, a state inmate appearing pro se, appeals
from the district court’s dismissal of his action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983against D ennis Corbin, Paul Hollenbeck, and W illiam Zalman (collectively
“D efendants”), all of w hom are Colorado prison officials. M r. Rounds’s
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
**
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge
panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material
assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th
Cir. R. 34.1(G). The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
complaint alleged violations of his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel
and unusual punishment and his First Amendment right to freedom of speech.
M ore specifically, he alleged that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to the
safety and well-being of the inmates at the Colorado Territorial Facility (the
facility at which M r. Rounds was housed) when they allowed electrical work at
the facility to be completed not up to code, without the necessary permits, and
without the supervision of a licensed electrician. He alleged that his First
Amendment rights w ere violated when he was transferred to another facility in
retaliation for complaining about the allegedly shoddy electrical work.
On December 16, 2005, Defendants filed two motions to dismiss— one to
dismiss for failure to exhaust and one to dismiss on the merits. See R. Docs. 75,
76. The district court referred both motions to a magistrate judge for a
recommended disposition. See R. Doc. 77. On June 7, 2006, the magistrate judge
recommended that Defendants’ M otion to D ismiss for Failure to Exhaust
Administrative Remedies (R. Doc. 75) be granted in full under our since-defunct
total exhaustion rule, see Jones v. Bock, 127 S. Ct. 910, 925-26 (2007), and
recommended that, in the alternative, the Defendants’ M otion to Dismiss (R. Doc.
76) be granted in part and denied in part. See Rounds v. Corbin, 2006 W L
1832680, at *12 (D. Colo. June 30, 2006). Included within the magistrate judge’s
recommendations was a notice to M r. Rounds, written in bold-faced type, that he
had “ten (10) days after service of this recommendation to serve and file written,
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specific objections to the above recommendation with the District Judge assigned
to the case.” See R. Doc. 121 at 23. It also notified him that failure to file
detailed objections within ten days would result in his waiving “de novo review
of the recommendation by the District Judge” and “appellate review of both
factual and legal questions.” See id.M r. Rounds filed a motion for extension of time to file objections to the
magistrate’s report and recommendation on June 22, 2006, along with several
other motions. See R. Doc. 126, 123-125, 127. In it he claimed that he needed
more time because he is untrained at the law and had limited access to a law
library. R. Doc. 126 at 1. The district court denied M r. Rounds’s request for
additional time the next day, on June 23, 2006, because the case was set to go to
trial on July 10, 2006. See R. Doc. 129. Having not heard further from M r.
Rounds regarding the recommendations, the district court adopted it on June 30,
2006, thereby dismissing M r. Rounds’s complaint in full for failure to exhaust.
See Rounds, 2006 W L 1832680, at *12. Finally, on July 3, 2006, M r. Rounds
filed objections to the magistrate’s recommendations.
M r. Rounds filed a notice of appeal on July 28, 2006. On August 3, 2006,
we ordered him to, within forty days, serve and file an opening brief on the merits
addressing: “W hether the plaintiff waived appellate review by failing to timely
file objections to the magistrate judge’s recommendation.” On September 11,
2006, M r. Rounds filed “Appellant’s Ordered Show Cause Brief,” in which he
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argues that he needed additional time to file his objections to the
recommendations because he is untrained in the law and had limited access to a
law library. He also argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying
his request for additional time to file objections. Our jurisdiction arises under 28
U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm in part and reverse in part.
“[W]e have adopted a firm waiver rule when a party fails to object to the
findings and recommendations of the magistrate.” M oore v. United States, 950
F.2d 656, 659 (10th Cir. 1991). The Supreme Court has sanctioned the adoption
of such a rule, see Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 155 (1985), and pursuant to it
“the failure to make timely objection to the magistrate’s findings or
recommendations waives appellate review of both factual and legal questions,”
M oore, 950 F.2d at 659. The firm waiver rule, however, does not apply (1) when
a pro se litigant was not notified of the time period for filing an objection and the
consequences for failing to do so, (2) when the interests of justice warrant, or (3)
when the party that failed to object makes a showing of plain error. See W ardell
v. Duncan, 470 F.3d 954, 958 (10th Cir. 2006); M orales-Fernandez v. INS, 418
F.3d 1116, 1119 (10th Cir. 2005); W irsching v. Colorado, 360 F.3d 1191, 1197
(10th Cir. 2004).
M r. Rounds did not file timely objections to the magistrate judge’s
recommendations. W e find no abuse of discretion by the district court in denying
his motion for an extension of time to file such objections— the case was days
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away from trial and the recommendations could obviate the need for a trial.
M oreover, we note that M r. Rounds was able to file several other pleadings
contemporaneously with his motion for an extension of time. That leaves the
exceptions to the firm waiver rule.
M r. Rounds was given proper notice by the magistrate judge regarding the
need to file objections so that exception does not apply. See R. Doc. 121 at 23.
M r. Rounds also has not persuaded us that the interests of justice require
consideration of the merits. The fact that he is not an attorney or lacks free
access to a law library does not prove sufficient on this record. M r. Rounds
admits that the law library was open two days a week and a review of the
objections he eventually filed (six days late and after the district court’s
consideration of the matter) reveals that only one prior precedent was relied upon
and that most of the objections presented were based on information readily
available to M r. Rounds even in the absence of a law library. See generally R.
Doc. 135; cf. M arsh v. Soares, 223 F.3d 1217, 1221 (10th Cir. 2000) (declining
equitable tolling based on lack of access to a law library because petitioner had
“not shown how this lack of access caused his delay in filing”).
That leaves only the exception for plain error. Under plain error analysis,
M r. Rounds must establish (1) an error (2) that is plain (3) that affects his
substantial rights, and (4) that seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public
reputation of judicial proceedings. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725,
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732-34 (1993); M orales-Fernandez, 418 F.3d at 1122-23. Having reviewed the
record, including M r. Rounds’s untimely objections to the magistrate’s
recommendation, we conclude that only one aspect of that resolution constitutes
error that is plain— reliance on the total exhaustion rule. See Johnson v. United
States, 520 U.S. 461, 468 (1997). However, this reliance prejudiced M r. Rounds
only on one claim— his First Amendment retaliation claim against Defendant
Corbin— because the magistrate apparently viewed that claim as exhausted, 1 but
nonetheless dismissed it pursuant to the now-defunct total exhaustion rule. The
remaining claims were dismissed pursuant to the Defendants’ motion and the
magistrate’s determination that they had not been properly exhausted, and that
conclusion does not constitute plain error. Because it appears that the claim
would not have been dismissed otherwise and it should be resolved in the first
instance at the district court, we will exercise our discretion to notice plain error
only with respect to M r. Rounds’s First Amendment retaliation claim against M r.
Corbin. Consequently, our firm waiver rule does not apply and we reverse the
district court’s dismissal of that claim on exhaustion grounds.
In sum, we A FFIRM the district court’s dismissal with respect to M r.
1
See R. Doc. 75 at 8 (State Defendants’ M otion to Dismiss [for] Failure to
Exhaust Administrative Remedies) (“Frankly, the State D efendants are not sure
whether plaintiff filed a grievance and exhausted his administrative remedies
against defendant Corbin for his alleged conduct in claim two.”); Roberts v.
Barreras, __F.3d__, 2007 W L 1113956, at *4 (10th Cir. 2007) (explaining that
defendants have the burden of raising failure to exhaust).
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Rounds’s Eighth A mendment claim against all Defendants and his First
Amendment retaliation claim against M r. Hollenbeck and M r. Zalman. W e
REVERSE the district court’s dismissal with respect to M r. Rounds’s First
Amendment retaliation claim against M r. Corbin and REM AND for further
proceedings. W e GRANT IFP status and remind M r. Rounds of his obligation to
make partial payments until the filing fee is paid. Appellant’s “M otion for
Declatory [sic] Judgment” is denied.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
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