United States v. Marcks ( 1997 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
APR 8 1997
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 96-8052
(D.C. No. 95-CR-91-B)
THOMAS DEAN MARCKS, (District of Wyoming)
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Before PORFILIO, LUCERO, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
Defendant Thomas Marcks appeals his conviction for conspiracy to manufacture a
controlled substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846; attempted manufacture of a
controlled substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846; and possession of a
listed substance with intent to manufacture a controlled substance, in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 841(d). Mr. Marcks contends the district court erred in denying his motion for a
mistrial after the admission of evidence of prior crimes and his motion to suppress
evidence seized with an overly broad search warrant. We affirm.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. This court generally disfavors the
citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under
the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
I.
Mr. Marcks and codefendant Charles Northcott conspired to manufacture
methcathinone using a makeshift laboratory set up in Mr. Northcott’s girlfriend’s
apartment in Jackson, Wyoming. Shortly after the defendants’ arrival in Jackson,
however, Sergeant Alan John of the Jackson Police Department received a tip that an
individual named Tom Marcks was in the Jackson area with someone named “Chuck,”
staying at an apartment in the Cottonwood Park neighborhood that belonged to Chuck and
his girlfriend, Jo Anne Barbour. The informant reported that Mr. Marcks was driving a
silver, two-door automobile with stolen Wyoming license plates, that Mr. Marcks was
wanted by law enforcement authorities, and that Mr. Marcks and Chuck intended to
manufacture methamphetamine.
Sergeant John and Sergeant Scott Hughes then attempted to corroborate the tip.
They discovered that a Jo Anne Barbour did live in the Cottonwood Park neighborhood at
2000 Corner Creek, and observed a silver, two-door Toyota at the residence. A vehicle
check revealed the license plates belonged to a BMW and the car was registered to
Thomas Marcks. Further investigation uncovered an outstanding warrant for Mr. Marcks
issued in Utah for a parole violation.
Armed with this information, Sergeant John prepared an affidavit and obtained a
warrant to search Ms. Barbour’s apartment for the person of Thomas Marcks. During the
course of Mr. Marcks’ arrest, officers noticed chemicals and equipment associated with
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the manufacture of drugs in the apartment. Concerned with the potential danger
presented by the chemicals, Sergeant Hughes contacted a chemist from the state crime
laboratory and described his observations. The chemist confirmed Sergeant Hughes’
suspicion that officers had discovered a clandestine lab and advised that the residence be
secured and ventilated until the lab could be dismantled. Sergeant Hughes prepared
another affidavit, and a second warrant was issued authorizing seizure of the drug
paraphernalia.
At trial, Mr. Northcott testified for the government pursuant to a plea agreement.
The following exchange occurred during his testimony:
Q. Before we get into that, you ever use drugs with the defendant?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I object as Rule 404, Your Honor, and ask the
jury to disregard the question.
THE COURT: Does it come under any of the exceptions under Rule 404?
Is this what you’re doing?
[GOVERNMENT]: Your Honor, I think, if anything, it’s inextricably
intertwined with this whole course of events, Your Honor, goes to the
nature of the relationship that was between this defendant and -- or this
witness and the defendant. I suppose I could -- you could -- I could argue
that it goes to intent. It goes to knowledge.
THE COURT: Well, I’ll admit it under 404(b) as to evidence of other
crimes and wrongs that may be admissible for the purposes of proof of
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge or indemnity [sic].
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Next, despite a pretrial order in limine precluding testimony about Mr. Marcks’
prior Utah felony conviction, the government elicited the following testimony from
Sergeant Hughes:
Q. Tell the jury, please, how it was that you first became involved in this
case.
A. During that week in September . . . Investigator John at the time --
advised me of the possibility of a gentleman by the name of Mr. Marcks
being in the Teton County area --
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Object to Rule 802 and confrontation, Your
Honor.
THE COURT: Overruled.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Also cumulative.
THE COURT: Overruled.
A. -- advised me that a gentleman by the name of Mr. Marcks would be in
the Teton County area, which is covered by our enforcement team, and that
he was a wanted felon, and that he was there for the purpose of establishing
-- setting up --
Defense counsel requested a mistrial, arguing the officer’s testimony had violated the
court’s order in limine. The government maintained the order precluded testimony
concerning the underlying felony charge, not the fact of the conviction itself. The district
court agreed and denied defense counsel’s motion.
II.
Mr. Marcks contends the district court abused its discretion in admitting evidence
of his drug use and his prior felony conviction because the evidence constituted character
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evidence prohibited under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). He further argues the introduction of
prior bad acts evidence was so prejudicial that the district court committed error in
denying his motion for a mistrial. We review the district court’s admission of prior
crimes evidence for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Wacker, 72 F.3d 1453, 1468
(10th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 136 (1996).
Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) provides:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It
may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of
mistake or accident . . . .
A determination of the admissibility of Rule 404(b) evidence is guided by a four-part test
requiring that (1) the evidence was offered for a proper purpose, (2) the evidence was
relevant, (3) the probative value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by its
potential for unfair prejudice, and (4) the district court, upon request, submitted a limiting
instruction. Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 691-92 (1988); United States v.
Hill, 60 F.3d 672, 676 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 432 (1995). We consider the
prior bad acts and prior conviction separately.
Our review under the purpose prong of the Huddleston test is complicated by the
failure of both the government and the district court to state with any precision the
purpose for admitting evidence of Mr. Marcks’ prior drug use. In response to Mr.
Marcks’ objection at trial, the government offered three alternatives for admission and the
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court admitted the evidence under an all-encompassing restatement of the rule. We have
rejected a sweeping application of the exceptions to Rule 404(b). In United States v.
Biswell, 700 F.2d 1310 (10th Cir. 1983), we instructed that
[s]uch purpose should have been clearly identified and a broad statement
invoking the Rule does not suffice. The burden is on the Government
which “must carry the burden of showing how the proffered evidence is
relevant to one or more issues in the case; specifically, it must articulate
precisely the evidential hypothesis by which a fact of consequence may be
inferred from the other acts evidence.”
Id. at 1317 (quoting United States v. Mehrmanesh, 689 F.2d 822, 830 (9th Cir. 1982)).
Without a more reasoned explanation from the government or the court, we are at a
loss to understand the application of any of Rule 404(b)’s exceptions to this evidence.
Even assuming Mr. Marcks’ entire defense was a lack of knowledge of the substance to
be manufactured, his use of marijuana and methamphetamine does not demonstrate he
understood the chemical properties of and procedure for manufacturing methcathinone.
The government asserts that Mr. Marcks’ drug use falls within the exceptions because it
“is highly relevant . . . to prove the nature of the trusting relationship between the
conspirators.” We are underwhelmed. The argument still fails to identify an allowable
purpose under 404(b). Any relevance of that evidence does nothing to illuminate its
purpose, and proof of the nature of codefendants’ relationships does not qualify as an
enumerated exception. If the government means to suggest the evidence serves as proof
of a plan, that argument is even less compelling. Evidence of sharing a marijuana
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cigarette is no more linked to a conspiracy to manufacture methcathinone than evidence
of sharing a bottle of whiskey would be linked to a conspiracy to create an illegal still.
The government’s “res gestae” theory fails for the same reason. Drug use is not, as
the government maintains, “part and parcel” of a conspiracy to manufacture drugs.1 The
government’s reliance on United States v. Kimball, 73 F.3d 269 (10th Cir. 1995), to
support this proposition is misplaced. In Kimball, we allowed the introduction of
testimony concerning defendant’s recent incarceration and limited income source as
evidence of defendant’s involvement in an armed bank robbery. Offered as proof of
motive and intent, the evidence was used to reconstruct the crime and prove its specific
elements. Id. at 272.
That is not the case here. Mr. Marcks’ drug use had no value as evidence proving
he conspired to manufacture methcathinone. The evidence could only serve to
incriminate Mr. Marcks’ character, to portray him as a drug user who acted in conformity
1
The government’s claim that the evidence of drug use revealed the development
of the manufacturing conspiracy is not borne out by Mr. Northcott’s testimony. In
response to the government’s rather suggestive query, “[w]as it while you were using
drugs with the defendant that you started to talk about this plan to get chemicals and so
on,” Mr. Northcott stated:
Yeah. It was right -- I just got out of -- like I said, I got out of the rehab and
I went out and -- I mean, I’d only been out like a day and I started using the
drugs. I had the recipe and it looked like a pretty easy way for me to get
back on my feet after being in jail for six months, make some money. And I
-- yeah, basically we just started hustling.
At best, Mr. Northcott’s answer is entirely ambiguous.
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with his character by manufacturing drugs. This is precisely the type of evidence
proscribed by Rule 404. See United States v. Wilson, ___ F.3d ___, 1997 WL 71659, at
*11 (10th Cir. Feb. 20, 1997); Biswell, 700 F.2d at 1318. We believe the limited
probative value of Mr. Marcks’ prior drug use is substantially outweighed by the
significant potential for prejudice from its introduction. See Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 691(trial court must determine under Fed. R. Evid. 403 whether the evidence’s probative
value is substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice). Furthermore, the
court issued no limiting instruction explaining the discrete purpose for which the evidence
was introduced. For these reasons, we conclude the district court abused its discretion in
admitting this evidence.
Admission of Mr. Marcks’ prior conviction is similarly flawed. The district court
issued its order in limine precluding testimony about the conviction in response to the
government’s concession to defendant’s motion. Consequently, the court made no
independent findings assessing the relevance or prejudicial effect of the evidence. In
admitting Sergeant Hughes’ testimony, the court merely concluded the mention of Mr.
Marcks’ prior conviction did not violate the order. The government now contends
introduction of Mr. Marcks’ status as a felon was required to place the officers’ actions in
context. We are unpersuaded by this argument.
First, the evidence has no connection to any elements of the offenses with which
Mr. Marcks was charged; his felony conviction, therefore, sheds no light on the question
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of his guilt or innocence. And because admission of a prior felony conviction carries
even greater risk of prejudice than evidence of drug use, any potential probative value is
substantially outweighed by prejudicial effect. See id.Second, to the extent the government felt it necessary to provide the jury with an
extended exposition of police activity, it took that opportunity, with no objection from
Mr. Marcks, through Sergeant John’s testimony that Mr. Marcks was “wanted for some
type of warrants.” We can discern no possible reason to further specify the nature of the
warrant except to overzealously introduce damaging character evidence against Mr.
Marcks. See Wacker, 72 F.3d at 1472. Accordingly, we conclude the admission of this
evidence was, similarly, an abuse of the district court’s discretion.
Our determination that the evidence of prior crimes was not justified under a Rule
403 or 404(b) balancing test does not end our inquiry, however. Because the error in
admitting the evidence does not implicate a constitutional right, the error is harmless
“unless it had a ‘substantial influence’ on the outcome or leaves one in ‘grave doubt’ as to
whether it had such effect.” United States v. Flanagan, 34 F.3d 949, 955 (10th Cir.
1994) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 (1946)). We review the
record de novo to evaluate the effect of the evidence on the jury’s verdict “in the context
of the entire case against [defendant].” Wilson, ___ F.3d at ___, 1997 WL 71659, at *11
(quoting United States v. Short, 947 F.2d 1445, 1455 (10th Cir. 1991)).
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The record reveals the government introduced starkly overwhelming evidence of
Mr. Marcks’ guilt. Mr. Marcks was essentially caught red-handed -- laboratory
equipment and chemicals were seized from his temporary residence while he was present
and the manufacturing process was underway. At the time of his arrest, he made
incriminating statements to the officers. Furthermore, Mr. Northcott testified extensively
concerning their plan to manufacture drugs, and much of his testimony was corroborated
by physical evidence. We believe the admission of Mr. Marcks’ prior conviction and
drug use did not substantially influence the jury’s verdict. Accordingly, we hold the
district court’s error in admitting the evidence was harmless. See Wilson, ___ F.3d at
___, 1997 WL 71659, at *12; United States v. Sloan, 65 F.3d 861, 865 (10th Cir. 1995)
(“[w]here the evidence against a defendant is overwhelming, any error in mentioning a
defendant’s criminal record is harmless”), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 824 (1996).
III.
Mr. Marcks argues the first search warrant, authorizing seizure of his person, was
“a general warrant issued without probable cause for the discovery and seizure of
property,” and the illegality of that warrant rendered the subsequent search warrant
invalid. We disagree.
In determining whether a search warrant was properly issued, the extent of our
inquiry is whether the issuing magistrate or judge had a substantial basis for finding
probable cause. United States v. Cusumano, 83 F.3d 1247, 1250 (10th Cir. 1996) (en
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banc). In this instance, the initial warrant authorized officers to search the residence at
2000 Corner Creek for the limited purpose of apprehending Mr. Marcks. Officers had
received information from an informant that Mr. Marcks was staying at a particular
residence, that he was a fugitive, and that he was involved in drug activity. After
verifying nearly every detail of the tip, Sergeant John prepared an affidavit setting forth
his knowledge of the situation. Based on the totality of the circumstances, see Illinois v.
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983); Cusumano, 83 F.3d at 1250, the judge’s probable cause
determination was substantially supported by the evidence.
The warrant is not a general warrant. The Fourth Amendment requires warrants to
describe with particularity the things to be seized, so that “nothing is left to the discretion
of the officer executing the warrant.” United States v. Robertson, 21 F.3d 1030, 1033
(10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 197 (1995). Generally, a warrant is sufficiently
specific when “it enables the searcher to reasonably ascertain and identify the things
authorized to be seized.” United States v. Janus Industries, 48 F.3d 1548, 1554 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 87 (1995). It is difficult to imagine how the first warrant
could have described with more particularity the object of the search.2 The warrant was
2
The warrant provided in relevant part:
Affidavit having been made before me by Alan John, that he has reason to
believe that on the premises described in Exhibit A . . . there is now being
concealed a certain person, to wit: see Exhibit B attached hereto and made a
part hereof:
(continued...)
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sufficiently specific, alerting officers to the person to be seized and the scope of the
search.
Mr. Marcks’ challenge to the validity of the second warrant is premised upon the
assumption the first warrant’s infirmities precluded it from serving as a basis for a second
warrant. That was not the case. The first warrant, supported by probable cause and
sufficiently specific, legally authorized the officers to enter Mr. Marcks’ temporary
residence. While executing that warrant, officers observed in plain view items associated
with the manufacture of illegal drugs. See Harden v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136-37
(1990); United States v. Lang, 81 F.3d 955, 967 (10th Cir. 1996). The district court
found these observations “gave the police more than adequate probable cause to apply for
a second warrant authorizing them to search the apartment for materials related to the
production and distribution of illicit drugs.” We find no reason to disturb that conclusion.
IV.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
2
(...continued)
....
YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED to search the place named for the
person specified . . . and if the person be found there to seize him, and
prepare a written inventory of the person and any property seized.
Exhibit B provided the additional information that “The Person to Be Seized” was
Thomas Marcks.
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ENTERED FOR THE COURT
John C. Porfilio
Circuit Judge
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