United States v. Tidwell ( 2006 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
February 2, 2006
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
No. 05-7018
v. (Eastern District of Oklahoma)
(D.C. No. CR-04-42-WH)
CLIFTON L. TIDWELL,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRISCOE, LUCERO and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). This case is, therefore,
ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
I. Introduction
Appellant Clifton Tidwell pleaded guilty to possession of child
pornography. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Oklahoma sentenced him to twenty-seven months’ imprisonment, based in part on
a two-level enhancement for possession of material involving a prepubescent
minor or a minor under the age of twelve years and a two-level enhancement for
possession of at least ten images, but fewer than 150 images. Tidwell objected to
the facts contained in the Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) that were
used to support the enhancements. The district court overruled the objection and
relied solely on the facts stated in the PSR in applying the enhancement for the
age of the children depicted in the images. Tidwell appealed. We exercise
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). Because the
district court failed to find the facts necessary to support the enhancement
regarding the children’s ages by a preponderance of the evidence when those facts
were contested by Tidwell, we reverse and remand for resentencing.
II. Background
Tidwell was charged in a two-count indictment with transportation of child
pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(1) (Count One) and possession
of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) (Count Two). In
accordance with an oral plea agreement, Tidwell pleaded guilty to Count Two and
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the government dismissed Count One. Count Two of the indictment alleged,
“[f]rom about April 30, 2003, until about February 19, 2004, Tahlequah,
Oklahoma, in the Eastern District of Oklahoma, and elsewhere, Clifton L.
Tidwell, defendant herein, did knowingly possess a computer system containing at
least 12 computer images of child pornography and at least five video movies of
child pornography . . . .” During the plea colloquy in district court, Tidwell
provided the following factual basis for his guilty plea: “Before February 2004 in
Cherokee County, which is in the Eastern District of Oklahoma, I possessed a
computer that contained images of child pornography which I had downloaded
from the Internet. I understand by downloading the images from the Internet they
affected interstate commerce.” The district court inquired whether Tidwell
knowingly possessed the computer disk, and Tidwell replied that he did.
Prior to sentencing, the probation officer prepared a PSR applying the 2003
edition of the United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual (“USSG” or
“Guidelines”). Pursuant to USSG § 2G2.4(a), Tidwell’s base offense level was
fifteen. The PSR recommended three, two-level enhancements for: (1) possession
of material involving a prepubescent minor or a minor under the age of twelve
years pursuant to USSG § 2G2.4(b)(1); (2) possession of material resulting from
defendant’s use of a computer pursuant to USSG § 2G2.4(b)(3); and (3)
possession of at least ten images, but fewer than 150 images pursuant to USSG §
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2G2.4(b)(5)(A). The enhancement for the age of the children depicted in the
pornographic materials was based on a statement by Tidwell to an FBI agent that,
in his opinion, the children pictured were between the ages of six and sixteen.
The enhancement for the number of images was based on the twelve images of
child pornography found in Tidwell’s Yahoo! online folder when his computer
was seized by the FBI and the language of the indictment. The PSR also
recommended a three-level downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility,
bringing Tidwell’s total offense level to eighteen. Tidwell was assigned a
criminal history category of I, resulting in a Guidelines range of twenty-seven to
thirty-three months’ imprisonment.
Tidwell filed written objections to the PSR based on Blakely v. Washington,
542 U.S. 296 (2004). Specifically, Tidwell asserted the enhancements based on
the age of the children depicted in the pornographic materials and the number of
images violated Blakely because they were based upon facts not charged in the
indictment or admitted by him. At the sentencing hearing, which took place after
the Supreme Court issued its opinion in United States v. Booker, Tidwell again
objected to the enhancements under USSG §§ 2G2.4(b)(1) and (b)(5)(A). 125 S.
Ct. 738 (2005). Defense counsel stated:
[T]he factual basis that [Tidwell] provided [in his guilty plea] . . . did
not provide some of the enhancements that were considered in the
guideline computation in the presentence report, and we object to
those being considered in as much as there’s never been a jury
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finding or a statement by the defendant admitting those. And I think
that is something that was addressed by Booker and Fanfan . . . that
unless there’s been a jury finding or an admission by the defendant to
certain sentencing factors that they should not be considered in the
computation of the guidelines even though the guidelines are
ultimately advisory before the Court. I think that it’s important for
Mr. Tidwell to have the Court make a finding as to exactly what the
basis is . . . .
The government offered to provide the district court with copies of the
pornographic materials Tidwell possessed so the court could make findings
regarding the enhancements. The district court declined, stating “that’s why I
have a probation officer so I don’t have to do that.” The district court
subsequently overruled Tidwell’s objection and found that “the presentence report
forms the factual basis for the sentence today.” The district court adopted the
Guidelines application in the PSR and sentenced Tidwell to twenty-seven months’
imprisonment.
III. Discussion
Tidwell challenges his sentence on the ground that the district court erred
in relying on contested facts contained in the PSR to support the sentencing
enhancements instead of requiring the government to prove the contested facts by
a preponderance of the evidence. Although Tidwell framed his objection to the
enhancements as a Booker challenge, this case actually involves general
sentencing error, not Booker error, because the district court applied the
Guidelines as advisory only.
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The government bears the burden of proving sentencing enhancements.
United States v. Yarnell, 129 F.3d 1127, 1136 (10th Cir. 1997). At sentencing,
the district court may rely on facts stated in the PSR to support an enhancement
unless those facts are objected to by the defendant. 1 United States v. Keifer, 198
F.3d 798, 800 (10th Cir. 1999). When a defendant objects to a fact in the PSR,
the government must prove that fact at the sentencing hearing by a preponderance
of the evidence. Id. “[A] district court may not satisfy its obligation [to find
contested facts supporting a sentencing enhancement] by simply adopting the
presentence report as its finding.” United States v. Farnsworth, 92 F.3d 1001,
1011 (10th Cir. 1996).
After reviewing the record, including the transcript of the sentencing
hearing, we conclude Tidwell’s objection contested the facts contained in the PSR
and used to support the enhancements. Specifically, Tidwell argued he had not
admitted facts regarding the ages of the children depicted in the pornographic
materials or the number of images he possessed in his plea colloquy before the
district court. Tidwell did, however, admit the facts necessary to support the
enhancement for the number of images possessed. Count Two of the indictment,
1
In United States v. Bass, we held a defendant’s failure to object to a fact in
the PSR does not operate as an admission of that fact “for purposes of the rights
announced in Booker.” 411 F.3d 1198, 1204 n.7 (10th Cir. 2005). Because this
case does not involve Booker error and we conclude Tidwell properly objected to
the relevant facts in the PSR, Bass is not applicable.
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to which Tidwell pleaded guilty, alleged Tidwell “knowingly possess[ed] a
computer system containing at least 12 computer images of child pornography.”
Tidwell’s guilty plea is sufficient to support the district court’s application of the
two-level enhancement for possession of more than ten images, but fewer than
150 images. See United States v. Hill, 53 F.3d 1151, 1155 (10th Cir. 1995) (en
banc) (holding that a defendant who pleads guilty admits all the well-pleaded
facts in the indictment).
The ages of the children depicted in the images, however, was neither
alleged in the indictment, nor discussed by Tidwell in the plea colloquy. The
facts supporting the enhancement regarding the children’s ages came solely from
the PSR. Because Tidwell objected to the facts in the PSR supporting this
enhancement, the government was required to prove, and the district court was
required to find, those facts by a preponderance of the evidence before imposition
of the enhancement. See Keifer, 198 F.3d at 800. Although the government
offered to produce the images possessed by Tidwell to support the enhancement,
the district court instead chose to rely solely on the facts as stated in the PSR. In
merely adopting the contested facts contained in the PSR to support the
enhancements, the district court erred. See Farnsworth, 92 F.3d at 1011.
Tidwell argues the government should be prevented from presenting the
pornographic materials to support the enhancement on remand because the
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government acknowledged it routinely tries to avoid putting such materials into
evidence, presumably to protect the victims. When a case is remanded for
resentencing, however, the district court must begin anew with de novo
proceedings. United States v. Moore, 83 F.3d 1231, 1234 (10th Cir. 1996). The
district court is permitted to receive “any relevant evidence the court could have
heard at the first sentencing hearing.” Id. (quotation omitted). Therefore, the
government is entitled to present the pornographic materials possessed by Tidwell
at resentencing.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE and REMAND for resentencing.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Michael R. Murphy
Circuit Judge
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