Maggard v. Gammon ( 2003 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FEB 5 2003
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
RUSSELL R. MAGGARD,
Petitioner - Appellant,
No. 02-3177
v. D.C. No. 01-CV-3081-DES
(D. Kansas)
JAMES A. GAMMON, Warden;
CARLA STOVALL, Attorney General
of Kansas,
Respondents - Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before KELLY, McKAY, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges. **
Petitioner-Appellant Russell R. Maggard, a state inmate appearing pro se,
seeks a certificate of appealability (“COA”) allowing him to appeal the district
court’s order denying relief on his petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2254. Because Mr. Maggard has failed to make “a substantial
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. This court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
**
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge
panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material
assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th
Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
showing of the denial of a constitutional right” as required by 28 U.S.C. §
2253(c)(2), we deny his request and dismiss the appeal.
Mr. Maggard was convicted by a jury in Kansas state court of two counts of
arson. He was sentenced to two consecutive terms of five to ten years
imprisonment, which was then doubled under the Kansas Habitual Criminal Act,
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-4504, to consecutive terms of ten to twenty years. On direct
appeal, the Kansas Court of Appeals (“KCOA”) affirmed Mr. Maggard’s
conviction but remanded the case for resentencing because, in the court’s view,
the trial court imposed a habitual criminal increase without competent evidence of
Mr. Maggard’s prior convictions. On remand, the trial court imposed the same
sentence but “without articulating a statutory basis for its discretionary
conclusion,” State v. Maggard, No. 71,558 (Kan. Ct. App. Feb 3, 1995) (quoted at
R. Doc. 8 at 6), and so the case was again remanded by the KCOA for
resentencing. Finally, the trial court resentenced Mr. Maggard to the same term,
and the KCOA affirmed the sentence in 1998. State v. Maggard, 953 P.2d 1379(Kan. Ct. App. 1998). Mr. Maggard’s post-conviction appeal to the Kansas state
courts was unsuccessful, Maggard v. State, 11 P.3d 89 (Kan. Ct. App. 2000), and
he filed a request for federal habeas relief in 2001.
Mr. Maggard raised four claims before the federal district court and
reasserts them on appeal: (1) the failure to bring him to trial within the time
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provisions of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act (“IAD”), 18 U.S.C. App.
§ 2, violated his constitutional rights, (2) the trial court’s failure to conduct an
evidentiary hearing prior to introduction of prior bad acts evidence violated his
due process rights, (3) ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, and (4)
ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
We have carefully reviewed Mr. Maggard’s brief, the district court’s
thorough disposition, and the record on appeal. Nothing in the facts, the record
on appeal, or Petitioner’s brief raises an issue which meets our standards for the
grant of a COA. For substantially the same reasons as set forth by the district
court in its order of April 22, 2002, R. Doc. 8, we cannot say “that reasonable
jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should
have been resolved in a different manner.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484
(2000) (quotations omitted).
In particular, Mr. Maggard relies upon New York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110(2000), as supporting the notion that a violation of the IAD is cognizable under
§ 2254. The case came to the Supreme Court from the New York Court of
Appeals, and held that defense counsel could waive a defendant’s speedy trial
rights under the IAD. Hill, 528 U.S. at 114. It does not directly or by implication
suggest that an IAD violation is cognizable under § 2254. Even if we were to so
find, Mr. Maggard has not alleged facts sufficient to support a “substantial
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showing of the denial of a constitutional right” as required by 28 U.S.C. §
2253(c)(2). Absent here is any showing of “special circumstances” that drive the
IAD violations–if in fact they occurred–to the level of depriving Mr. Maggard of
some constitutionally protected right. Greathouse v. United States, 655 F.2d
1032, 1034 (10th Cir. 1981).
So also Mr. Maggard’s objections to the trial court’s admission of prior bad
acts evidence do not rise to the level of denial of a constitutional right, and mere
errors of state law cannot form the basis for habeas relief. See Estelle v.
McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991) (“[F]ederal habeas corpus relief does not lie for
errors of state law.”) (citations omitted). This court will not, as a general matter,
revisit state court evidentiary rulings “unless the rulings in question rendered the
trial so fundamentally unfair as to constitute denial of federal constitutional
rights.” Moore v. Marr, 254 F.3d 1235, 1246 (10th Cir. 2001) (quotation
omitted).
Finally, Mr. Maggard’s ineffective assistance claims were rejected by the
Kansas Supreme Court due to a procedural bar, and, because the decision of the
state court rested on an “independent and adequate” state procedural ground, this
Court cannot review it absent a showing of “cause” and “prejudice.” See
Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991) (“In all cases in which a state
prisoner has defaulted his federal claims in state court pursuant to an independent
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and adequate state procedural rule, federal habeas review of the claims is barred
unless the prisoner can demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a
result of the alleged violation of federal law.”). Moreover, petitioner has failed to
satisfy the “prejudice” prong of the test for constitutionally ineffective assistance
of counsel insofar as nothing in the record indicates that there is a reasonable
probability that the result of the proceedings would have been different but for
Mr. Maggard’s counsels’ alleged transgressions.
Accordingly, we DENY Petitioner's request for a COA and DISMISS the
appeal.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
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