United States v. Killingsworth ( 1997 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
JUN 30 1997
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
No. 96-6021
BRYAN LEE KILLINGSWORTH,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Oklahoma
(D.C. No. CR-95-58-L)
Submitted on the briefs: *
William P. Early, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Oklahoma City, OK, for the
appellant.
Patrick M. Ryan, United States Attorney, Leslie M. Maye, Assistant United States
Attorney, Oklahoma City, OK, for the appellee.
Before BRORBY, HOLLOWAY, and EBEL, Circuit Judges.
EBEL, Circuit Judge.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case therefore is
ordered submitted without oral argument.
Defendant-Appellant Bryan Lee Killingsworth (“Killingsworth”) appeals
the denial of his motion to withdraw a guilty plea, and the denial of his motion to
suppress certain evidence obtained through a telephone wiretap. Because we
believe there was an adequate factual basis to support a finding of Killingsworth’s
guilt, and because we believe the government complied with the pertinent
provisions of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968, as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 2510-22 (1994 & Supp. 1996), we affirm.
BACKGROUND
On May 19, 1995, a grand jury in the Western District of Oklahoma
returned a 19-count indictment charging various drug and weapon offenses
against Killingsworth and his co-defendant, Patrick Hackbert. Killingsworth was
named in fifteen of the substantive counts and in a forfeiture count. The two
counts relevant to this appeal are: Count One, under which Killingsworth was
charged with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute
methylenedioxymethamphetamine (“ecstasy”), methamphetamine, and cocaine
(powder) in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1994); and Count Nineteen, under
which Killingsworth was charged with using or carrying a firearm in connection
with a drug offense in violation of 18 U.S.C. §924(c) (1994).
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The indictments against Killingsworth were returned on May 18, 1995,
after a lengthy investigation into the “Bustos Organization,” a drug distribution
ring operated out of Oklahoma City. The investigation was coordinated by the
FBI and the Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, police. Much of the incriminating
information regarding Killingsworth was gathered through wiretap surveillance of
two telephone lines subscribed to by Steve Schardein and Jill Knight, two
suspected members of the Bustos Organization. The wiretap was authorized by an
Order issued by Judge Alley on February 17, 1995, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1994).
Killingsworth moved to suppress the evidence gathered through the wiretap
interceptions. In his motion, Killingsworth claimed that: (1) the government
failed to show necessity for the surveillance; (2) the wiretap interceptions were
not conducted in conformity with the authorization order; and (3) the
authorization order was insufficient on its face because Killingsworth was not
named as a target in the wiretap application.
In an order dated October 6, 1995, the district court denied Killingsworth’s
motion to suppress. Based on Agent Lotspeich’s affidavit, the court concluded
that the government had established that the wiretap was necessary. Specifically,
the court noted that the Bustos Organization was comprised largely of family
members and close friends, and thus had proven difficult to infiltrate; that
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previous efforts at investigation, including infiltration, interviews with
organization members, pen registers, and visual surveillance, had proven
unsuccessful; and that confidential sources had not been forthcoming due to fear
for their personal safety. Additionally, the court rejected Killingsworth’s
minimization and identification arguments, noting that Judge Alley’s
authorization order had specifically included “others as yet unknown” who were
involved in the Bustos Organization, and that the officers did not know that
Killingsworth was not one of the persons named in the authorization order when
they recorded his incriminating conversations.
On October 17, 1995, Killingsworth pled guilty to Counts One and
Nineteen. As part of his plea agreement, the other charges were dismissed, and
Killingsworth’s plea was conditioned under Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2) upon his
right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion.
On December 6, 1995, the Supreme Court decided Bailey v. United States ,
116 S. Ct. 501 (1995). In Bailey , the Court held that a person may not be
convicted of having “used” a firearm in connection with a drug offence in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) unless he “actively employed the firearm during
and in relation to the predicate crime.” Id. at 509. Bailey effectively overruled
prior Tenth Circuit precedent, under which a § 924(c) “use” conviction could be
based on evidence showing that the defendant merely had access to a firearm. See
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United States v. Hager , 969 F.2d 883, 888-89 (10th Cir.), cert. denied , 506 U.S.
964 (1992). Based on Bailey , Killingsworth filed a pre-sentence motion to
withdraw his guilty plea to Count Nineteen pursuant to what is now codified as
Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(e), claiming that there was no longer a factual basis
supporting a finding of guilty on the § 924(c) charge.
The district court denied Killingsworth’s motion, reasoning that there was
sufficient evidence that Killingsworth had used his gun in connection with his
drug offenses, both by displaying it while transactions took place and by
employing it to intimidate people into paying their debts for drugs purchased from
him. Killingsworth was then sentenced to sixty months confinement on Count
One and to sixty months confinement on Count 19, to run consecutively.
Killingsworth now appeals both the denial of his motion to withdraw his
guilty plea and the denial of his motion to suppress.
Discussion
A. Motion to Withdraw the Plea
Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(e) provides that “[i]f a motion to withdraw a plea of
guilty or nolo contendere is made before sentence is imposed, the court may
permit the plea to be withdrawn if the defendant shows any fair and just reason.”
The defendant bears the burden of showing that a denial of a motion to withdraw
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a plea was not “fair and just,” United States v. Gordon , 4 F.3d 1567, 1572 (10th
Cir. 1993), cert. denied , 510 U.S. 1184 (1994), and we review the denial of such a
motion for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Guthrie , 64 F.3d 1510, 1513
(10th Cir. 1995).
In Gordon , we outlined seven factors that courts should consider in
determining whether the defendant has shown a fair and just reason for allowing
withdrawal of a guilty plea: (1) whether the defendant has asserted innocence; (2)
prejudice to the government if the motion is granted; (3) whether the defendant
has delayed filing the motion to withdraw his plea; (4) inconvenience to the court
if the motion is granted; (5) the quality of the defendant’s assistance of counsel
during the plea; (6) whether the plea was knowing and voluntary; and (7) the
waste of judicial resources. Gordon , 4 F.3d at 1572.
Killingsworth’s argument that there is no longer a factual basis for his
conviction under § 924(c) goes to the first factor we consider under Gordon , that
is, whether the defendant claims to be innocent. We note that Killingsworth does
not dispute the government’s version of the facts; he merely disputes whether
those facts can give rise to a conviction under § 924(c).
We believe that Killingsworth is simply incorrect in asserting that there was
no factual basis for his guilt under Bailey . As the district court discussed in its
order, testimony of witness Marla Black indicated that Killingsworth kept the gun
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on display in his bedroom during drug transactions that were conducted there. 1
Additionally, both co-defendant Hackbert and witness Black told Agent Lotspeich
that Killingsworth used the gun to intimidate individuals who owed him money
from prior drug transactions.
In Bailey , the Court explained that a defendant “uses” a firearm within the
meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) when the defendant “has a gun on display during a
transaction.” 116 S.Ct. at 507. The Bailey Court also stated that “‘use’ certainly
includes brandishing, displaying, bartering, striking with, and most obviously,
firing or attempting to fire, a firearm.” Id. at 508. Thus, Killingsworth’s claim
that there was not a factual basis to convict him under Bailey is simply false.
Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
denying Killingsworth’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Because the change
in the law effected by Bailey simply does not bear on Killingsworth’s factual guilt
or innocence, Killingsworth simply did not satisfy his burden of showing that a
1
This testimony was given at Hackbert’s sentencing hearing. The district
court took judicial notice of that testimony, relying on cases allowing sentencing
courts to take judicial notice of information that has “sufficient indicia of
reliability to support its probable accuracy,” United States v. Davis , 912 F.2d
1210, 1214 (10th Cir. 1990), and cases allowing courts to take judicial notice of
its own records, United States v Valencia , 44 F.3d 269, 273 n.3 (5th Cir. 1995);
United States v. Estep , 760 F.2d 1060, 1063 (10th Cir. 1985). (See D.Ct. Order
1/5/96, at 3). Killingsworth does not object to the court’s taking judicial notice of
this testimony.
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withdrawal of his guilty plea would be fair and just. See Guthrie , 64 F.3d at
1513. 2
B. Motion to Suppress
Killingsworth also contends that the evidence against him should be
suppressed due to various alleged violations of the wiretapping statute, Title III of
the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, as amended. 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2510-22 (1994 & Supp. 1996) (“Title III”). Section 2515 of Title III provides
that evidence derived from a wiretap shall be suppressed if that evidence was
obtained unlawfully. 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (1994).
Among other provisions, Title III requires the government to make a full
and complete showing that a wiretap is necessary. See Id. §§ 2518(1)(c),
2518(3)(c). It also requires that authorization orders include the identity, if
It appears that Killingsworth also argued below that the government
2
would not be prejudiced by the withdrawal of his guilty plea. We disagree. The
government dismissed the other counts against Killingsworth in accepting
Killingsworth’s plea agreement. Thus, if the plea were withdrawn and the
government is not permitted to return to the pre-plea agreement status, the
government would be forced either to obtain a new indictment on those counts or
forego their prosecution. Finally, the defendant did not attempt to prove any of
the other Gordon factors below and thus we will not review them here. See Sac &
Fox Nation v. Hanson, 47 F.3d 1061, 1063 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 57(1995) (explaining that we will not consider an issue on appeal that was not raised
below, except for the most manifest error or where the issue of sovereign
immunity or jurisdiction is raised).
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known, of persons subject to the wiretap, id. § 2518(1)(b)(iv), and that the
interception of communications be minimized, id. § 2518(5).
Under what is known as the “necessity requirement,” an application for
wiretap authorization must contain “a full and complete statement as to whether
or not other investigative procedures have been tried and failed or why they
reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous.” 18
U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c) (1994). The judge issuing an authorization order then must
find that “normal investigative procedures have been tried and have failed or
reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous.” 18
U.S.C. § 2518(3)(c) (1994). We have explained that the purpose of the necessity
requirement “is to ensure that the relatively intrusive device of wiretapping ‘is not
resorted to in situations where traditional investigative techniques would suffice
to expose the crime.’” United States v. Edwards , 69 F.3d 419, 429 (10th Cir.
1995), cert. denied , 116 S.Ct. 2497 (1996) (quoting United States v. Kahn , 415
U.S. 143, 153 n.12 (1974)).
In United States v. Mesa-Rincon , 911 F.2d 1433 (10th Cir. 1990), the
legislative history of Title III was consulted for examples of the types of
investigative procedures that should be considered by the government as a matter
of first resort; namely: “‘ . . .standard visual or aural surveillance[,] . . . general
questioning or interrogation under an immunity grant, use of regular search
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warrants, and the infiltration of conspiratorial groups by undercover agents or
informants.’” Id. at 1444 (quoting S. Rep. No. 90-1097, at [79] (1968), reprinted
in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2190). 3
We elaborated upon the investigative
procedures that must be considered before resort is made to wiretapping in
United States v. Castillo-Garcia , No. 96-1259, (10th Cir. June 30, 1997). There,
we said,
We now expressly hold what the court in Mesa-Rincon
suggested and what seems clearly to be contemplated by Title III. To
obtain an electronic surveillance order, the government must explain
fully in its application what investigative techniques have been tried
against the target of the wiretap. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2518(1)(c),
2518(3)(c) (1994). If any of the four categories of normal
investigative techniques referred to in the legislative history of Title
III have not been tried, the government must explain with
particularity why each of such untried techniques would be either
unsuccessful or too dangerous. Those investigative procedures are:
(1) standard visual and aural surveillance; (2) questioning and
interrogation of witnesses or participants (including the use of grand
juries and the grant of immunity if necessary); (3) use of search
warrants; and (4) infiltration of conspiratorial groups by undercover
agents or informants. In addition, if other normal investigative
techniques such as pen registers or trap and trace devices have not
been tried, a similar explanation must be offered as to why they also
would be unsuccessful or too dangerous. We add pen registers and
trap and trace devices to this list because they possess a logical
3
Although Mesa-Rincon involved visual, rather than aural, electronic
surveillance, the Mesa-Rincon court adopted a “necessity” requirement for the
government’s use of clandestine television cameras by analogizing to the very
provisions of Title III at issue here. See Mesa-Rincon, 911 F.2d at 1442-43. The
Mesa-Rincon court predicated its analysis primarily on case law pertaining to
wiretapping, and on the same legislative history materials applicable to the
present case. See id. at 1442-45.
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relationship and close affinity to wiretaps and yet are less intrusive.
Thus, unless the government can show that they would be ineffective
or dangerous they must be tried before resorting to wiretaps.
Whether other normal investigative techniques must also be
explored before turning to wiretaps will depend on the unique
circumstances of each investigation. For example, it will often be
the case that the government must consider first the less intrusive
technique of reviewing available public, private, or governmental
records pertaining to the suspects under investigation to see if the
requisite information needed to prosecute may be obtained in that
way.
Id. , slip op. at 15-16.
Finally, a district court’s wiretap authorization order is presumed proper,
and the defendant bears the burden of overcoming this presumption. United States
v. Nunez , 877 F.2d 1470, 1472 (10th Cir.), cert. denied , 493 U.S. 981 (1989). We
review de novo whether the necessity requirement was met. United States v.
Quintana , 70 F.3d 1167, 1169 (10th Cir. 1995).
With these guidelines in mind, we believe that both the government’s
wiretap application and the district court’s authorization order adequately
complied with Title III because the wiretap application detailed that normal
investigative techniques had been attempted with regard to the Bustos
Organization and it explained why those techniques had been unsuccessful.
(Application, ¶¶ 66-80).
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Standard Visual or Aural Surveillance
In its wiretap application, the government explained that visual surveillance
had been attempted, but that it had proven unsuccessful because of the
government’s difficulty in determining from surveillance whether the purpose of a
monitored meeting was for legitimate or criminal purposes. (Application, ¶ 70).
The application explained that such a determination was especially difficult with
regard to the Bustos Organization because the core of the organization was
“related by blood and/or marriage.” ( Id. )
General Questioning or Interrogation Under an Immunity Grant
The wiretap application revealed that the government had attempted
interviews with subjects but that information gained from those interviews proved
insufficient to “identify all persons involved in the conspiracy, the source of the
drugs, its manner of financing, or the investment and use of drug proceed.”
(¶ 66). One particular subject, Jose Cruz-Bustos, offered to cooperate with law
enforcement concerning the investigation but failed to provide any information
concerning his brother and other family members. (¶ 68). The application also
explained that further interviews would prove unsuccessful because the family
members at upper echelon of the Bustos Organization were unlikely to turn on
each other. Finally, the application explained that further interviews would
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compromise the investigation by alerting the Bustos organization to that
investigation. (¶ 69).
In addition, the application discussed the possibility of instigating a grand
jury investigation and an assistant United States Attorney concluded that would
not be an appropriate investigative tool because the subjects of the investigation
would most likely invoke the Fifth Amendment, it would be unwise to grant
immunity because it might preclude prosecution of the most culpable persons, and
that it would alert the conspirators of the investigation, which would jeopardize
both the on-going investigation and the lives of informants and undercover
officers. (¶79).
Search Warrants
The government explained in its wiretap application that search warrants
had not been used because documentary records of the drug distribution
conspiracy appeared to be sparse, and thus a search warrant would not reveal the
kind of evidence needed to prove that certain family members participated in the
conspiracy. (¶ 75). Further, the application explained that the execution of
search warrants would notify the principals of the existence of the ongoing
investigation. ( Id. ).
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Infiltration by Undercover Agents or Informants .
The government disclosed in its wiretap application that it was currently
using an undercover agent as part of its investigation, but that this agent had been
unsuccessful in reaching the high levels of the organization. (¶ 76). The
government also disclosed that it had used confidential informants to make illegal
drug purchases, but explained that these informants were unwilling to testify, and
at any rate, had little information concerning the major participants in the
organization. (¶ 78).
Other Techniques
The government also explained that its use of pen registers and long
distance toll records had not provided sufficient evidence with regard to the
Bustos Organization because such methods were incapable of determining which
individuals actually made and received the monitored calls, nor could the methods
ascertain the nature of the calls. (¶ 72).
Finally, the government detailed how it had used public, private, and
governmental records as part of its investigation. Specifically, the government
obtained records from Southwestern Bell Telephone Company to determine that
subscribers to certain telephone were suspected members of the Bustos
Organization. (¶¶ 15, 17, 18, and 34). The government also analyzed phone
records to determine that the length of phone calls made by suspected members of
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the Bustos Organization indicated that calls were being made to digital pagers and
thus suggestive of large-scale drug trafficking. (¶ 24). Further, the government
obtained the criminal background of the intended interceptees, (¶ 26) and relied
upon Oklahoma City Police Department crime, investigative, and arrest reports to
further its investigation. (¶¶ 50, 51, 58, 59, 62, 63, and 65). However, none of
these investigatory techniques provided the government with sufficient
information to complete its investigation.
We believe that the government’s explanations in its application comprise
“a full and complete statement as to whether or not other investigative procedures
have been tried and failed or why they reasonably appear to be unlikely to
succeed if tried or to be too dangerous.” 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c) (1994). Thus,
the district court did not err in finding that the government had satisfied the
“necessity requirement” with regard to the wiretap at issue. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 2518(3)(c) (1994). Compare Castillo-Garcia , No. 96-1259 (granting suppression
with respect to evidence obtained through certain wiretaps where the government
failed to meet the “necessity requirement”).
The district court was also correct in rejecting Killingsworth’s claim that
the authorization was converted into an impermissible “general warrant” by
allowing the recording of conversations among “others not yet known.” The
wiretap statute only requires that an application for a wiretap include “the identity
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of the person, if known , committing the offense and whose communications are to
be intercepted.” 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(b)(iv) (1994) (emphasis added). Likewise,
the district court’s authorization order must specify “the identity of the person, if
known , whose communications are to be intercepted.” Id. § 2518(4)(a) (emphasis
added). As the Supreme Court has recognized, “[t]he clear implication of this
language is that when there is probable cause to believe that a particular
telephone is being used to commit an offense but no particular person is
identifiable, a wire interception order may, nevertheless, properly issue under the
statute.” United States v. Kahn , 415 U.S. 143, 157 (1974). 4
Thus, the mere fact
that neither the wiretap application nor the authorization order mentioned
Killingsworth by name does not render the interception of communications to
which Killingsworth was a party unlawful.
Finally, the district court properly rejected Killingsworth’s claim that the
wiretap evidence should be suppressed because the law enforcement officers
allegedly did not minimize the communications intercepted and recorded pursuant
to section 2518(5). That section requires that wiretaps “be conducted in such a
way as to minimize the interception of communications not otherwise subject to
4
In addition to holding that the wiretapping statute only requires an
application to name known persons who are subject to a wiretap, the Court in
Kahn also recognized that the failure to name all persons subject to a wiretap does
not render the wiretap unconstitutional. 415 U.S. at 154-55 & n.15.
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interception under this chapter . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (1994). The Supreme
Court has held that this provision does not create an “inflexible rule of law,” but
rather demands an evaluation of the “facts and circumstances of each case.” Scott
v. United States , 436 U.S. 128, 139-40 (1978).
The Court in Scott considered several “factors” in determining that the law
enforcement officers properly minimized interceptions in that case. Id. at 140-41
Several of these factors are instructive here. First, the Court emphasized the
importance of considering the “circumstances of the wiretap” at issue rather than
the absolute percentage of irrelevant calls intercepted. Id. at 140. Next, the
Court stated that “more widespread surveillance” is justified when the wiretap is
targeted towards what is thought to be a widespread conspiracy. Id. Finally, the
Court noted that officers should be given some leeway at the early stages of
investigation where it is difficult to determine which calls are relevant and which
are irrelevant. Id. at 141.
In the present case, Killingsworth contends that the officers should have
ceased recording once they realized that the persons involved in the conversations
were neither Schardein nor Knight, the two people named in the application and
the authorization order. For several reasons, Killingsworth’s argument runs
counter to the flexible approach mandated by the Supreme Court in Scott .
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First, Killingsworth does not dispute that the intercepted communications
were drug-related (see D. Ct. Order 8/6/95 at 7, uncontested in Killingsworth’s
brief) and thus not precluded by the minimization requirements See 18 U.S.C.
§ 2518(5) (requiring that wiretaps “be conducted in such a way as to minimize the
interception of communications not otherwise subject to interception . . . .”)
(emphasis added). The district court’s wiretap order clearly, and properly,
permitted interceptions of overheard conversations between unlisted parties
during the course of an otherwise valid wiretap intercept if “it is determined
during the portions of the conversations already overheard that the conversation is
criminal in nature.” (D.Ct. Order, at 6).
Second, the intercepted calls to which Killingsworth was a party were
authorized by the order. The authorization order specifically stated that
“‘[i]nterception must be suspended immediately when it is determine [ sic ] . . .
that none of the named interceptees or any of their confederates , when identified,
are participants in the conversation.’” D. Ct. Order 8/6/95 at 6 (quoting
authorization order). It is undisputed that Killingsworth was a confederate of
Schardein and Knight, and was viewed as such by the officers recording the
conversation. Thus, the minimization requirements were satisfied.
Finally, assuming arguendo that the conversations at issue were not within
the scope of the authorization order, the circumstances in which those calls were
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intercepted were such that a liberal approach to minimization is appropriate. See
Scott , 436 U.S. at 140 (requiring courts to look to circumstances of interception
in determining how much minimization is appropriate). Minimization does not
require perfection in differentiating between innocent and criminal conversations.
The investigation at issue here concerned a suspected widespread drug
conspiracy, and thus “more extensive surveillance” was justified. Id. Further, the
conversations at issue were intercepted during the early stages of the
investigation, when the officers had not yet identified the voices of the persons
named in the authorization order and had not yet determined the scope of the
Bustos Organization. More deference is owed with regard to such interceptions
because it is difficult for investigating officers to determine which conversations
are pertinent and which are impertinent early in an investigation. Id. at 141.
Accordingly, we believe the wiretap authorization in this case was neither
invalid nor violated by the investigating officers. Therefore, we affirm the
district court’s refusal to suppress the evidence against Killingsworth obtained by
wiretap interception.
CONCLUSION
Because we believe the investigating officers complied with the pertinent
provisions of the wiretapping statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (1994), and because we
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believe that, notwithstanding Bailey v. United States , 116 S.Ct. 501 (1995), there
was sufficient factual basis for a finding of Killingsworth’s guilt under 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c) (1994), we AFFIRM the district court’s denials of both Killingsworth’s
motion to suppress, and his motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
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