Kataria v. Chater ( 1997 )


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  •                                                                           F I L E D
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    OCT 1 1997
    FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
    PATRICK FISHER
    Clerk
    USHA KATARIA,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.                                                   No. 97-5050
    (D.C. No. 95-CV-730)
    JOHN J. CALLAHAN, Acting                             (N.D. Okla.)
    Commissioner, Social Security
    Administration, *
    Defendant-Appellee.
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT **
    Before ANDERSON, BARRETT, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
    After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
    unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
    argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore
    ordered submitted without oral argument.
    *
    Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 43(c), John J. Callahan, Acting Commissioner
    of Social Security, is substituted for Shirley S. Chater, Commissioner of Social
    Security, as the defendant in this action.
    **
    This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
    doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
    generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
    and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
    Claimant Usha Kataria appeals from an order of the district court affirming
    the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying her application
    for supplemental security income benefits. We review the Commissioner's
    decision to determine whether it is supported by substantial evidence and whether
    the correct legal standards were applied. See Washington v. Shalala, 
    37 F.3d 1437
    , 1439 (10th Cir. 1994). The Commissioner’s factual findings are conclusive
    when supported by substantial evidence, see 
    42 U.S.C. § 405
    (g), which is
    adequate relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept to support a
    conclusion, see Richardson v. Perales, 
    402 U.S. 389
    , 401 (1971).
    In her application for benefits filed in March 1993, claimant contended that
    she was disabled due to a variety of ailments including bone spurs in her heels,
    goiter, hypertension and ulcer disease. Subsequently she was diagnosed as having
    diabetes. Relying on the opinion of a medical expert who had reviewed
    claimant’s medical records, the administrative law judge (ALJ) concluded that the
    goiter, hypertension, ulcer disease and diabetes were adequately controlled
    through medication and thus were not severe impairments. He found her bone
    spurs to be severe impairments, but also found they did not prevent her from
    performing the full range of sedentary work. Because claimant had no past
    relevant work, the case proceeded to step five of the five-part sequential process
    for determining disability. See 
    20 C.F.R. § 416.920
    . Relying on the Medical-
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    Vocational Guidelines, 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 2, the ALJ determined
    that claimant was not disabled and denied her application for benefits. The
    Appeals Council denied review, making the ALJ’s determination the final
    decision of the Commissioner.
    On appeal, claimant contends that the ALJ’s finding that her goiter,
    hypertension, ulcer disease, and diabetes were not severe impairments because
    they were well controlled with medication is not supported by substantial
    evidence because the ALJ failed to consider the fact that claimant could not
    afford and therefore was not taking the medication necessary to control these
    ailments. She further contends that because this case reached step five, the
    burden was on the Commissioner to show that the impairments were adequately
    controlled.
    Ordinarily, a claimant cannot be found disabled when her impairment can
    be controlled through medical treatment and she unjustifiably refuses to undergo
    that treatment. See 
    20 C.F.R. § 416.930
    ; Teter v. Heckler, 
    775 F.2d 1104
    , 1107
    (10th Cir. 1985). Claimant does not question the ALJ’s conclusion that her
    impairments can be readily controlled through use of prescribed medications. She
    contends instead that (1) she did not take the medications, and (2) the reason she
    did not take them was because she could not afford them, which may be a
    justifiable excuse, see 
    id.
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    There is evidence in the record that claimant was at least delayed in
    obtaining, and maybe never did obtain, certain medical procedures, such as X-rays
    and a thyroid scan that apparently were not available from free clinics. However,
    there is no medical evidence that she could not or did not obtain prescribed
    medications or that her condition deteriorated or was not controlled because of a
    failure to take prescribed medications. It is clear that at least until October 1993,
    nine months prior to her hearing before the ALJ, she was taking her prescribed
    medications. See Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 129 (claimant’s statement listing
    medications she was then taking, including zantac for her ulcer,
    hyydrochlorathizide for hypertension, and synthroid for her goiter). She
    apparently obtained these medications from the Morton Clinic, which claimant
    describes as a clinic for the homeless that apparently provides, at no cost,
    medications and certain medical services. See, e.g, Appellant’s Br. at 4-5
    (describing numerous doctor visits to Morton and Neighbor for Neighbor clinics
    and noting that “Ms. Kataria returned each month [to the Morton Clinic] for her
    medication”).
    There is some evidence indicating that at some point claimant may have
    been unable to obtain her medications and was not taking them. At her hearing
    before the ALJ on July 1, 1994, claimant stated that the doctor had given her
    medicine for her thyroid problem, but that it did not help much. Appellant’s App.
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    Vol. II at 40. Later, in response to a question from her representative concerning
    why she needed benefits, she stated:
    I don’t have money to pay the bills. I don’t have any doctor. My
    sickness, my disease, this thyroid problem, knee pain, I just need
    some medicine, some medication, some treatment. I can not go to
    any doctor, they always refuse to do my treatment.
    Id. at 56-57. There were no followup questions or other discussion at the hearing
    concerning claimant’s failure to take and/or inability to obtain her prescribed
    medications. The only other indication in the record that she might not be taking
    her medications is a January 1995 notation in the records from the Neighbor for
    Neighbor Clinic, where claimant went for treatment for her diabetes, stating that
    the University of Oklahoma Adult Medicine Clinic “turned pt over to collections--
    so pt. discontinued treatment & has not been going any where for care since
    then.” Id. at 236. However, claimant apparently obtained medication for her
    diabetes from the Neighbor for Neighbor Clinic “to last until Morton appt.” Id. at
    235.
    The ALJ found that
    [t]he claimant has medically-determinable impairments of
    hypothyroidism and goiter, hypertension, ulcer disease, and diabetes,
    but the medical evidence shows that these conditions are well
    controlled with medication. The Administrative Law Judge finds that
    these impairments are not severe and would no more than minimally
    affect her ability to engage in substantial gainful activity.
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    Id. at 14. The ALJ did not address whether claimant was continuing to take her
    medications, nor whether she failed to take them because she could not afford
    them.
    The evidence is at best inconclusive whether claimant in fact failed to take
    her prescribed medications, and whether if she did not take them, it was because
    she could not afford them, particularly in light of their apparent availability from
    free clinics. We disagree with claimant’s contention that the absence of evidence
    from October 1993 to January 1995 showing that she did take her medications
    necessarily means that she did not take them, that the reason she did not take them
    was because of her poverty, or even that she continued to experience symptoms.
    Moreover, her contention that the lack of treatment for her thyroid disorder
    caused her diabetes is not supported by any medical evidence. We conclude that
    the ALJ did not commit reversible error in finding that claimant’s goiter,
    hypertension, ulcer disease and diabetes were well controlled by medications.
    AFFIRMED.
    Entered for the Court
    Michael R. Murphy
    Circuit Judge
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