Wyoming Timber Industry Ass'n v. United States Forest Service , 6 F. App'x 733 ( 2001 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
MAR 20 2001
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
WYOMING TIMBER INDUSTRY
ASSOCIATION, a Wyoming non-
profit trade association; FRONTIERS
OF FREEDOM-WYOMING, a
Wyoming non-profit organization,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v. No. 00-8016
UNITED STATES FOREST (D.C. No. 99-CV-1016)
SERVICE; DANIEL R. GLICKMAN, (D. Wyo.)
in his official capacity as Secretary of
the United States Department of
Agriculture; MICHAEL P.
DOMBECK, in his official capacity as
Chief Forester of the United States
Forest Service; LYLE K. LAVERTY,
in his official capacity as Regional
Forester, Region II, United States
Forest Service; JACK A.
BLACKWELL, in his official capacity
as Regional Forester Region IV,
United States Forest Service,
Defendants-Appellees.
_________________
WYOMING OUTDOOR COUNCIL;
BIGHORN FOREST USERS
COALITION; SIERRA CLUB;
WILDERNESS SOCIETY; GREATER
YELLOWSTONE COALITION;
NORTHWEST WYOMING
RESOURCE COUNCIL;
BIODIVERSITY ASSOCIATES;
WYOMING WILDERNESS
ASSOCIATION; AMERICAN
WILDLANDS; AMERICAN LANDS
ALLIANCE; PACIFIC RIVERS
COUNCIL; OREGON NATURAL
RESOURCES COUNCIL; U.S.
PUBLIC INTEREST RESEARCH
GROUP,
Intervenors.
PACIFIC LEGAL FOUNDATION,
Amicus Curiae.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before SEYMOUR, BRISCOE, Circuit Judges, and OWEN , District Judge **
.
Appellants Wyoming Timber Industry Association (WTIA) and Frontiers of
Freedom-Wyoming (FOF) appeal the district court’s ruling that they lacked
standing to assert a declaratory relief action. The action challenged a “final
interim rule” promulgated by the United States Forest Service (Forest Service)
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
**
The Honorable Richard Owen, United States District Judge, Southern
District of New York, sitting by designation.
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that temporarily suspended road construction and reconstruction in many
unroaded areas of the National Forest System. The interim rule expired by its
own terms on September 1, 2000, after appellate briefs were filed. We dismiss
the appeal as moot.
I.
On February 12, 1999, the Forest Service, the lead defendant, issued a final
interim rule that suspended “new road construction projects, including temporary
road construction, and road reconstruction projects” within various enumerated
areas of the National Forest System. See 64 Fed. Reg. 7290 (1999) (codified at
36 C.F.R. § 212.13 (1999)). The suspension was to become effective March 1,
1999, and last “until the Forest Service, after giving appropriate public notice
and opportunity to comment, adopts its revised road management policy, or 18
months from the effective date of this rule, whichever is first.” See 36 C.F.R.
§ 212.13(d)(3).
On April 5, 1999, WTIA, “a non-profit trade association whose
membership is comprised of nineteen primary and secondary timber processing
companies,” and FOF, “a subsidiary of Frontiers of Freedom, a non-profit
corporation formed for purposes of, inter alia, education, research, advising and
monitoring governmental activity for its members and the general public” filed
this action. See Wyo. Timber Indus. Ass’n v. United States Forest Serv. , 80 F.
3
Supp. 2d 1245, 1249-50 (D. Wyo. 2000). On June 29, 1999, the district court
granted numerous interest groups leave to intervene as a single party on the side
of the Government.
The gravamen of appellants’ July 6, 1999, first amended complaint is that
the interim rule violates the National Forest Management Act (NFMA). The
NFMA “requires the Secretary of Agriculture to ‘develop, maintain, and, as
appropriate, revise land and resource management plans for [each forest unit] of
the National Forest System.’” Ohio Forestry Ass’n, Inc. v. Sierra Club , 523 U.S.
726, 728 (1998) (citing 90 Stat. 2949, as renumbered and amended, 16 U.S.C.
§ 1604(a)). For each forest unit, “[f]orest management occurs at two distinct
levels.” Colo. Envtl. Coalition v. Dombeck , 185 F.3d 1162, 1167 (10th Cir.
1999). “At the first level, the Forest Service develops the Forest Plan, a broad,
programmatic document, accompanied by an environmental impact statement and
public review process conducted in accordance with the National Environmental
Policy Act.” Id. at 1167-68. “At the second level, the Forest Service implements
the Forest Plan by approving (with or without modification) or disapproving
particular projects.” Id. at 1168. These “particular projects”“must be consistent
with the Forest Plan, and are subject to further National Environmental Policy
Act review.” Id. (citations omitted); see also 16 U.S.C. § 1604(i) (“Resource
plans and permits, contracts, and other instruments for the use and occupancy of
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National Forest System lands shall be consistent with the land management
plans.”).
Ultimately, appellants read the NFMA to require that any regulatory
decision be made on a forest-by-forest basis and to prohibit any regulatory
decision that affects more than one national forest. Since the interim rule was
designed broadly to affect many areas within the National Forest System,
appellants contended it violated the NFMA. More specifically, appellants argued
the interim rule is a “significant amendment or revision to the forest plans” and
“not in compliance with current forest plans.” Aplts. App. at 32 ¶ 23. Whether a
forest plan amendment is “significant” is important because, in general, forest
plans can “be amended in any manner whatsoever after final adoption after public
notice.” 16 U.S.C. § 1604(f)(4). If, however, the amendment “would result in a
significant change in such plan,” the Forest Service is statutorily required to
comply with the procedures set forth in 16 U.S.C. § 1604. Id. (emphasis added).
Appellants alleged that the interim rule violated the NFMA because it was in
effect a significant amendment to all forest plans and was not adopted in
accordance with Section 1604. Appellants also contend that promulgation of the
interim rule violated the Wyoming Wilderness Act (WWA), the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).
Most of the alleged violations stem from their reading of the NFMA. Appellants
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further asserted that the interim rule created de facto “buffer zones,” which are
prohibited by the WWA.
On January 5, 2000, the district court dismissed the action with prejudice,
holding appellants lacked standing to bring their claims. See Wyo. Timber , 80 F.
Supp. at 1260-61. Appellants filed a notice of appeal before final judgment was
entered. We have jurisdiction to hear this appeal because there is no question
that the district court’s order was final. See Burlington N. R.R. Co. v.
Huddleston , 94 F.3d 1413, 1416 n.3 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding “[i]f no question
exists as to the finality of the district court’s decision, the absence of a Rule 58
judgment will not prohibit appellate review”). On appeal, appellants contend (1)
the district court erred in finding they lacked standing; and (2) the challenged
rule was adopted in violation of the NFMA and the WWA.
The interim rule expired on September 1, 2000. On January 12, 2001, the
final rule establishing “prohibitions on road construction, road reconstruction,
and timber harvesting in inventoried roadless areas on National Forest System
lands” appeared in the Federal Register. Roadless Area Conservation, 66 Fed.
Reg. 3244 (Jan. 12, 2001). Although the rule was to become effective March 13,
2001, the effective date has been postponed at least sixty days to May 12, 2001.
See 66 Fed. Reg. 8899 (Feb. 5, 2001). The Forest Service and the intervenors
have filed motions to dismiss this appeal as moot.
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II.
“‘Mootness is a threshold issue because the existence of a live case or
controversy is a constitutional prerequisite to federal court jurisdiction.’” Out of
Line Sports, Inc. v. Rollerblade, Inc. , 213 F.3d 500, 501 (10th Cir. 2000)
(quoting McClendon v. City of Albuquerque , 100 F.3d 863, 867 (10th Cir.
1996)). Federal courts have “no authority to give opinions upon moot questions
or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot
affect the matter in issue in the case before [them].” Church of Scientology of
Cal. v. United States , 506 U.S. 9, 12 (1992) (internal quotations omitted). For
that reason, a party must seek relief that is “capable of addressing the alleged
harm.” Nat’l Advertising Co. v. City & County of Denver , 912 F.2d 405, 411
(10th Cir. 1990); see also McAlpine v. Thompson , 187 F.3d 1213, 1216 (10th
Cir. 1999) (“A claim will be deemed moot unless a proper judicial resolution
settles some dispute which affects the behavior of the defendant toward the
plaintiff.” (internal quotations omitted)). This requirement exists “at all stages of
the proceedings,” not only at the inception of the case. Nat’l Advertising , 912
F.2d at 411. Thus, “if an event occurs while a case is pending on appeal that
makes it impossible for the court to grant ‘any effectual relief whatever’ to a
prevailing party, the appeal must be dismissed.” Church of Scientology , 506 U.S.
at 12.
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Here, key events have occurred while this case pended on appeal which
potentially alter this court’s ability to provide appellants the relief they seek. The
source of appellants’ grievance, the interim rule, has expired. This court cannot
grant appellants’ request for an order that the Forest Service rescind the interim
rule and an order enjoining the Forest Service from further activity implementing
the rule . Since their ultimate relief cannot be granted, there is little or no
purpose for reviewing appellants’ declaratory relief claims. Appellants are
concerned that “through its mootness claims, the Forest Service seeks to abdicate
any responsibility for . . . continuing effects [of the interim rule] and evade
accountability for its illegal actions.” Aplts. Response to Motion to Dismiss at 5.
Appellants argue a case is not moot if the action complained of continues to have
“present adverse effects” such as continued postponement of the timber sales.
Aplts. Br. at 4. This phrase is culled from a Supreme Court discussion of
standing, which is similarly based upon the limitations of Article III authority but
is decided under a different legal standard. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v.
Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc. , 528 U.S. 167, 174 (2000). No Supreme Court or
Tenth Circuit jurisprudence supports a “continuing effect” test for mootness.
The cases cited by appellants in support of this proposition did not consider the
effects of the challenged conduct, but whether a remedy for that conduct
remained available. See , e.g. , Church of Scientology , 506 U.S. at 13 (court
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retained “power to effectuate a partial remedy”); Northwest Envtl. Defense Ctr.
v. Gordon , 849 F.2d 1241 (9th Cir. 1988) (effects of earlier law could be
countered by later action). While appellants ultimately seek relief of financial
damages in the form of timber sales offered by the Forest Service, they cannot
request a court to order those sales. The only relief sought was recission of the
interim rule and an injunction against its enforcement, and those remedies retain
no real force in the wake of expiration of the interim rule.
In an attempt to save their action, appellants further contend this appeal
fits within one of the two exceptions to the mootness doctrine. The first
exception is for voluntary cessation of a challenged action. See ARW
Exploration Corp. v. Aguirre , 947 F.2d 450, 452 (10th Cir. 1991). This
exception exists to counteract the potential for a defendant to cease illegal action
long enough to render a lawsuit moot and then resume the illegal conduct. It is
inapposite here since the expired interim rule cannot be easily repeated. The
second exception is for challenges to conduct “capable of repetition yet evading
review.” See S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Smith , 110 F.3d 724, 729 (10th Cir.
1997) . This exception is only to be used in exceptional situations. See White v.
Colo. , 82 F.3d 364, 366 (10th Cir. 1996). Such exceptional circumstances arise
“where two elements combine: (1) the challenged action was in its duration too
short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration; and, (2) there was a
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reasonable expectation that the same complaining party would be subjected to the
same action again.” Cent. Wyo. Law Assocs., P.C. v. Denhardt , 60 F.3d 684, 686
(10th Cir. 1995).
Appellants argue “because the duration of the interim rule was too short
for the case to be fully litigated prior to its expiration,” the Forest Service’s
alleged violations clearly “evade review.” Aplts. Response to Motion to Dismiss
at 14. However, this argument is in direct contradiction of appellants’
contentions in their “capable of repetition” argument. Assuming that the final
rule is identical to the interim rule (a fact that is at this point unknown), and
therefore suffers the same alleged infirmities, it is unclear how the issue will
evade review.
There remains for our consideration the anticipated effect of the final rule
and whether considerations of judicial economy would mitigate toward our
retention of this appeal to address issues now raised as regards the interim rule
that appellants would likely continue to assert as regards the final rule. See Nat’l
Iranian Oil Co. v. Mapco Int’l, Inc. , 983 F.2d 485, 490 (3d Cir. 1992). There is
no bright line test for determining whether the “same” statutory challenge would
be present in another suit. A challenge to an interim rule may proceed if the new
rule reproduces the old rule “word-for-word,” Tollis, Inc. v. San Bernadino
County , 827 F.2d 1329, 1331-32 (9th Cir. 1987), but fails as moot if there are
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any relevant changes, see Bunker Ltd. P’ship v. United States , 820 F.2d 308, 312
(9th Cir. 1987). The new road management rule will not take final effect until at
least May 2001. See 66 Fed. Reg. 8899 (Feb. 5, 2001). A two-month delay in its
finalization ordered in conjunction with the change in Presidential
administrations strongly hints that changes may still be made. If appellants want
to challenge the validity of the new rule, they must wait until that rule is
finalized.
Dismissal as moot is appropriate in this case. Were the court to grant the
relief requested, it would have no ultimate effect. See Phelps v. Hamilton , 122
F.3d 885, 891 (10th Cir. 1997). Further, appellants’ claims do not fall within
either of the two exceptions to the mootness doctrine.
The appeal is DISMISSED as moot.
Entered for the Court
Per Curiam
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