United States v. Borghee ( 2013 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
July 1, 2013
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 13-6001
(W.D. Oklahoma)
ALEX ALI BORGHEE, (D.C. No. 5:12-CR-00133-M-1)
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before PORFILIO, ANDERSON, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination
of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Defendant and appellant Alex Ali Borghee pled guilty to one count of bank
robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). He was sentenced to thirty-seven
months’ imprisonment. Arguing that his sentence is procedurally and
substantively unreasonable, Mr. Borghee appeals his sentence. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
At approximately 4:40 p.m. on April 20, 2012, Mr. Borghee entered a Bank
of America branch in Oklahoma City. He approached a teller and slid a note to
her which read, “5,000.00 money . . . or I’ll shoot.” Mr. Borghee also warned
the teller not to hit the panic button. When the teller realized Mr. Borghee was
robbing her, she began to unlock her drawer, which caused Mr. Borghee to ask if
she had hit the panic button. The teller told him that she had not. As the teller
began retrieving the cash, Mr. Borghee said, “thirty seconds” and then, a short
time later, “twenty seconds,” which made the teller believe that he was “counting
down.”
After the teller gave Mr. Borghee $1,442.00 in cash, he left the bank. The
teller then hit the panic button, informed a fellow employee that she had been
robbed, and locked the doors to the bank. When law enforcement personnel
arrived, the teller gave them a description of the robber.
After the robbery, Mr. Borghee contacted an individual, A.F., a former co-
worker to whom he owed money. Mr. Borghee told A.F. to meet him in a church
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parking lot and that he “had her money.” Mr. Borghee arrived at the meeting in a
black BMW. A.F. testified that Mr. Borghee had “bloodshot eyes, was sweating
on his hairline, fidgeting, and appeared extremely nervous.” Mr. Borghee had a
stack of cash in his hand and gave A.F. a $50 bill, telling her that he had robbed a
bank. A.F. stated that because Mr. Borghee “lied about everything,” A.F. did not
believe him.
On May 5, 2010, A.F. contacted the FBI and told agents that she had seen
pictures from the bank robbery which had been released to the public and that she
recognized Mr. Borghee. When the agents showed her additional pictures from
the bank robbery, A.F. confirmed that the robber was Mr. Borghee. She
apparently told the agents that Mr. Borghee “can be violent and would flee if
confronted about the bank robbery.” Other bank workers also identified
Mr. Borghee as the bank robber. Law enforcement personnel arrested
Mr. Borghee on May 15, 2012, and laboratory results confirmed that his
fingerprints were on the demand note.
A grand jury subsequently issued a one-count indictment charging
Mr. Borghee with bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). Mr.
Borghee then pled guilty to the offense without a plea agreement.
In preparation for sentencing under the advisory United States Sentencing
Commission, Guidelines Manual (“USSG”), the United States Probation Office
prepared a presentence report (“PSR”). The PSR calculated a total offense level
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of 21 which, with a criminal history category of I because Mr. Borghee had no
prior criminal convictions, yielded an advisory Guidelines range of 37 to 46
months.
Mr. Borghee filed his sentencing memorandum, in which he asked the court
to classify the bank robbery as “aberrant behavior” and depart downward,
pursuant to USSG § 5K2.20. 1 He also suggested a below-Guidelines sentence was
warranted because of his young age (24 years old) and his history of depression
and panic attacks. The government also filed a sentencing memorandum, in
which it argued that Mr. Borghee did not qualify for a departure based on
“aberrant behavior” and arguing, further, that a departure was not warranted
because Mr. Borghee made no effort to mitigate his crime and did not accept
responsibility for it until he was actually arrested and shown the evidence against
him.
1
Policy Statement §5K2.20 allows a downward departure “only if the
defendant committed a single criminal occurrence or . . . transaction that was (1)
committed without significant planning; (2) was of limited duration; and (3)
represents a marked deviation by the defendant from an otherwise law-abiding
life.” The commentary specifically includes a defendant’s “mental and emotional
conditions; . . . record of prior good works; . . . motivation for committing the
offense; and . . . efforts to mitigate the effects of the offense,” as proper
circumstances to consider in departing on these grounds. USSG §5K2.20 at
appl.n.3.
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The district court subsequently held a sentencing hearing. After listening
to all parties, the court made the following statement concerning Mr. Borghee’s
sentence and the issue of a downward departure:
Concerning the matter of the departure, the Court would first
note that this Court has a great deal of discretion in its application of
this particular guideline.
Someone said something about an ordinary bank robbery.
There is not an ordinary bank robbery, there is no such thing, in this
Court’s opinion, as an ordinary bank robbery.
The Court is aware that there are certainly some mitigating
factors in this case, but whether or not the behavior required . . .
significant planning, . . . certainly there was planning that had to
occur to get to the bank. . . . [T]he acts which the Defendant took
required[] significant planning[] to get there. The duration certainly
was brief, but the Court cannot consider this, without weighing the
impact of Ms. Perkle, who described for her what these moments
meant when the Defendant said to her, “give me $5,000 . . . or I’ll
shoot.” The fact that he did not have a gun doesn’t matter. . . .
I think probably the most compelling part . . . [is] the dearth of
mitigation conduct by the Defendant. I guess to use the words of the
prosecutor, he didn’t turn himself in, he did not have contact with
any authority, I think the fact was that he went to pay off one of the
debts that he had.
....
This Court does not find, and I know that there are other
judges in this courthouse who have departed in a bank robbery case
to a sentence of probation, but this Court does not find this case is
one such case where the Court can depart. It certainly is not the
worst bank robbery that this Court has ever seen, but meeting those
minimum — the planning, it was a few minutes, and he was an
otherwise law-abiding citizen, but this is not the case that this Court
believes is an appropriate one for the Court to depart from.
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I guess the Court will hang its hat on the efforts to mitigate the
effects of the offense in determining whether or not the Court should
depart.
Also, the motivation for committing the offense. I’m sure, Mr.
Borghee, because of his own efforts at taking seriously the mental
health, and other counseling that he has gotten, is good, but
everybody has bills. I appreciate that he is a younger man,
everybody has problems, but your response cannot be, in an ordered
society, to go and tell somebody, “Give me $5,000 . . . or I’ll shoot.”
It is just unacceptable.
. . . The Court is exercising its discretion not to depart downward
for those reasons.
Tr. of Sentencing Hr’g at 17-19 (emphasis added). The court then sentenced
Mr. Borghee to 37 months, at the bottom of the advisory Guidelines range.
This appeal followed, in which Mr. Borghee argues (1) the court abused its
discretion and committed procedural error in interpreting and refusing to apply
the “aberrant behavior”departure provisions of USSG §5K2.20 when it denied a
downward departure; and (2) the 37-month sentence is substantively
unreasonable.
DISCUSSION
We review a sentence for both procedural and substantive reasonableness,
giving deference to the district court under an abuse of discretion standard. Gall
v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). “[W]e review de novo the district
court’s legal conclusions regarding the guidelines and review its factual findings
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for clear error.” United States v. Gantt, 679 F.3d 1240, 1246 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 133 S. Ct. 555 (2012). “Procedural reasonableness addresses whether the
district court incorrectly calculated or failed to calculate the Guidelines sentences,
treated the Guidelines as mandatory, failed to consider the § 3553(a) factors,
relied on clearly erroneous facts, or failed to adequately explain the sentence.”
United States v. Huckins, 529 F.3d 1312, 1317 (10th Cir. 2008). Substantive
reasonableness, in turn, addresses whether the sentence length is reasonable given
all the circumstances of the case in light of the § 3553(a) factors. Id.
I. Procedural reasonableness and applicability of “aberrant
behavior” provision:
Prior to and at the sentencing hearing, Mr. Borghee sought a downward
departure from the advisory Guidelines range applicable to his sentence, arguing
that his single act of bank robbery constituted “aberrant behavior” in accordance
with USSG §5K2.20. The district court declined to award such a downward
departure. Mr. Borghee argues the court committed a procedural error by
“inject[ing] a new factor into the downward departure consideration which was
inconsistent with the purpose of the departure provision.” Appellant’s Op. Br. at
11. The government responds that we lack jurisdiction to review the district
court’s decision, because that decision was a discretionary refusal to grant a
downward departure.
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“Even after Booker, ‘[t]his court has no jurisdiction . . . to review a district
court’s discretionary decision to deny a motion for a downward departure on the
grounds that a defendant’s circumstances do not warrant the departure.’” United
States v. Fonseca, 473 F.3d 1109, 1112 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v.
Sierra-Castillo, 405 F.3d 932, 936 (10th Cir. 2005)). We may review the “denial
of a downward departure only if the denial is based on the sentencing court’s
interpretation of the Guidelines as depriving it of the legal authority to grant the
departure.” Id. We also have jurisdiction where a defendant “claim[s] that the
district court considered a prohibited factor under the Guidelines in denying a
downward departure.” Sierra-Castillo, 405 F.3d at 937.
Applying those precepts to our case, it is clear that the district court knew
it had the power and authority to depart downward from Mr. Borghee’s advisory
Guidelines range. It is also clear that the court considered whether the “aberrant
behavior” Guideline provision permitted it to so depart downward. Thus, we first
consider whether the court properly interpreted and applied the aberrant behavior
provision of USSG §5K2.20 to determine whether the court committed a
procedural error in calculating the advisory Guidelines sentence.
As indicated, the aberrant behavior provision permits a downward departure
where a defendant is implicated in a “single criminal occurrence” which was “of
limited duration” and “was committed without significant planning.” USSG
§5K2.20(b). The accompanying commentary suggests the consideration of other
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circumstances. The district court considered those circumstances and, contrary to
Mr. Borghee’s allegations, the court did not rely upon prohibited circumstances.
The court considered the totality of the circumstances surrounding Mr. Borghee’s
conduct, to see if it qualified as an “extraordinary” case of aberrant behavior.
Having determined that it did not, the court did not depart downward on that
basis. We perceive no procedural irregularity in the district court’s decision that
Mr. Borghee did not qualify for an aberrant behavior departure. 2
II. Substantive reasonableness
Mr. Borghee also claims his 37-month sentence is substantively
unreasonable. “When evaluating the substantive reasonableness of a sentence, we
afford substantial deference to the district court, and determine whether the length
of the sentence is reasonable given all the circumstances of the case in light of the
factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” United States v. Balbin-Mesa, 643 F.3d
783, 788 (10th Cir. 2011) (further quotation omitted). If the sentence is within
the correctly calculated Guideline range, it “is entitled to a rebuttable
presumption of reasonableness on appeal.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
“This is a deferential standard that either the defendant or the government may
rebut by demonstrating that the sentence is unreasonable when viewed against the
2
To the extent that the question before us is simply whether the district
court erred in refusing to depart downward in the exercise of its broad discretion,
we agree with the government that we lack jurisdiction to review such a decision.
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other factors delineated in § 3553(a).” United States v. Kristl, 437 F.3d 1050,
1054 (10th Cir. 2006) (per curiam).
Mr. Borghee argues that the “circumstances of this case warrant a sentence
below th[e] guideline range based on consideration of the factors enumerated in
[18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)].” Appellant’s Br. at 22. He argues that his “growing
depression and panic attacks, which were fueled by his financial situation” along
with his “young age and level of maturity,” led him to commit the bank robbery.
Id. at 23-24. Mr. Borghee further argues that a 37-month sentence is longer than
is necessary to further the sentencing goals of deterrence, protection, respect for
the law, and appreciation of the seriousness of the offense of bank robbery.
While Mr. Borghee makes a compelling case, he fails to rebut the
presumption of reasonableness which attaches to his within-Guidelines sentence.
The district court is afforded considerable discretion in crafting an appropriate
sentence. “A district court abuses its discretion when it renders a judgment that is
‘arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or manifestly unreasonable.’” United States v.
Munoz-Nava, 524 F.3d 1137, 1146 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v.
Byrne, 171 F.3d 1231, 1235-36 (10th Cir. 1999)). We cannot say that the district
court’s judgment in this case was arbitrary or capricious. It was thoughtful and
reasonable.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the sentence in this case.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Stephen H. Anderson
Circuit Judge
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