United States v. Radcliff ( 2014 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT May 7, 2014
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 14-1076
(D.C. Nos. 1:13-CV-03331-PAB &
JOHN WESLEY RADCLIFF, 1:99-CR-00061-PAB-2)
(D. Colo.)
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY*
Before HOLMES, EBEL, and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges.
John Wesley Radcliff, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks a certificate
of appealability (COA) to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion filed
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. We deny a COA, but we also vacate the district
court’s judgment and remand with instructions to dismiss Radcliff’s motion for lack
of jurisdiction.
Radcliff was convicted in 2001 of federal drug and firearm offenses. He
appealed, and this court affirmed his convictions and sentence. United States v.
Radcliff, 331 F.3d 1153, 1164 (10th Cir. 2003). In the § 2255 motion he filed in
*
This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the
case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its
persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
December 2013, Radcliff challenged his sentence imposed for his 2001 convictions,
citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151(2013). He argued that his motion was timely under § 2255(f)(3) because he claimed
that Alleyne recognized a new right that has been “made retroactively applicable to
cases on collateral review.”
The district court first construed Radcliff’s motion as an unauthorized second
or successive § 2255 motion, noting that he had previously filed a § 2255 motion in
2004. The court stated that, without this court’s authorization, it had no jurisdiction
to consider the merits of the claims Radcliff asserted in his second or successive
§ 2255 motion. The court next determined that transfer of the motion to this court
was not in the interests of justice and that the motion should be “denied” for lack of
jurisdiction. R. at 64. The court then proceeded to hold that, if the court did have
jurisdiction, Radcliff’s motion would be denied as untimely. The court ultimately
stated that the motion was “denied” “[f]or the reasons stated.” Id. at 61. The
judgment denied the motion and dismissed the action.
Radcliff must obtain a COA to pursue an appeal. See United States v. Harper,
545 F.3d 1230, 1233 (10th Cir. 2008). Because the district court’s ruling rests on
procedural grounds, he must show both “that jurists of reason would find it debatable
whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that
jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its
procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).
-2-
Radcliff first argues that the district court erred in holding that his motion was
untimely because it misconstrued § 2255(f)(3). But a district court does not have
jurisdiction to address the merits of an unauthorized second or successive § 2255
motion. In re Cline, 531 F.3d 1249, 1251 (10th Cir. 2008) (per curiam). Radcliff
therefore disputes that his December 2013 § 2255 motion was second or successive.
He claims that he never filed a first § 2255 motion.
The district court’s docket, however, reflects that Radcliff did file such a
motion on October 27, 2004. See R. at 50. He nonetheless maintains that his 2004
motion was not filed pursuant to § 2255. We have reviewed Radcliff’s 2004 filing
and conclude that it was a § 2255 motion. His motion and the district court’s order
denying it are attached to this order as Exhibits A and B. Radcliff filed the motion
on a form citing § 2255, and he stated he was challenging his 2001 convictions.
See Ex. A at 1. He then cited Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), for the
proposition that he was entitled to a jury determination of the facts supporting a
sentence enhancement based upon obstruction of justice. See id. at 4-5.
The district court denied Radcliff’s 2004 § 2255 motion as untimely.
See Ex. B at 2-3. A § 2255 motion that was dismissed as time-barred qualifies as a
first § 2255 motion, making any later motions challenging the same conviction
second or successive. See In re Rains, 659 F.3d 1274, 1275 (10th Cir. 2011)
(per curiam).
-3-
Thus, reasonable jurists would not debate the district court’s procedural ruling
that it lacked jurisdiction to consider Radcliff’s latest § 2255 motion because it had
not been authorized by this court. For that reason we deny a COA. But because the
district court proceeded to deny, rather than dismiss, Radcliff’s motion, we vacate the
district court’s judgment and remand with instructions to dismiss Radcliff’s
unauthorized second or successive motion for lack of jurisdiction. See Bender v.
Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986) (“When the lower federal
court lacks jurisdiction, we have jurisdiction on appeal, not of the merits but merely
for the purpose of correcting the error of the lower court in entertaining the suit.”
(brackets and internal quotation mark omitted)). We grant Radcliff’s application to
proceed on appeal without prepayment of costs and fees.
Entered for the Court
ELISABETH A. SHUMAKER, Clerk
-4-