Farlaino v. United States ( 1997 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
MAR 25 1997
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
SUSAN C. FARLAINO,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
No. 95-4165
v. (Dist. Of Utah)
(D.C. No. 94-CV-833-B)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before EBEL, HOLLOWAY, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
Susan Farlaino filed this action against the United States pursuant to the
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680, for personal
injuries allegedly sustained as a result of medical care she received from various
military medical facilities. Specifically, Farlaino claimed that officers and
employees of the United States negligently placed or left foreign objects within
her breast and, as a result, she incurred medical expenses and loss of earnings and
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
suffered “a continuing injury of mind and body.” The district court granted the
United States' Motion to Dismiss or Alternatively For Summary Judgment on the
grounds that plaintiff failed to comply with the jurisdictional prerequisites of the
FTCA. This court exercises jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and
affirms.
BACKGROUND
Farlaino, was the dependent wife of an active army serviceman. [R. at 107]
Between September 1983 and February 1990, Farlaino sought and received
medical care from various military medical facilities for infections and abscesses
in her right breast. On February 12, 1990, Farlaino sought medical care outside
of the military medical system, undergoing exploratory surgery by a private
physician at Castleview Hospital in Price, Utah. It was during that procedure,
according to Farlaino, that her private physician discovered and removed several
foreign objects from her right breast.
On January 31, 1992, Farlaino presented an administrative claim to the
United States Attorney's Office (USAO). On February 10, 1992, Farlaino
presented an administrative claim to the United States Department of Justice
(DOJ). Both claims alleged that an officer or employee of the United States
negligently placed or left a foreign object within Farlaino's breast.
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On February 10, 1992, Assistant United States Attorney Joseph W.
Anderson wrote to Farlaino's counsel and advised him that the receipt of the
Standard Form 95 Claim for Damage by the USAO did not comply with the
jurisdictional requirements of the FTCA. In response, Farlaino presented an
administrative claim to the United States Department of the Army (the “Army”)
on February 24, 1992, setting forth the same claim which she asserted in the
administrative claims filed with the DOJ and USAO.
On September 18, 1992, Farlaino filed a civil action in the district court
pursuant to the FTCA. Farlaino claimed that officers and employees of the
United States negligently placed or left foreign objects within her breast and, as a
result, she incurred medical expenses and loss of earnings and suffered injuries to
her mind and body. Approximately two months later, on November 23, 1992, the
Army denied Farlaino's administrative claim on two grounds: (1) her claim was
not presented to the Army within two years of the date on which it accrued; and
(2) because a lawsuit was pending, her claim was no longer amenable to
administrative settlement.
After Farlaino failed to appear at a status conference scheduled by the
district court, failed to designate expert witnesses, failed to conduct discovery,
and failed to file any dispositive motions before the scheduled cut-off date, the
district court dismissed Farlaino’s complaint for failure to prosecute. On August
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24, 1994, approximately one year later, Farlaino filed a document entitled "Re-
filing of Complaint" under the same civil number as her original complaint. On
January 4, 1995, Farlaino then commenced this action by filing a document
entitled "Amended Complaint." The amended complaint contained the same
allegations that Farlaino's original complaint contained, that the United States
negligently placed or left foreign objects in Farlaino's breast. 1
The United States filed a Motion to Dismiss or Alternatively For Summary
Judgment on the grounds that Farlaino's claims were barred by her failure to
present her administrative claim to the appropriate federal agency, the Department
of the Army, within two years after her claim accrued and by her failure to
commence this action within six months after notice of the final denial of her
administrative claim as required by the FTCA, 28 U.S.C. 2401(b). On August 8,
1995, the United States District Court for the District of Utah granted the United
States' motion. Farlaino appeals.
1
In addition, the Amended Complaint alleged that in September, 1983, Dr.
Antoine Jumell, an officer and employee of the United States, engaged in an
unauthorized touching or battery of Farlaino when he attempted to change
Farlaino's surgical dressing over her protests. Farlaino conceded at oral argument
before the district court that her claims of assault and battery were barred by the
statute of limitations. Accordingly, Farlaino has not appealed the district court's
dismissal of those claims.
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ANALYSIS
We review the grant of summary judgment de novo and apply the same
legal standard used by the district court under Fed. R. C. P. 56(c). Applied
Genetics Int’l, Inc. v. First Affiliated Sec., Inc., 912 F.2d 1238, 1241 (10th Cir.
1990). “Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute over
a material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Russillo v. Scarborough, 935 F.2d 1167, 1170 (10th Cir. 1991).
It is beyond dispute that the United States is immune from suit unless it has
consented to be sued. United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980). It is
similarly well established that “‘the terms of [the United States’] consent to be
sued in any court define that court’s jurisdiction to entertain the suit.’” Id.(quoting United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941)). The FTCA
represents a waiver of the United States’ sovereign immunity and must, therefore,
be strictly construed. Pipkin v. United States Postal Service, 951 F.2d 272, 275
(10th Cir. 1991). One of the conditions of that waiver is the statute of limitations
set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b). United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117-18
(1979). Section 2401(b) provides as follows:
A tort claim against the United States shall be forever barred
unless it is presented in writing to the appropriate Federal agency
within two years after such claim accrues or unless action is begun
within six months after the date of mailing, by certified or registered
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mail, of notice of final denial of the claim by the agency to which it
was presented.
The United States argues that Farlaino failed to comply with either
limitation period set out in § 2401(b). The United States notes that under §
2401(b), a claim is barred unless it is presented in writing “to the appropriate
Federal agency” within two years after the claim accrues. The Code of Federal
Regulations provides that the appropriate agency for purposes of § 2401(b) is the
“agency whose activities gave rise to the claim.” 28 C.F.R. § 14.2(b)(1).
Because Farlaino did not present her claim to the Army, the agency whose
activities gave rise to her claim, until more than two years after her claim
accrued, the United States argues that her action is barred by the first clause of §
2401(b).
In response, Farlaino argues that the DOJ was obligated to transfer the
claim to the Army pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 14.2(b)(1), which provides as follows:
A claim shall be presented to the Federal agency whose activities
gave rise to the claim. When a claim is presented to any other
Federal agency, that agency shall transfer it forthwith to the
appropriate agency, if the proper agency can be identified from the
claim, and advise the claimant of the transfer. If transfer is not
feasible, the claim shall be returned to the claimant. The fact of
transfer shall not, in itself, preclude further transfer, return of the
claim to the claimant or other appropriate disposition of the claim. A
claim shall be presented as required by 28 U.S.C. [§] 2401(b) as of
the date it is received by the appropriate agency.
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Because the DOJ failed to comply with the transfer requirements set out in
§ 14.2(b)(1), Farlaino argues that her claim should be considered constructively
presented to the Army as of the date it was presented to the DOJ. See Bukala v.
United States, 854 F.2d 201, 203-04 (7th Cir. 1988).
This court need not decide whether 28 C.F.R. § 14.2(b)(1) creates a
constructive filing exception to § 2401(b) because even if we assume, without
deciding, that Farlaino timely presented her claim to the Army, she still failed to
file this action “within six months after the date of mailing, by certified or
registered mail, of notice of final denial of the claim” by the Army. 28 U.S.C. §
2401(b).
The United States contends that Pipkin v. United States Postal Serv., 951
F.2d 272 (10th Cir. 1991), controls the disposition of this case. We agree. In
Pipkin, the plaintiff filed a grievance with the United States Postal Service
(“USPS”). Id. at 274. After the USPS denied the grievance on July 23, 1988, the
plaintiff filed an FTCA action on November 12, 1988. Id. Although the district
court dismissed the original FTCA suit on May 23, 1989, the plaintiff filed a
second and virtually identical FTCA suit on May 2, 1990. The district court
dismissed this second action as well. Id. On appeal, this court assumed that the
six-month limitations period set out in § 2401(b) was tolled during the pendency
of the original and timely filed FTCA action. Id. Upon dismissal of that claim
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for failure to prosecute, however, the limitations period began to run again.
Because more than six months elapsed between the dismissal of the first action
and the filing of the second, the second action was not timely filed. Id.
The facts of the instant case are remarkably similar to Pipkin. Farlaino
filed her administrative claim with the Army on February 24, 1992. She filed her
original FTCA action on September 18, 1992. Approximately two months later,
on November 23, 1992, the Army denied Farlaino’s claim on the following
grounds: (1) her claim was not filed within two years of the date her cause of
action accrued; and (2) her claim was no longer subject to administrative
settlement because a lawsuit was pending. The district court dismissed Farlaino’s
original FTCA action on August 23, 1993, for failure to prosecute. Farlaino then
filed a document styled “Re-filing of Complaint” on August 23, 1994 and filed an
“Amended Complaint” on January 4, 1995.
Assuming, as did the court in Pipkin, that the statute of limitations was
tolled during the pendency of Farlaino’s original FTCA action, the limitations
period did not begin to run until the district court dismissed the original action for
failure to prosecute on August 23, 1993. See id. Thus, Farlaino had until
February 23, 1994, (six months) to file suit. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b). Because she
did not file her second FTCA action until at least August 23, 1994, her suit was
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not timely filed. See Pipkin, 951 F.2d at 274; see also Benge v. United States, 17
F.3d 1286, 1288 (10th Cir. 1994).
In an effort to distinguish Pipkin, Farlaino argues that the documents she
filed as “Re-filing of Complaint” and “Amended Complaint” constitute a
continuation of her original, timely-filed FTCA action. This contention is clearly
untenable. The district court dismissed Farlaino’s original FTCA action on
August 23, 1993, for failure to prosecute. Because the district court’s order of
dismissal did not provide otherwise, the dismissal for failure to prosecute
“operate[d] as an adjudication upon the merits.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b); See 5
James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 41.14 (2d 1996). Thus, at
that point, the original action was terminated and there was nothing to which the
amended complaint could relate back. See Benge, 17 F.3d at 1288 (holding under
similar facts that “a separately filed claim, as opposed to an amendment or
supplementary pleading, does not relate back to a previously filed claim”).
This court can resolve Farlaino’s remaining contentions in short order.
First, Farlaino contends that DOJ is an “appropriate agency” for purposes of §
2401(b). She further contends that because she presented her claim to the DOJ in
a timely manner and the DOJ has not yet acted on her claim, the six-month
limitations period set out in § 2401(b) has not yet began to run. This contention
clearly fails in light of the 28 C.F.R. § 14.2(b)(1), which specifically defines
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appropriate agency for the purposes of § 2401(b) as the “agency whose activities
gave rise to the claim.” Second, in a barely comprehensible portion of her brief,
Farlaino appears to argue that the United States should be estopped from relying
on § 2401(b) for the following two reasons: (1) the DOJ failed to transfer
Farlaino’s claim to the Army as it was obligated to do under 28 C.F.R. §
14.2(b)(1); and (2) the United States failed to raise § 2401(b) in its answer to
Farlaino’s original, timely FTCA action. It is sufficient to note in response to
Farlaino’s contention that the limitations periods set out in § 2401(b) are
jurisdictional and are not subject to estoppel or waiver principles. See Hopeland
Band of Pomo Indians v. United States, 855 F.2d 1573, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1988);
Burns v. United States, 764 F.2d 722, 724 (9th Cir. 1985); Garrett v. United
States, 640 F.2d 24, 26 (6th Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Utah is
hereby AFFIRMED.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Michael R. Murphy
Circuit Judge
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