Gilchrist v. Citty ( 2003 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
JUN 25 2003
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
JOYCE A. GILCHRIST,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. Nos. 02-6352 & 02-6353
(D.C. No. CIV-02-538-R)
BILL CITTY, individually and in his (W.D. Okla.)
official capacity as Assistant Police
Chief; KEN MCDONALD and
JOHNNY KUHLMAN, both
individually and in their official
capacities as Majors with the
Oklahoma City Police Department;
RICHARD DAWES, individually and
in his official capacity as Chemist
Supervisor with the Oklahoma City
Police Department; MATTHEW
SCOTT, individually and in his
official capacity as Chemist with the
Oklahoma City Police Department;
JAMES D. COUCH, individually,
Defendants-Appellants,
and
CITY OF OKLAHOMA CITY, a
municipal corporation; M.T. BERRY,
individually and in his official
capacity as Chief of Police; ROBERT
A. JONES, individually and in his
official capacity as Deputy Chief of
Police; GAROLD SPENCER,
individually and in his official
capacity as Major with the Oklahoma
City Police Department; BYRON
BOSHELL, individually and in his
official capacity as Captain with the
Oklahoma City Police Department;
LAURA SCHILE, individually and in
her official capacity as Forensic
Chemist with the Oklahoma City
Police Department,
Defendants.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRISCOE , PORFILIO , and ANDERSON , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ requests for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The cases are
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
In these companioned cases, defendants Bill Citty, Ken McDonald, Johnny
Kuhlman, Richard Dawes, Matthew Scott, and James D. Couch appeal from the
district court’s order denying their motions to dismiss plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983wrongful discharge suit on the grounds that they are protected by absolute and
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
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qualified immunity. We have jurisdiction over these interlocutory appeals:
“[T]he denial of a motion to dismiss based on qualified or absolute immunity is
immediately appealable under the Cohen [v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp. ,
337 U.S. 541 (1949)] collateral order doctrine.” Tonkovich v. Kan. Bd. of Regents ,
159 F.3d 504, 515 (10th Cir. 1998) (footnote omitted). We determine that, at the
Rule 12(b)(6) stage of this litigation, defendants have not demonstrated their
entitlement to the protection of immunity. We affirm.
STANDARD AND SCOPE OF REVIEW
We review de novo a district court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Dill v. City of Edmond ,
155 F.3d 1193, 1201 (10th Cir. 1998). Our “‘function on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion
is not to weigh potential evidence that the parties might present at trial, but to
assess whether the plaintiff’s complaint alone is legally sufficient to state a claim
for which relief may be granted.’” Sutton v. Utah State Sch. for Deaf & Blind ,
173 F.3d 1226, 1236 (10th Cir. 1999) (quoting Miller v. Glanz , 948 F.2d 1562,
1565 (10th Cir. 1991)). We “accept[] as true all well-pleaded allegations in the
complaint and constru[e] them in a manner favorable to the non-moving party.”
Moore v. Gunnison Valley Hosp. , 310 F.3d 1315, 1316 (10th Cir. 2002).
We generally “look only at the four corners of the complaint” because we
are “reviewing the sufficiency of the complaint alone.” Moffett v. Halliburton
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Energy Servs., Inc. , 291 F.3d 1227, 1231 (10th Cir. 2002). There are exceptions to
this practice, however. As relevant to the instant Rule 12(b)(6) analysis, we may
take judicial notice of the existence of the opinions of other courts but not the
truth of the facts recited therein. Lee v. City of Los Angeles , 250 F.3d 668, 690
(9th Cir. 2001); S. Cross Overseas Agencies, Inc. v. Wah Kwong Shipping Group
Ltd. , 181 F.3d 410, 426 (3d Cir. 1999).
The brief summary provided below, therefore, is compiled primarily from
plaintiff’s complaint. It also includes information from published state and federal
court cases–not for the truth of the factual findings relating to Ms. Gilchrist, but
for the fact that defendants were aware of their existence. The summary does not
rely on factual allegations made only by defendants or on documents submitted
with the motions to dismiss. Specifically, it does not incorporate defendants’
characterization of the review board report recommending Gilchrist’s firing. 1
1
Although defendants did not attach the Review Board report to their
motions to dismiss, they attached numerous other documents which Gilchrist had
attached to an earlier complaint. See Aplt. App., 91-103. These documents have
no place in our Rule 12(b)(6) review.
Defendants state that they “offered to produce [the report] but were afraid
to attach it for fear it would turn [their] Motion to Dismiss into a Motion for
Summary Judgment (Fed.R.Civ.P., Rule 12b) defeating their right not to be
subjected to the burdens of discovery, etc. ” Aplt. Br. at 9, n.8; see also id. at 23
(“[T]heir [sic] exists an argument that by filing a Motion for Summary Judgment,
Appellants would give up their right not to face the burdens of discovery.”).
They also express a concern that the district court would not have given the
(continued...)
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FACTUAL SUMMARY
Joyce Gilchrist was an Oklahoma City Police Department forensic chemist
from 1980 through September 2001. Her job required her to conduct chemical
tests on physical evidence and provide expert testimony on the results of the tests.
For a number of years, her police-department supervisors and prosecutors believed
her to be an excellent employee. Apparently, they considered her expert testimony
to be especially effective. Problems with Gilchrist’s efforts on behalf of the
prosecution were simmering, however. In several cases, the Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals determined that Gilchrist violated discovery orders by
inexcusably delaying a forensic examination and providing reports to the defense
in an untimely manner. Miller v. State , 809 P.2d 1317, 1319-20 (Okla. Crim. App.
1
(...continued)
authorization to file a second motion for summary judgment required under the
Local Rules for the United States District Court of Oklahoma. Id. at 23.
The Review Board report, however, could have fallen into a recognized
exception to the general rule limiting this court’s review to the complaint. “[I]f a
plaintiff does not incorporate by reference or attach a document to its complaint,
[and] the document is referred to in the complaint and is central to the plaintiff’s
claim, a defendant may submit an indisputably authentic copy to the court to be
considered on a motion to dismiss.” GFF Corp. v. Associated Wholesale Grocers,
Inc. , 130 F.3d 1381, 1384 (10th Cir. 1997). “If the rule were otherwise, a
plaintiff with a deficient claim could survive a motion to dismiss simply by not
attaching a dispositive document upon which the plaintiff relied.” Id. at 1385.
The Review Board report is certainly central to Gilchrist’s claim. It is not part of
the record, however, and defendants’ statements concerning the report cannot be
considered.
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1991); Pierce v. State , 786 P.2d 1255, 1261 (Okla. Crim. App. 1990); McCarty v.
State , 765 P.2d 1215, 1217 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988).
In 1998, Gilchrist reported to the police chief that she heard that one of the
defendants, Major Garold Spencer, had sexually harassed a female vendor. She
alleges that Spencer and his allies on the police force were outraged, even though
he was not disciplined in connection with the charge.
Gilchrist’s expert testimony was even more seriously called into question in
September 1999 in the federal district court’s decision in Mitchell v. Ward ,
150 F. Supp. 2d 1194, 1220-29 (W.D. Okla. 1999), aff’d in part and rev’d in part
by Mitchell v. Gibson , 262 F.3d 1036 (10th Cir. 2001). This court granted habeas
relief to Mitchell based in part upon the district court’s finding that Gilchrist’s
testimony was false or misleading. Mitchell v. Gibson , 262 F.3d at 1063-66. The
police department responded to the district court’s publication of the Mitchell case
by prohibiting Gilchrist from DNA testing, giving her menial assignments, and
ordering her to move out of her office. They also arranged for an FBI agent to
conduct a re-analysis of the forensic evidence and a review of Gilchrist’s trial
testimony in eight cases.
Gilchrist was advised of misconduct charges: problems with her expert
testimony and also managerial shortcomings. She filed a grievance objecting to
the charges. Defendant M.T. Berry, the chief of police, named defendants Bill
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Citty (assistant police chief), Richard Dawes (a police-department chemist
supervisor), Johnny Kuhlman (a police-department major), Ken McDonald
(a police-department major), and Matthew Scott (a police-department chemist) to
the Oklahoma City Police Department Review Board responsible for conducting
proceedings in Gilchrist’s grievance.
The Review Board held a multi-day hearing in August 2001. With the
assistance of counsel, Gilchrist testified, presented a witness, and cross-examined
police-department witnesses. The Board then issued a report recommending the
termination of Gilchrist’s employment, primarily for her expert testimony in court
proceedings in seven cases, decided from 1984 to 1992. On September 25, 2001,
Berry followed the Board’s recommendation and discharged Gilchrist. Her
termination was approved by defendant Couch, the city manager.
She filed this § 1983 lawsuit, naming as defendants Oklahoma City, the city
manager, the chief of police, the deputy chief of police, her former supervisor,
Major Spencer, the police-department chemist who attempted to duplicate
Gilchrist’s analyses, and members of the Review Board. Gilchrist’s claims
included: First-Amendment retaliation for filing charges against Spencer,
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First-Amendment retaliation for providing truthful expert testimony, conspiracy to
retaliate, defamation, and deprivation of substantive and procedural due process. 2
Alleging that defendants retaliated against her and terminated her employment due
to her exercise of her First-Amendment right to testify in court and also due to her
reporting of Major Spencer’s alleged sexual harassment. She explicitly alleges
that her testimony was consistently truthful and accurate and that defendants
orchestrated false accusations of mishandling, withholding, and misrepresenting
evidence.
The members of the Review Board and Defendant Couch moved to dismiss,
arguing that they were entitled to judicial or quasi-judicial absolute immunity and
qualified immunity. The district court denied defendants’ motion. In two separate
orders, one addressing the Review Board defendants’ motion and one addressing
defendant Couch’s motion, the court concluded that, at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage of
the proceedings, they had not demonstrated entitlement to either absolute or
qualified immunity. This appeal followed.
2
The district court dismissed Gilchrist’s procedural due process claim
against the Review Board defendants. That dismissal is not an issue in this
interlocutory appeal.
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DISCUSSION
Absolute immunity
Defendants argue that they are entitled to absolute immunity from damages
for their termination decision, under the rationale of Butz v. Economou , 438 U.S.
478 (1978). 3
In Butz , the Supreme Court held that agency officials who perform
quasi-judicial functions are entitled to absolute immunity from suit. Id. at 514.
Later, in Cleavinger v. Saxner , 474 U.S. 193 (1985), the Court extended absolute
immunity to federal hearing examiners and administrative law judges. It refused,
however, to accord absolute immunity to employees of the Bureau of Prisons
temporarily diverted from their usual duties to serve on a prison discipline
committee, id. at 203-04, because they “are under obvious pressure to resolve
a disciplinary dispute in favor of the institution and their fellow employee,” id.
at 204. Absolute immunity is recognized only sparingly, and officials seeking the
immunity bear the burden of showing that their actions are entitled to such
absolute protection. Burns v. Reed , 500 U.S. 478, 486-87 (1991). There is a
presumption that qualified immunity is generally sufficient to protect government
officials. Id.3
Defendant Citty, the chairman of the Review Board, also asserts that he is
entitled to absolute immunity for his denial of one of Gilchrist’s pre-termination
requests for documents. The analysis of this issue is identical to that of the major
issue relating to all defendants.
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A court must engage in a functional analysis of an official’s conduct to
determine whether it is quasi-judicial in nature, and whether absolute immunity
attaches. Id. at 512. Following and applying Cleavinger , the Tenth Circuit has
identified six factors, among others
as characteristic of the judicial process and to be considered in
determining absolute as contrasted from qualified immunity: (a) the
need to assure that the individual can perform his functions without
harassment or intimidation; (b) the presence of safeguards that reduce
the need for private damages actions as a means of controlling
unconstitutional conduct; (c) insulation from political influence;
(d) the importance of precedent; (e) the adversary nature of the
process; and (f) the correctability of error on appeal.
Moore , 310 F.3d at 1317.
In this case, the limited record on appeal does not permit a reasoned
balancing of the Moore factors. For instance, it contains insufficient information
concerning the importance of precedent, the insulation of Review Board members
from political influence, the correctability of error on agency review, or the role of
Defendant Couch. The district court’s determination that defendants failed to
show entitlement to absolute immunity is therefore sustainable.
Qualified immunity
As an alternative basis for dismissal, defendants argue that the doctrine of
qualified immunity protects them from liability to Gilchrist.
Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, government officials
performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from
liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate
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clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known. The key to the qualified
immunity inquiry is the objective reasonableness of the official’s
conduct in light of the legal rules that were clearly established at the
time the action was taken.
Tonkovich , 159 F.3d at 516 (quotations, citations, and parentheticals omitted).
“Once a defendant raises the defense of qualified immunity in the context of
a motion to dismiss, a court must first determine whether the plaintiff has asserted
a violation of federal law.” Currier v. Doran , 242 F.3d 905, 917 (10th Cir. 2001).
“If the answer is yes, then we determine whether the right was clearly established
such that a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would have known that
his or her conduct violated that right.” Tonkovich , 159 F.3d at 516 (quotations,
citations, and parentheticals omitted).
The issue here is whether Gilchrist’s claim that she was discharged for
giving truthful opinion testimony satisfies both prongs of the qualified-immunity
test. It is well-established that “truthful testimony is protected by the First
Amendment and that a government employee may not be fired or subjected to
other adverse action as the result of such testimony.” Worrell v. Henry , 219 F.3d
1197, 1204-05 (10th Cir. 2000). “[Q]ualified immunity is not available to a
defendant who knowingly punishes an employee for uttering truthful testimony on
matters of public concern.” Wright v. Ill. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs. ,
40 F.3d 1492, 1505 (7th Cir. 1994).
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Defendants point out, however, that if an employee’s “supervisors
reasonably believed, after an adequate investigation, that her testimony was false,
even if it actually was true, they could punish her on the basis of their
investigation.” Id. at 1506 (citing Waters v. Churchill , 511 U.S. 661, 678 (1994)
(plurality opinion)). Defendants claim that, at the very least, the published cases
criticizing Gilchrist’s performance provided a reasonable basis for their belief that
Gilchrist’s testimony was false.
The complaint, however, alleges that defendants knew that certain portions
of Gilchrist’s testimony were corroborated by a later analysis, that DNA
technology did not exist at the time of her analysis, that her trial testimony was
misrepresented, and that the FBI agent acknowledged that certain of her analyses
were highly subjective. We agree with the district court that Gilchrist’s
allegations adequately raise an inference that defendants did not reasonably
believe her testimony to be false. Confining our analysis, as we must, to
Gilchrist’s allegations and judicially noticed facts, we determine that she has
adequately stated a violation of her First Amendment right to engage in protected
speech. Further, this right was clearly established at the time of her discharge.
As a consequence, the district court correctly denied defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6)
motion.
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CONCLUSION
Although we make no comment on the ultimate merit of Gilchrist’s case,
defendants have not shown entitlement to absolute or qualified immunity at this
point in the litigation. The district court’s denial of defendants’ motions to
dismiss is AFFIRMED. The defendants’ motion to file a supplemental appendix
is DENIED.
Entered for the Court
John C. Porfilio
Circuit Judge
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