Webb v. Williams ( 1997 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 11 1997
TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
EDWARD WEBB,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v. No. 97-2280
(D.C. No. CIV-97-246-JC)
JOE WILLIAMS, Warden; (New Mexico)
ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE
STATE OF NEW MEXICO,
Respondents-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, PORFILIO and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Edward Webb was convicted by a jury in state court of criminal sexual
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
penetration of a child and criminal sexual contact with a minor. He filed a
petition for habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, alleging that his
constitutional rights were violated in his state criminal proceedings because he
was denied: (1) equal protection during the jury selection process; (2) the right to
confront the witnesses against him; (3) the effective assistance of counsel; and (4)
due process when his prison legal assistant failed to inform him of the deadline
for filing a petition for writ of certiorari from the state district court’s denial of
his request for post-conviction relief. The magistrate judge recommended that
Mr. Webb’s request for federal habeas relief be denied, and the district court
adopted the recommendation. The district court granted a certificate of
appealability as to issues one to three but not as to issue four. Mr. Webb appeals
and we affirm.
In his first claim, Mr. Webb asserts he was denied due process during the
jury selection process when the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to remove
blacks from the jury panel. In his third claim, he alleges that his counsel was
ineffective in failing to raise an objection to the jury selection process, and in
failing to investigate the victim’s father. Mr. Webb raised these claims for the
first time in his petition for state post-conviction relief. The state district court
rejected the claims summarily as without merit. The New Mexico Supreme Court
returned Mr. Webb’s petition for writ of certiorari as untimely and denied his
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motion to file an untimely appeal.
The magistrate judge concluded that federal habeas review of these claims
was barred by procedural default, and we agree. We have held under virtually
identical circumstances that a claim raised for the first time in state post-
conviction proceedings is procedurally defaulted if the petitioner fails to obtain
timely review by the New Mexico Supreme Court of the state trial court’s ruling.
See Ballinger v. Kerby, 3 F.3d 1371, 1374 (10th Cir. 1993). Federal habeas
review of such a claim is barred unless the petitioner shows both cause and
prejudice for the default, 1 or that failure to hear the claim will result in a
fundamental miscarriage of justice. Shafer v. Stratton, 906 F.2d 506, 509 (10th
Cir. 1990). Mr. Webb has not shown cause for his failure to timely seek review
of these issues and we therefore need not address prejudice. 2 Moreover, to show
a fundamental miscarriage of justice, Mr. Webb must do more than make an
1
The state court’s finding of procedural default must, of course, be an
adequate and independent state ground in order to bar federal habeas review. See
Shafer v. Stratton, 906 F.2d 506, 509 & n.2 (10th Cir. 1990). Mr. Webb does not
argue that the New Mexico Supreme Court’s ruling barring his pleadings as
untimely was not adequate and independent, and we therefore do not address the
issue.
2
Mr. Webb appears to assert that his prison legal assistant’s failure to
apprise him of the filing deadline constitutes cause for the late filing of his state
post-conviction appeal. The Supreme Court has expressly rejected this argument,
holding that because a petitioner has no right to an attorney in state post-
conviction proceedings, the petitioner must bear the burden of his representative’s
failure to follow state procedural rules. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722,
752-54 (1991).
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unsupported allegation of factual innocence. He must present evidence sufficient
to undermine our confidence in the outcome of the trial. See Schlup v. Delo, 513
U.S. 298, 316 (1995). Mr. Webb has failed to make this showing as well, and
federal habeas review of these claims is therefore barred.
Mr. Webb’s second claim is that he was denied the right to confront
witnesses against him. This claim is based on the state trial court’s decision to
keep from Mr. Webb information about the individual who told the victim’s
mother that Mr. Webb was abusing the victim. In this appeal, Mr. Webb asserts
he was denied disclosure of the accuser’s identity, the opportunity to discover
whether the accuser possessed exculpatory evidence, and the right to confront the
accuser who did not testify at trial. The trial judge held an in camera proceeding
and concluded that the accuser’s identity was irrelevant and that he possessed no
exculpatory information.
Mr. Webb raised these issues in his direct appeal. The state court of
appeals held he had waived them by agreeing in open court that the identity of the
accuser was not important, and by failing to object to the trial court’s proposed
use of the in camera procedure. Mr. Webb has not shown cause 3 or prejudice for
his waiver of these claims during trial, nor, as discussed above, has he satisfied
We note that Mr. Webb does not assert that his trial counsel was
3
incompetent with respect to this matter.
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the requirements for invoking the “fundamental miscarriage of justice” exception.
Accordingly, federal habeas review of these claims is also barred.
Finally, Mr. Webb asserts he was denied due process by his prison legal
assistant’s failure to inform him of the deadline for filing a petition for writ of
certiorari. Implicit in this argument is Mr. Webb’s belief that he was entitled to
constitutionally adequate representation in his state post-conviction proceedings.
The Supreme Court has clearly held, under circumstances analogous to those here,
that a petitioner has no constitutional right to an attorney in state post-conviction
proceedings and that the petitioner must therefore bear the burden of a failure to
follow state procedural rules. See Coleman v.Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752-54
(1991). Absent a constitutional violation, a court’s reliance on its procedural
rules to deny review of a defaulted claim simply does not deny a petitioner due
process. We therefore deny a certificate of appealability as to this issue.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED as to issues one through
three. The appeal is DISMISSED as to issue four.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Stephanie K. Seymour
Chief Judge
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