Clark v. Scott ( 1998 )


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  •                                                                          F I L E D
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FEB 9 1998
    TENTH CIRCUIT
    PATRICK FISHER
    Clerk
    CHESTER LEE CLARK,
    Petitioner-Appellant,
    v.                                                     No. 97-6184
    (D.C. No. 97-CV-232)
    H.N. SCOTT; ATTORNEY                                   (W.D. Okla.)
    GENERAL OF THE STATE OF
    OKLAHOMA,
    Respondents-Appellees.
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
    Before BRORBY, EBEL, and KELLY, Circuit Judges. **
    Petitioner Chester Lee Clark, appearing pro se, seeks to appeal from the
    district court’s denial of a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The
    district court denied a certificate of appealability. Because Mr. Clark has failed
    to make a “substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right,” 28 U.S.C.
    *
    This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
    doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. This court
    generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
    and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
    **
    After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge
    panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material
    assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th
    Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
    § 2253(c)(2), we likewise deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the
    appeal.
    In 1993 Mr. Clark was convicted of using a vehicle to facilitate the
    intentional discharge of a firearm, shooting with intent to kill, assault and battery
    with a dangerous weapon, and felonious possession of a firearm. The Oklahoma
    Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed his convictions. Mr. Clark does not
    challenge his convictions but requests that his sentences on counts II, III, and IV
    be run concurrently with his sentence on count I.
    Sentencing issues are matters for state courts to determine by interpreting
    their own statutes, and ordinarily raise no constitutional claim cognizable in
    habeas. See Hill v. Page, 
    454 F.2d 679
    , 680 (10th Cir. 1971); see also Haynes v.
    Butler, 
    825 F.2d 921
    , 923-24 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 
    484 U.S. 1014
    (1988).
    Nevertheless, because we construe petitioner’s pro se brief liberally, see United
    States v. Hardwell, 
    88 F.3d 897
    , 897 (10th Cir. 1996), we address the issues Mr.
    Clark raises. He claims the trial court erred (1) in admitting evidence of other
    crimes by allowing testimony that Mr. Clark operated a drug house, (2) in merely
    sustaining an objection to, and admonishing the jury to disregard, a police
    officer’s testimony that he did not believe petitioner was telling the truth, (3) in
    admitting photographs without proper foundation, (4) in not allowing defense
    counsel to impeach a witness with prior inconsistent statements, (5) in allowing
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    the prosecution to refer to the charged incident as a drive-by shooting, and (6) in
    splitting petitioner’s two-count prior conviction to use as both a predicate felony
    for the weapon possession charge and as the basis for enhancing his sentence.
    “State court rulings on the admissibility of evidence may not be questioned
    in federal habeas proceedings unless they render the trial so fundamentally unfair
    as to constitute a denial of federal constitutional rights.” Brinlee v. Crisp, 
    608 F.2d 839
    , 850 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 
    444 U.S. 1047
    (1980); see Martin v.
    Kaiser, 
    907 F.2d 931
    , 934 (10th Cir. 1990) . None of Mr. Clark’s evidentiary
    challenges, in the context of the proceedings as a whole, rises to the level of
    fundamental unfairness or calls into question constitutional due process.
    With respect to Mr. Clark’s sixth assignment of error, “the Double Jeopardy
    Clause does no more than prevent the sentencing court from prescribing greater
    punishment than the legislature intended.” Missouri v. Hunter, 
    459 U.S. 359
    , 366
    (1983). We look to Oklahoma’s interpretation of its own law in determining
    whether double jeopardy has been violated. See Mansfield v. Champion, 
    992 F.2d 1098
    , 1100 (10th Cir. 1993). In Mr. Clark’s direct appeal the Oklahoma
    Court of Criminal Appeals ruled that Oklahoma law was not violated by using one
    count of his prior felony conviction as an element of the present count IV, and the
    other to enhance his punishment for counts I-III, where the sentence on count IV
    was not enhanced. See R. doc. 7, exh. A, at A3-4. We find no constitutional
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    error.
    Mr. Clark alludes to violations of Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 11(A) (West
    Supp. 1998) and the Double Jeopardy Clause with respect to his four-count
    conviction arising from what he describes as a single criminal event. Mr. Clark
    failed to raise this issue in his direct appeal. See R. doc. 7, exh. A. While Mr.
    Clark has failed to exhaust on this issue, it is clear that under Oklahoma law he
    has waived any claim of error which he could have raised on direct appeal but did
    not. See Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, § 1086 (West 1986); Paxton v. State, 
    910 P.2d 1059
    , 1061 (Okla. Crim. App. 1996). We may therefore consider the issue. See
    Coleman v. Thompson, 
    501 U.S. 722
    , 735 n.1 (1991), Demarest v. Price, 
    130 F.3d 922
    , 939 (10th Cir. 1997). This waiver results in a default pursuant to an
    independent and adequate state procedural rule. See Steele v. Young, 
    11 F.3d 1518
    , 1521 (10th Cir. 1993). Habeas review is thus prohibited in the absence of a
    showing of cause for the default and actual prejudice resulting from it, or a
    showing that a fundamental miscarriage of justice would result from the denial of
    relief. See 
    Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750
    ; 
    Steele, 11 F.3d at 1521
    .
    Mr. Clark does not suggest cause for or prejudice from his procedural
    default. Nor does he claim factual innocence; consequently no fundamental
    miscarriage of justice will result from the denial of relief. See Selsor v. Kaiser,
    
    22 F.3d 1029
    , 1034 (10th Cir. 1994).
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    APPEAL DISMISSED.
    Entered for the Court
    Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
    Circuit Judge
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