Colbert v. Barnhart , 85 F. App'x 152 ( 2004 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
JAN 6 2004
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
HAROLD COLBERT,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 03-6128
(D.C. No. 01-CV-1766-R)
JO ANNE B. BARNHART, (W.D. Okla.)
Commissioner, Social Security
Administration,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before McCONNELL , ANDERSON , and BALDOCK , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Plaintiff Harold Colbert appeals from the district court ’s affirmance of the
decision of the Social Security Administration denying disability benefits for his
claimed pain in his back, hips, and knees; swelling in his legs; high blood
pressure; hearing loss; and nervousness. “Our review is limited to determining
whether the agency’s findings are supported by substantial evidence and whether
the correct legal standards were applied.” Rutledge v. Apfel , 230 F.3d 1172, 1174
(10th Cir. 2000). In light of these standards, and after a thorough review of the
record on appeal, we affirm.
In order to determine whether a claimant is disabled under the Social
Security Act, the agency applies a five-step process. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520;
Williams v. Bowen , 844 F.2d 748, 750-52 (10th Cir. 1988) (discussing steps in
detail). Here, the administrative law judge (ALJ) reached step five, where the
burden is on the agency to show that claimant retains the RFC to perform work
that exists in the national economy. See Miller v. Chater , 99 F.3d 972, 975 (10th
Cir. 1996).
Following a hearing, the ALJ determined that Mr. Colbert was severely
impaired by osteoarthritis of the hips and knees and also by a sensorineural
hearing loss, that his conditions do not meet or equal a listed impairment, and
that Mr. Colbert could not perform his past relevant work as a warehouseman.
Finally, the ALJ concluded that Mr. Colbert retained the residual functional
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capacity to perform a limited range of light work, with nonexertional limitations
as to concentration, climbing, kneeling, crouching, and working in exposure to
heights or noise. Given these limitations, and based on testimony from a
vocational expert, the ALJ concluded that Mr. Colbert could perform several jobs
which exist in significant numbers in the national economy. Consequently, the
ALJ determined that Mr. Colbert was not disabled as defined in the Social
Security Act and regulations.
On appeal, Mr. Colbert’s main contention is that the ALJ committed legal
error in failing to discuss the medical evidence as required by Clifton v. Chater ,
79 F.3d 1007 (10th Cir. 1996). Under Clifton , “[ t]he record must demonstrate
that the ALJ considered all of the evidence,” and the ALJ must “‘discuss[] the
evidence supporting his decision, . . . the uncontroverted evidence he chooses not
to rely upon, [and] significantly probative evidence he rejects.” Id. at 1009-10.
The ALJ, however, need not discuss every piece of evidence. Id.Contrary to Mr. Colbert’s contentions, the ALJ’s discussion of the medical
evidence is legally sufficient. Though the decision is terse, it demonstrates a
meaningful analysis of the full medical record and Mr. Colbert’s testimony. In
the decision, the ALJ recognizes Mr. Colbert’s medically determinable
impairments. He notes that Mr. Colbert suffers from high blood pressure but
finds that this condition does not restrict his ability to work. He further
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comments that “[t]here is no objective evidence of any medically determinable
back condition.” Aplt’s App., Vol. 2 at 17.
The decision cites to the exhibits which the ALJ accorded “significant
weight,” as providing the “best evidence of [claimant’s] medical condition,” and
states that “there is no substantial evidence . . . contrary” to the listed exhibits.
Id. The specified exhibits included the records of treating physicians and a
consulting physician. See id. at 91-116 (Ex. 1F, medical records from treating
ear, nose, and throat specialist Dale B. Smith, D.O.); 117-27 (Ex. 2F, outpatient
records from Duncan Regional Hospital); 141-44 (Ex. 4F, medical records from
treating orthopedist Thomas J. Eiser, M.D.); and 145-150 (Ex. 5F, consultative
medical evaluation of internist David Seitsinger, D.O.).
Our review of the record bears out the ALJ’s conclusion that there is no
significant conflict in the evidence: the medical records of treating physicians
and consultants demonstrate remarkable agreement. Notwithstanding
Mr. Colbert’s hyperbole concerning treating physicians’ statements about his
weight, his eventual need for joint replacement surgery, and the need to avoid
running or jogging, the ALJ did not reject any “significantly probative evidence,”
Clifton , 79 F.3d at 1010. Accordingly, there was no such evidence to be
discussed. Id.-4-
With this consistent evidence as a base, the ALJ adequately explained his
determination that Mr. Colbert’s osteoarthritis does not meet the “objective
findings or loss of function” required to meet the applicable Listing 1.03,
concerning arthritis of a major weight-bearing joint. Aplt.’s App., Vol. 2 at 18.
Similarly, the ALJ adequately explained his reasons for not fully crediting
Mr. Colbert’s own description of his condition. He stated that Mr. Colbert’s
testimony was undercut by a number of considerations, including his medical
history and his account of a daily walk and swim. Id. at 19.
Although Mr. Colbert couches his argument as a question of law, he is
essentially asking us to reweigh the evidence. Of course, we cannot do this. See
Kelley v. Chater , 62 F.3d 335, 337 (10th Cir. 1995). We conclude that the agency
applied the correct legal standards and that substantial evidence supports the
agency’s decision. In light of this conclusion, we need not address Mr. Colbert’s
complaints about the district court ’s decision or analysis. The judgment of the
district court is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Bobby R. Baldock
Circuit Judge
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