Braxton v. Wyandotte County Sheriff's Department ( 2006 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
November 28, 2006
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
C ED RIC BR YA N T B RA X TO N,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
No. 06-3302
v. (D.C. No. 05-CV-3460-SAC)
(D . Kan.)
W YANDOTTE COUNTY SHERIFF’S
D EPA RTM EN T; LER OY G REEN,
Sheriff; RAN D A LL H EN D ER SON,
Jail Administrator; JOH N G AM BLE,
Chief Doctor; NEPHCA RE HEALTH
SERVICES; (FNU) (LNU), Nurses,
N ephCare H ealth Services; (FNU)
FITZPA TR IC K, Escort O fficer; (FNU)
BRIDG ES, Deputy; (FNU) HERW ITT,
Acting Sargent; (FNU) SHARP,
Sargent; (FNU) BUNNELL, Deputy;
(FNU) GARCIA, Deputy; GELBERT
(LN U), Deputy; (FNU) OW EN S,
D eputy; (FN U ) TR EN , D eputy; (FNU)
M ORM AN, Deputy; (FNU) W ALKER,
D eputy; JO H N A TH A N MA SO N,
Nurse; LANCE (LNU), Nurse.
Defendants - Appellees.
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. This court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Before KELLY, M cKA Y, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges. **
Plaintiff-Appellant Cedric Braxton, a state inmate appearing pro se, appeals
from the district court’s order dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights
complaint for failure to state a claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). At the
time of the events giving rise to this case, M r. Braxton was an inmate held in the
W yandotte County Detention Center, in Kansas City, Kansas. On October 13,
2005, while handcuffed and shackled, M r. Braxton fell down a flight of stairs at
the facility. He twisted his ankle, bruised and scraped his knee, damaged a
toenail, and experienced lower back and shoulder pain which required him to take
pain medication, restrict his activity, and use a walker. He alleges the fall was
caused by the negligence of an officer that was escorting him and by the torn and
unsafe shoes he was wearing. He also alleges that the medical response provided
to him was deficient under the Eighth Amendment. The district court dismissed
M r. Braxton’s complaint for failure to state a claim.
W e review the district court’s dismissal de novo, accepting all allegations
in the complaint as true and construing them in a light most favorable to the
plaintiff. See French v. Adams County Det. Ctr., 379 F.3d 1158, 1159 (10th Cir.
**
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge
panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material
assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th
Cir. R. 34.1(G). The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
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2004). Because M r. Braxton filed pro se, we must liberally construe the
allegations of his complaint. Id. W e will affirm the dismissal if it is obvious that
M r. Braxton cannot prevail on the facts he alleged and if it would be futile to give
him an opportunity to amend. Perkins v. Kan. Dep’t of Corrs., 165 F.3d 803, 806
(10th Cir. 1999). On appeal, M r. Braxton argues that the district court’s decision
is not in accord with Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976), and that he should
have been given leave to amend based on supplementary information provided the
district court. Our jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
The district court properly applied the requirements of Estelle v. Gamble
and required M r. Braxton to allege both objective and subjective components to
state an Eighth Amendment violation. To succeed on an Eighth Amendment
claim based on the conditions of confinement, an inmate must allege facts to
demonstrate the deprivation is “sufficiently serious” and that prison officials
acted with “deliberate indifference to inmate health or safety.” Fogle v. Pierson,
435 F.3d 1252, 1260 (10th Cir. 2006). In cases involving the deprivation of
medical treatment, prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment if “their
deliberate indifference to serious medical needs . . . constitutes the unnecessary
and wanton infliction of pain.” K ikumura v. Osagie, 461 F.3d 1269, 1291 (10th
Cir. 2006). However, medical malpractice is not compensable under § 1983
because inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care or negligence in
diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not violate the Eighth
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Amendment. Id.
M r. Braxton’s charge of negligence against the officer escorting him is not
cognizable under the Eighth Amendment because negligence does not constitute
deliberate indifference. See Smith v. Cummings, 445 F.3d 1254, 1258 (10th Cir.
2006). Similarly, M r. Braxton’s claim that his torn and unsafe shoes contributed
to his fall also sounds in negligence and does not violate the Eighth Amendment.
W e also conclude that the medical treatment provided to M r. Braxton did
not violate the Eighth Amendment. A delay in medical care only violates the
Eighth Amendment if the plaintiff can show the delay caused substantial harm.
Garrett v. Stratman, 254 F.3d 946, 950 (10th Cir. 2001). Substantial harm
constitutes a “lifelong handicap, permanent loss, or considerable pain.” Id.Although M r. Braxton may have experienced a modest delay in treatment, he has
not identified any substantial harm resulting from the delay in treatment.
Furthermore, within four days of his fall, M r. Braxton was seen by a prison
doctor, who prescribed pain medication and ankle support. M r. Braxton was also
referred to the University of Kansas M edical Center where he received
specialized treatment for his injuries. Based on these facts, we agree that M r.
Braxton has failed to allege a delay in medical care causing substantial harm.
M r. Braxton has also failed to demonstrate that the defendants acted with
deliberate indifference to his medical needs, namely that the defendants
knowingly disregarded an excessive risk to M r. Braxton’s health or safety. See
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Kikumura, 461 F.3d at 1291. M r. Braxton must allege some facts to demonstrate
the defendants’ subjective intent to deprive him of medical care, knowing that
such deprivation would cause significant risk to his health. M r. Braxton’s mere
allegations about the timing of his treatment, and his allegations that he only
received treatment after filing an administrative grievance, are insufficient in this
regard. The district court considered M r. Braxton’s supplementary information
under the correct legal standards.
AFFIRM ED. As the district court granted M r. Braxton’s motion to proceed
in forma pauperis on appeal, we remind him of his obligation 1 to make partial
payments until he has paid the entire appellate filing fee.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
1
The district court noted that any partial payments of filing fees will be
applied first to M r. Braxton’s obligation for the remainder of the $350.00 district
court filing fee. R. Doc. 18 at 1.
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