United States v. Robbins ( 2010 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
September 13, 2010
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
__________________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
No. 10-3078
v. (D.C. No. 5:09-CR-40002-JAR-1)
(D. Kan.)
TYLER N. ROBBINS,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BARRETT, ANDERSON, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination
of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Appellant Tyler N. Robbins appeals his conviction for being a felon in
possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He alleges the
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained during a
search of his home because the affidavit in support of the search warrant failed to
establish probable cause. We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291and affirm Mr. Robbins’s conviction.
I. Factual Background
In disposing of Mr. Robbins’s appeal, we summarize the facts contained in
the record on appeal and relied on by the district court which are addressed in its
memorandum order denying Mr. Robbins’s motion to suppress. In September
2008, Maryland law enforcement arrested and charged Mr. Robbins with six
firearms offenses, including three counts of possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon and three counts of having a handgun in a vehicle. After his
release on bond, Mr. Robbins failed to appear in court and an arrest warrant
issued. Sometime thereafter, Mr. Robbins returned to his home in Concordia,
Kansas. On October 30, 2008, Mr. Robbins’s sister-in-law, Jenny Parker, called
Concordia Police Officer Douglas Thoman to report that someone told her Mr.
Robbins was attempting to sell weapons and “could be transporting four AK-47
assault rifles and up to or around 4,000 rounds of ammunition.” She also reported
that her father, who is Mr. Robbins’s father-in-law, told her “there was a loaded
12-gauge shotgun sitting next to [Mr. Robbins’s] front door,” and he had
“weapons in the house with him.” She further stated Mr. Robbins was trying to
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pay someone to batter her and her mother, and she knew a warrant had been
issued for his arrest. She also informed Officer Thoman that Mr. Robbins was a
methamphetamine user and heavy drinker and she heard him say he was “not
afraid to shoot anyone.” Finally, she explained his two young children lived with
him.
Following Ms. Parker’s call, Concordia police assembled a six-person
tactical team to execute an arrest warrant on Mr. Robbins, as requested by
Maryland law enforcement officials. Included in the tactical team were
Concordia Police Officers Thoman, Voelker, Davis, Beldon, and Fredrickson, and
Detective Copple. They conducted surveillance of Mr. Robbins’s residence and
then had Ms. Parker call her sister, Gina Robbins, to get her and the two children
out of the house. However, Mrs. Robbins only left with one child. Officers and
Police Chief Danny Parker stopped Mrs. Robbins in her vehicle three blocks away
from her home, after which they took her child to another location. With her
cooperation, Police Chief Parker placed Mrs. Robbins in the front seat of his
vehicle and drove to and parked at the north end of the block, approximately three
lots away from her house.
The tactical team then stationed themselves around the house. Officer
Thoman positioned himself on the southwest corner of the house behind an
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evergreen tree only twelve to fifteen yards from the covered front porch and in
direct line of sight to the front door, giving him an unobscured view. Once the
team was in position, Mrs. Robbins contacted her husband by telephone, after
which Police Chief Parker took the telephone and talked to Mr. Robbins,
instructing him to send out his other child. Mr. Robbins complied by opening the
front door and pushing his son out the door; as he walked out behind his son, Mr.
Robbins continued to talk to Police Chief Parker on his cell phone. However,
Officer Thoman “noticed a long black object in Mr. Robbins’[s] hand,” which he
described as a “black long-barreled weapon.” As a result, Officer Thoman
immediately signaled to Officer Voelker that Mr. Robbins possessed a weapon; in
turn, Officer Voelker radioed the other tactical team members, informing them of
Mr. Robbins’s weapon possession. Other than Officer Thoman, none of the
officers were in a line of vision which permitted them to see whether Mr. Robbins
possessed a firearm.
After Mr. Robbins directed his son toward the lawn, he retreated back into
the house. After a minute or two, he again exited the front door unarmed and
continuing to speak on his cell phone. At that time he was arrested.
Later that day, Officer Thoman presented a federal magistrate judge an
affidavit and application for a search warrant on the basis of Ms. Parker’s
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statements and his first-hand observations during the execution of the arrest
warrant. In his affidavit, Officer Thoman stated he “noticed a long black object
in Mr. Robbins’[s] hand that resembled a firearm.” The magistrate judge
questioned him on the topic, asking him if he knew if it was a firearm, and
Officer Thoman explained he knew it was a firearm but did not know if it was a
rifle or a shotgun. At that time, for the purpose of clarification, the magistrate
judge asked Officer Thoman to alter the language of the affidavit from
“resembled a firearm” to having seen “either a shotgun or a rifle.” Accordingly,
Officer Thoman crossed out the phrase “resembled a firearm” and handwrote the
phrase “was either a shotgun or rifle.”
The magistrate judge then issued the search warrant, permitting police to
search Mr. Robbins’s residence for firearms. Three of the same members of the
tactical team, Officers Voelker, Davis, and Beldon, as well as another officer,
executed the warrant, finding, among other things: (1) parts to an AK-47 beside
the middle bedroom door; (2) two AK-47’s on the middle bedroom closet floor;
(3) a shotgun on the east bedroom closet floor; (4) several boxes of ammunition
found in the east bedroom; and (5) a green military duffel bag containing an AK-
47 with a loaded magazine. However, they did not find a shotgun near the front
door as indicated by Ms. Parker and her father.
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On January 21, 2009, a grand jury indicted Mr. Robbins on five counts of
being a felon in unlawful possession of a firearm in and affecting interstate
commerce in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Thereafter, Mr. Robbins filed a
motion to suppress all evidence seized from his residence, alleging Officer
Thoman’s statements in the affidavit were insufficient to establish probable cause.
In support, he claimed Officer Thoman’s recounting of Ms. Parker’s statements
lacked credibility, given she was motivated by animosity toward him and she did
not disclose who provided her information on the four AK-47 rifles. He also
alleged Officer Thoman’s observations during the arrest were unreliable because
he altered the affidavit from “firearm” to “shotgun or rifle” when he sought the
magistrate judge’s approval of the search warrant.
After the government filed its response opposing Mr. Robbins’s motion to
suppress, the district court held a hearing at which both parties presented
argument and evidence. The government presented the testimony of Officers
Thoman and Voelker. Officer Thoman testified: (1) his view of Mr. Robbins was
not obstructed, even though he was behind an evergreen tree and the porch had a
support beam; (2) he had no doubt Mr. Robbins possessed a “black long barreled
weapon” when he first exited the house with his son; (3) Mr. Robbins re-entered
the house and only one or two minutes lapsed before he exited the house again
without a firearm; (4) Officer Thoman signaled to Officer Voelker that Mr.
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Robbins possessed a gun; and (5) while they did not find a firearm by the front
door or in the front living room, the living room was only fourteen feet by twelve
feet, with the bedrooms containing the discovered firearms off to the side.
Officer Voelker’s testimony corroborated Officer Thoman’s testimony. He
explained Officer Thoman had a direct line of sight to the front door. He also
testified Officer Thoman signaled to him when Mr. Robbins first exited the house
that he had a gun, after which Officer Voelker radioed the other officers,
informing them of Mr. Robbins’s weapon possession.
Mr. Robbins’s only witness was his wife. She testified Police Chief Parker
took her to the north end of the block, three lots or approximately seventy feet
from her home, where he detained her in the front seat of his vehicle. She
testified she could see her husband’s hand on their son and a cell phone in his
other hand when he first exited the house, but she did not see anything in his
hands “that could be misconstrued as a firearm.” However, she also admitted that
while she could see the front door of their house when it was open, she was
positioned at an angle that did not permit her to see everything in the door frame.
She also testified that once her husband came out with her son, he did not go back
into the house.
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Following the hearing, the district court issued an order and memorandum
denying Mr. Robbins’s motion. As to probable cause in support of issuance of
the warrant, it determined Officer Thoman’s first-hand observation of seeing “a
long black object in Mr. Robbins’[s] hand that was either a shotgun or a rifle”
was also corroborated by Ms. Parker’s statement Mr. Robbins kept a weapon by
the door. Accordingly, the district court concluded the affidavit provided the
required substantial basis for the magistrate judge’s reasonable inference Mr.
Robbins maintained a firearm in his home and conclusion the affidavit established
the requisite probable cause for a search warrant.
On the issue of Officer Thoman’s handwritten change on the affidavit, it
noted Mr. Robbins did not cite to any authority, nor could the district court find
any, holding an interlineation on an affidavit per se discredits a magistrate
judge’s determination of probable cause, especially when it occurred in the
presence and at the advice of a neutral and detached magistrate. It further
explained the magistrate judge’s inquiry into the precise language used in the
affidavit was intended to clarify Officer Thoman’s meaning rather than to alter
what took place.
With respect to the testimony offered at the hearing, the district court found
Officer Thoman’s hearing testimony Mr. Robbins possessed a firearm was more
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reliable than Mrs. Robbins’s testimony he did not have a gun, given Officer
Thoman was only fifteen yards from the porch with a direct line-of-sight view to
the door, while Mrs. Robbins stated she was at least seventy feet from the door
and positioned at an angle which did not allow her to see everything occurring in
the door frame. It also found Officer Thoman’s testimony was corroborated by
Officer Voelker, who testified Officer Thoman immediately signaled to him that
Mr. Robbins possessed a firearm when he first exited the front door.
Alternatively, the district court held that even if the affidavit did not
support a finding of probable cause, the good faith doctrine in United States v.
Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), applied, and Mr. Robbins failed to establish any
exception to it. In so holding, it determined the affidavit supporting the warrant
contained a sufficient indicia of probable cause, based on Officer Thoman’s hand
signal and Officer Voelker’s subsequent radio signal to other officers that Mr.
Robbins possessed a firearm, so that those same officers could reasonably and in
good faith rely on the affidavit stating Mr. Robbins possessed firearms when they
executed the search warrant. It also found the officers, in executing the search
warrant, could reasonably rely on Ms. Parker’s statements Mr. Robbins possessed
weapons, given her familial connection to the home and her accurate statements
concerning his outstanding arrest warrant and the fact his two children were
living in the home.
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Following the suppression hearing, Mr. Robbins entered into a conditional
plea agreement, pleading guilty to count five of being a felon in illegal possession
of a firearm, but reserving his right to appeal the district court’s denial of his
motion to suppress. After the district court accepted Mr. Robbins’s guilty plea, it
sentenced him to forty-six months imprisonment and three years supervised
release.
II. Discussion
Mr. Robbins now appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to
suppress evidence, raising the same issues he raised before concerning the
reliability of Officer Thoman’s and Ms. Parker’s statements and the alteration on
the affidavit. In turn, the government continues to oppose Mr. Robbins’s
arguments in support of his motion to suppress.
In addressing Mr. Robbins’s contentions, we first consider our standard of
review:
When reviewing a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress, this
court accepts the district court’s factual findings unless they are
clearly erroneous, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the government. However, the ultimate determination of
reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is a question of law and
is reviewed de novo under the totality of the circumstances.
United States v. Basham, 268 F.3d 1199, 1203 (10 th Cir. 2001). “[O]ur review of
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a magistrate judge’s probable-cause ruling is more deferential.” United States v.
Biglow, 562 F.3d 1272, 1280 (10 th Cir. 2009). We generally “give considerable
deference to a magistrate’s determination of probable cause; a reviewing court’s
only duty is to ensure that the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding
that probable cause existed.” United States v. Mathis, 357 F.3d 1200, 1205 (10 th
Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).
As to the applicable legal principles involved, it is clear probable cause is
necessary for issuance of a search warrant, as supported by an oath or affirmation.
See id. at 1203. We review the sufficiency of an affidavit on which a warrant is
issued by looking at the totality of the circumstances and ensuring the magistrate
judge had a substantial basis for concluding probable cause existed. See Basham,
268 F.3d at 1203. “Probable cause to issue a search warrant exists only when the
supporting affidavit sets forth facts that would lead a prudent person to believe
there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in
a particular place.” Id. However, we do not require “hard evidence or personal
knowledge of illegal activity [to] link a Defendant’s suspected unlawful activity
to his home.” Biglow, 562 F.3d at 1279 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Instead, “a sufficient nexus is established once an affidavit describes
circumstances which would warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief
that the articles sought are at a particular place.” Id. (internal quotation marks
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omitted).
As a result, “judges may rely on the opinion of law enforcement officers as
to where contraband or other evidence may be kept” as well as inferences
reasonably drawn from the evidence connecting a defendant’s suspected activity
to his residence. Id. at 1279-80. Judges may also rely on hearsay evidence which
“may form the basis for a probable cause determination” as well as “information
received through an informant, ... so long as the informant’s statement is
reasonably corroborated by other matters within the officer’s knowledge.”
Mathis, 357 F.3d at 1204 (internal quotation marks omitted). While an
“informant’s veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge [are] relevant factors to
evaluate,” so is “a law enforcement agent’s opinion, based upon his professional
expertise, that evidence of illegal activity will be found in the place to be
searched.” Id. at 1205.
In applying our standard of review and the applicable rules in evaluating
probable cause for issuance of a search warrant, we conclude the district court in
this case did not commit any error in denying Mr. Robbins’s motion to suppress.
The affidavit in question plainly stated Officer Thoman personally observed a
long-barreled shotgun or rifle in Mr. Robbins’s possession the first time he exited
the house. This alone would be sufficient for the magistrate judge to have
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determined a substantial basis existed that evidence of the crime of being a felon
in possession of a firearm was probably present in the place to be searched and
thereby conclude the requisite probable cause was present for the purpose of
issuing the warrant.
The fact the magistrate judge asked Officer Thoman to clarify what he
meant by “firearm” in the affidavit and, in turn, had Officer Thoman insert his
clarification into the affidavit that it “was either a shotgun or a rifle” does not
alter what Officer Thoman saw. While Mr. Robbins suggests this alteration
evidences the magistrate judge’s lack of objectivity and neutrality, we disagree.
Instead, the magistrate judge was acting in a detached and neutral capacity by
ensuring that what Officer Thoman saw was indeed a firearm and attempting to
narrow down the type of firearm seen. In addition, the magistrate judge was able
to observe Officer Thoman during this discussion for the purpose of making a
credibility determination, to which we give due deference.
In addition to Officer Thoman’s first-hand account of seeing Mr. Robbins
with a firearm, the affidavit also advised the magistrate judge that Mr. Robbins
was a convicted felon with six recent outstanding firearms violations, three of
which involved possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Thus, even without
Ms. Parker’s hearsay statements in the affidavit, such reliable information
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showing Mr. Robbins’s recent history of illegal possession of firearms and the
outstanding warrant related thereto tended to corroborate Officer Thoman’s
statement Mr. Robbins possessed a firearm on the day in question.
With respect to the statements made by Ms. Parker, it is clear she had a
familial relationship with Mr. Robbins and that at least one source of her hearsay
information was sufficiently identified as her father, who saw a shotgun by the
front door and knew weapons existed in the home. As previously stated, the
magistrate judge may rely on such hearsay information in making a probable
cause determination, and this information clearly corroborated Officer Thoman’s
statement he observed Mr. Robbins holding a shotgun or rifle. In addition, the
reliability of Ms. Parker’s statements was supported, not only by her and her
father’s familial relationship to Mr. Robbins, but her accurate information as to
Mr. Robbins’s outstanding warrant for gun possession. Finally, it is obvious the
magistrate judge was aware of Ms. Parker’s apparent animosity toward her
brother-in-law, given her accusation regarding his desire to batter her and her
mother; however, that does not require the magistrate judge to totally discount the
information she provided but merely to weigh that information with the other
information provided. Thus, we agree with the district court a substantial basis
existed for the magistrate judge to conclude the affidavit alleged sufficient facts
to establish probable cause of illegal activity evidence at Mr. Robbins’s home.
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With respect to the district court’s determinations on the evidence
presented at the suppression hearing, it found Officer Thoman’s testimony on Mr.
Robbins’s gun possession was reliable based on his first-hand observations and
the fact his testimony was corroborated by Officer Voelker, who testified Officer
Thoman signaled to him that Mr. Robbins possessed a firearm. In addition, the
district court had an opportunity to observe these witnesses at the suppression
hearing and make a credibility determination. As we have long held, “[t]he
credibility of witnesses, the weight to be given evidence, and the reasonable
inferences drawn from the evidence fall within the province of the district court.”
United States v. Higgins, 282 F.3d 1261, 1269-70 (10 th Cir. 2002).
The only contrary testimony offered at the suppression hearing to counter
this evidence was Mrs. Robbins’s testimony. But the district judge, who also had
the opportunity to observe her and make reliability and credibility determinations,
considered her admission she could not entirely observe the events on the porch
and explicitly discounted her testimony Mr. Robbins did not possess a gun,
which, unlike Officer Thoman’s testimony, was uncorroborated by any other
evidence. We further point out that while Mrs. Robbins admitted she could not
see everything occurring in the door frame of the porch, Officer Thoman
unequivocally testified he had “no doubt” Mr. Robbins possessed a firearm.
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Based on the totality of the circumstances presented, it is clear probable
cause existed for issuance of the search warrant. Therefore, we need not
alternatively address the Leon good-faith doctrine, other than to agree with the
district court the officers executing the search warrant had an objective good-faith
belief the warrant was properly executed by a neutral magistrate. See United
States v. Campbell, 603 F.3d 1218, 1226 (10 th Cir. 2010), petition for cert. filed
(Aug. 3, 2010) (No. 10-5843). 1 As the district court concluded, the affidavit
supporting the warrant contained a sufficient indicia of probable cause based on
Officer Thoman’s hand signal and Officer Voelker’s subsequent radio signal to
1
As we stated in Campbell:
When an officer searches pursuant to a warrant, Leon generally
requires we presume the officer acted in good-faith reliance upon the
warrant. It is only when an officer’s reliance was wholly
unwarranted that good faith is absent. But this presumption is not
absolute. As we have reiterated many times, a warrant subsequently
determined to lack probable cause demands suppression of the
resulting evidence in at least four situations: (1) when the issuing
magistrate was misled by an affidavit containing false information or
information that the affiant would have known was false if not for his
reckless disregard of the truth; (2) when the issuing magistrate
wholly abandons [his or] her judicial role; (3) when the affidavit in
support of the warrant is so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to
render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable; and (4)
when a warrant is so facially deficient that the executing officer
could not reasonably believe it was valid.
Id. at 1225-26 (internal quotation marks, citations, and alterations omitted).
Another instance when the good faith doctrine may not apply is when the
warrant’s flaw results from recurring or systemic police negligence. See id. at
1226. Nothing in the record indicates any of these exceptions apply here.
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the other officers that Mr. Robbins possessed a gun, so those same officers could
reasonably rely on the affidavit stating Mr. Robbins possessed firearms when they
executed the search warrant. As the district court also determined, the officers
executing the search warrant could reasonably rely on Ms. Parker’s statement Mr.
Robbins possessed weapons, given her familial connection to the home and the
proven accuracy of her statements he had an outstanding arrest warrant and two
children living in the home.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons contained herein, we AFFIRM Mr. Robbins’s conviction.
Entered by the Court:
WADE BRORBY
United States Circuit Judge
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