Martinez v. Hartley , 413 F. App'x 44 ( 2011 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
TENTH CIRCUIT February 15, 2011
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
STEPHEN MARTINEZ,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v. No. 10-1390
(D.C. No. 1:07-CV-01305-CMA-KMT)
STEVE HARTLEY, Warden, L.C.F.; (D. Colo.)
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF
THE STATE OF COLORADO,
Respondents-Appellees.
ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY *
Before MURPHY, GORSUCH, and HOLMES, Circuit Judges.
Stephen Martinez, a Colorado state prisoner proceeding pro se, 1 seeks a
certificate of appealability (“COA”) to challenge the district court’s denial of his
petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Mr.
*
This order is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law
of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its
persuasive value consistent with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and
Tenth Circuit Rule 32.1.
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge panel
determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material assistance in
the determination of this matter. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G).
The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
1
Because Mr. Martinez is proceeding pro se, we construe his filings
liberally. See, e.g., Garza v. Davis, 596 F.3d 1198, 1201 n.2 (10th Cir. 2010).
Martinez also moves for leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal.
Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253(a), we deny Mr.
Martinez’s application for a COA and dismiss his appeal. We also deny Mr.
Martinez’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis.
BACKGROUND
A Colorado jury convicted Mr. Martinez of first-degree murder for
knowingly causing the death of a child under the age of twelve, and being in a
position of trust with respect to the victim, under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-6-
401(7)(c). 2 On direct appeal, the Colorado Court of Appeals reversed Mr.
Martinez’s conviction because it found that the trial court allowed into evidence
unfairly prejudicial expert testimony about accident scenarios that cause subdural
hematomas in children. See People v. Martinez, 51 P.3d 1046, 1051 (Colo. App.
2001). The Colorado Court of Appeals did not reach Mr. Martinez’s argument
that his due process rights were violated because the police and the prosecution
adopted inconsistent positions. See id. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed the
2
As the magistrate judge noted, “[a]t various times in the state court
record and their briefs . . . both Petitioner and Respondents assert that Petitioner
was convicted under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-102(1)(f) (2000) rather than
§ 18-6-401(7)(c).” Martinez v. Hartley, No. 1:07-CV-01305-CMA-KMT, 2009
WL 6749588, at *1 n.1 (D. Colo. July 14, 2009). “[Section] 18-6-401(7)(c)
incorporates § 18-3-10[2](1)(f) to define the crime of ‘knowingly caus[ing] the
death of a child who has not yet attained twelve years of age and the person
committing the offense is one in a position of trust with respect to the child’ as
first-degree murder.” Id. (third alteration in original).
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judgment of the Colorado Court of Appeals and reinstated Mr. Martinez’s
conviction. See People v. Martinez, 74 P.3d 316, 326 (Colo. 2003). On remand,
the Colorado Court of Appeals rejected Mr. Martinez’s inconsistent-positions
argument, and affirmed his conviction. See R., Vol. 1, at 273–76 (People v.
Martinez, No. 00CA0312 (Colo. App. Nov. 13, 2003)).
Mr. Martinez then filed a motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to
Colorado Rule of Criminal Procedure 35, asserting, inter alia, that his trial
counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to perform an adequate
investigation, and that the Colorado legislature unconstitutionally removed the
finding of sentence-enhancing facts from the jury. The state trial court denied
relief. See R., Vol. 2, Order Denying Def.’s Mot. for Post-Conviction Relief
Pursuant to Crim. P. 35(c) and Denying Def.’s Mot. for Appointment of Counsel,
at 2 (dated May 12, 2005) [hereinafter “Post-Conviction Order”]. Thereafter, the
Colorado Court of Appeals dismissed Mr. Martinez’s appeal as untimely filed.
See R., Vol. 2, People v. Martinez, No. 06CA1215 (Colo. App. Mar. 21, 2007).
Following his failure to obtain relief in the state courts, Mr. Martinez filed
a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the United
States District Court for the District of Colorado. The district court dismissed
Mr. Martinez’s habeas petition and denied a COA. See Martinez v. Hartley, No.
1:07-CV-01305-CMA-KMT, 2010 WL 3170770 (D. Colo. Aug. 10, 2010).
Mr. Martinez now seeks a COA from this court, arguing that: (1) his trial
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was rendered fundamentally unfair by the admission of expert testimony about the
amount of force necessary to cause a subdural hematoma in a child; (2) the police
and the prosecution impermissibly adopted inconsistent positions—viz., the police
promised Mr. Martinez that he would only be charged with accidentally causing
the child’s death, but the prosecution did not adhere to this promise when it
charged him with first-degree murder; (3) his trial counsel rendered ineffective
assistance by failing to adequately investigate evidence that modest amounts of
force could cause the child’s death; and (4) the state legislature unconstitutionally
removed the finding of sentence-enhancing facts from the jury.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
A COA is a jurisdictional prerequisite to this court’s review of a habeas
corpus petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c); Allen v. Zavaras, 568 F.3d 1197, 1199
(10th Cir. 2009) (citing Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003)). “We
will issue a COA ‘only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the
denial of a constitutional right.’” Allen, 568 F.3d at 1199 (quoting 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c)(2)). “To make such a showing, an applicant must demonstrate ‘that
reasonable jurists could debate whether . . . the petition should have been
resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to
deserve encouragement to proceed further.’” Id. (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529
U.S. 473, 484 (2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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In determining whether to grant a COA, we do not engage in a “full
consideration of the factual or legal bases adduced in support of the claims,”
Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 336; instead, we undertake “a preliminary, though not
definitive, consideration of the [legal] framework” applicable to each claim, id. at
338. Although an applicant need not demonstrate that his appeal will succeed, he
“must prove ‘something more than the absence of frivolity’ or the existence of
mere ‘good faith’” to obtain a COA. Id. (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S.
880, 893 (1983), superseded on other grounds by statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2)).
Where a “COA application rests on claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel, in order to determine if [an applicant] can make a substantial showing of
the denial of a constitutional right we must undertake a preliminary analysis . . .
in light of the two-part test for ineffective assistance” articulated in Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). United States v. Harris, 368 F. App’x 866,
868 (10th Cir. 2010), cert. dismissed, 131 S. Ct. 455 (2010). “Under Strickland,
[Mr. Martinez] must show that counsel’s performance fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness as measured against prevailing professional norms,
and he must show that there is a reasonable probability that the outcome would
have been different but for counsel’s inadequate performance.” Sandoval v.
Ulibarri, 548 F.3d 902, 909 (10th Cir. 2008) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688,
694).
Because the Colorado state courts addressed the merits of Mr. Martinez’s
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claims, “AEDPA’s deferential treatment of state court decisions must be
incorporated into our consideration of [his] request for [a] COA.” 3 Dockins v.
Hines, 374 F.3d 935, 938 (10th Cir. 2004). Under the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), we may grant an application for a writ of
habeas corpus on behalf of a person in state custody whose claims were
adjudicated on the merits in state court only if the state court’s decision (1) “was
contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established
Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” or
(2) “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)–(2).
A state court decision is contrary to established federal law if it “arrives at
a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme Court] on a question of
3
We review “the last reasoned state court decision” on a claim. Klein
v. Neal, 45 F.3d 1395, 1399 n.5 (10th Cir. 1995) (citing Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501
U.S. 797 (1991)). “[I]f the last state court to render a judgment on a claim did so
in a cursory or unexplained manner . . . [we] apply a ‘look through’ rule, which
essentially looks past the last state court decision to the last reasoned state court
decision.” Id.Here, we look to the Colorado Supreme Court’s decision on Mr. Martinez’s
claim that his trial was rendered fundamentally unfair by the admission of expert
testimony about the amount of force necessary to cause a subdural hematoma in a
child. We look to the decision of the Colorado Court of Appeals following
remand on Mr. Martinez’s claim that the government breached its promise by
charging him with first-degree murder. Finally, we look to the state trial court’s
decision denying the motion for post-conviction relief on Mr. Martinez’s claims
that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance, and that the state legislature
unconstitutionally removed the finding of sentence-enhancing facts from the jury.
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law,” or “confronts facts that are materially indistinguishable from a relevant
Supreme Court precedent and arrives at a[n opposite] result.” Bledsoe v. Bruce,
569 F.3d 1223, 1231 (10th Cir. 2009) (alterations in original) (quoting Williams v.
Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405 (2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert.
denied, 130 S. Ct. 808 (2009). A state court decision unreasonably applies
federal law if it “identifies the correct governing legal rule from [the Supreme]
Court’s cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular state
prisoner’s case,” or “either unreasonably extends a legal principle from [Supreme
Court] precedent to a new context where it should not apply or unreasonably
refuses to extend that principle to a new context where it should apply.” Id.(alterations in original) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 407) (internal quotation
marks omitted). “The state court’s decision must be ‘more than incorrect or
erroneous’; it must be ‘objectively unreasonable.’” Id. (quoting Wiggins v. Smith,
539 U.S. 510, 520–21 (2003)).
II. Admission of Expert Testimony
Mr. Martinez argues that his trial was rendered fundamentally unfair by the
admission of expert testimony about the amount of force necessary to cause a
subdural hematoma in a child. Mr. Martinez avers that but for the admission of
this testimony, he would not have been convicted of first-degree murder because
“it was still inferred at trial that there was a great amount of force necessary to
cause such injuries. . . . It is now accepted that a minimal amount of force is
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necessary to cause such injuries in a child.” Aplt. Br. & App. at 4(a)–4(b).
The Colorado Supreme Court found that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in admitting this expert testimony because “the testimony of accident
scenarios is admissible . . . as the basis of Dr. Rosquist’s opinion that a subdural
hematoma results from massive, violent force.” Martinez, 74 P.3d at 319.
“Federal habeas review is not available to correct state law evidentiary
errors; rather it is limited to violations of constitutional rights.” Smallwood v.
Gibson, 191 F.3d 1257, 1275 (10th Cir. 1999) (citing Estelle v. McGuire, 502
U.S. 62, 67–68 (1991)). “We may not provide habeas corpus relief on the basis of
state court evidentiary rulings unless they rendered the trial so fundamentally
unfair that a denial of constitutional rights results.” Duckett v. Mullin, 306 F.3d
982, 999 (10th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Mr. Martinez cites no authority prohibiting the admission of the expert
testimony at issue. That is a serious problem for him. Panels of this court have
repeatedly indicated that, where a trial court has properly admitted evidence,
there ordinarily will be no basis to conclude that the evidence rendered the trial
fundamentally unfair. See Hicks v. Jones, 350 F. App’x 199, 204 (10th Cir. 2009)
(“Hicks has failed to establish that the evidentiary rulings rendered his trial
fundamentally unfair. The taped conversations were relevant and not unduly
prejudicial; their admission therefore did not violate due process.”); Torres v.
Roberts, 253 F. App’x 783, 789 (10th Cir. 2007) (“The Kansas Supreme Court
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determined Exhibits 22 and 31 were probative and rejected Torres’s claim that
they were cumulative and overly gruesome. In light of the probative value of the
photographs, we conclude the admission of these exhibits was not fundamentally
unfair.” (citation omitted)); Sauceda v. Mondragon, 986 F.2d 1429, 1992 WL
401583, at *3 (10th Cir. 1992) (unpublished table decision) (“Since the district
court did not err in admitting relevant, non-inflammatory photographic evidence,
we must conclude that the Appellant was not denied a fundamentally fair trial.”).
We perceive no circumstances suggesting that a different outcome is
appropriate here. Consequently, we conclude that reasonable jurists could not
debate the district court’s determination that the Colorado Supreme Court’s
decision was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly
established federal law. Accordingly, Mr. Martinez is not entitled to a COA on
his first claim.
III. Government Adopted Inconsistent Positions and Breached Its Promise
Mr. Martinez next argues that “the police promised [him] that if he showed
them how he allegedly shook the infant, the prosecution would present the case as
an accident rather than a murder,” but the prosecution did not adhere to that
promise when it charged him with first-degree murder. Aplt. Br. & App. at 4(c).
Mr. Martinez maintains that Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971), which
held that one prosecutor’s plea-bargain promise binds other prosecutors in the
same office, should have been extended to the circumstances of his case to
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compel the prosecutor to adhere to the promise made by the police. See Aplt. Br.
& App. at 4(c)–4(d).
The Colorado Court of Appeals found that “[d]efendant’s contention that
the detective and the prosecution must adopt consistent positions or theories, or
that the failure to do so violates his right to due process of law, has no support in
our jurisprudence. . . . Moreover, the detective’s position during the taped
interview was not necessarily inconsistent with the prosecution’s theory of the
case at trial.” R., Vol. 1, at 275–76.
Mr. Martinez fails to demonstrate that the state court unreasonably refused
to extend the rule of Santobello to the circumstances of his case. See United
States v. Kettering, 861 F.2d 675, 677–78 (11th Cir. 1988) (collecting cases and
rejecting contention that principles of Santobello required a federal prosecutor to
abide by the unauthorized promise of DEA agent that defendant would serve no
more than five years’ imprisonment). Furthermore, Mr. Martinez suggests no
other Supreme Court precedent that the state court should have extended. We
conclude, therefore, that reasonable jurists could not debate the district court’s
determination that the decision of the Colorado Court of Appeals was neither
contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law.
Accordingly, Mr. Martinez is not entitled to a COA on his second claim.
IV. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Mr. Martinez also asserts that his trial counsel rendered ineffective
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assistance by “fail[ing] to conduct sufficient investigation which would have
allowed him to present evidence showing that the force necessary to cause the
horrific death of the child was minimal and hence Mr. Martinez could not have
acted knowingly.” Aplt. Br. & App. at 4(f).
The state trial court properly recognized that Strickland governs ineffective
assistance of counsel claims, and “requires a showing that counsel’s
representation fell below [an] objective standard of reasonableness and that there
is reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of
the proceeding would have been different.” R., Vol. 2, Post-Conviction Order at
2. Mr. Martinez “admitted to shaking the baby, striking the baby’s head against
the crib,” and “defense counsel presented a defense of accident at the trial.” Id.“The only question at trial was whether the fatal injuries were a result of
intentional conduct, or accident,” and “[t]he jury . . . apparently decided that
defendant acted with intent, after deliberation, not that the shaking and hitting of
the head was an accident.” Id. The state court reasoned that “[p]resenting expert
testimony that the injuries to the baby might have been caused by factors other
than defendant’s action would not change the jury’s finding that defendant acted
deliberately.” Id. Accordingly, the state court rejected Mr. Martinez’s ineffective
assistance of counsel claim because presenting such expert testimony “was not
part of defense counsel’s trial strategy, nor would it have changed the outcome of
the trial.” Id. at 3.
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Mr. Martinez fails to demonstrate that the state court unreasonably applied
Strickland to his case. Mr. Martinez makes a conclusory assertion that counsel’s
alleged failure was prejudicial. However, the state court determined that the jury
would have found that Mr. Martinez acted deliberately even if it had been
presented with Mr. Martinez’s proffered evidence. Mr. Martinez has pointed to
nothing to suggest that this determination is unreasonable. Accordingly,
reasonable jurists could not debate the district court’s determination that the state
trial court’s decision was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of,
clearly established federal law. Thus, Mr. Martinez is not entitled to a COA on
his ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
V. Sentence-Enhancing Facts
Mr. Martinez, relying on Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000),
further argues “that it is unconstitutional for a legislature to remove from the jury
the assessment of facts which increase the prescribed range of punishments to
which a criminal defendant is exposed.” Aplt. Br. & App. at 4(g). Mr. Martinez
argues that the Colorado legislature violated Apprendi by reducing the mens rea
for first-degree murder from intent to knowledge, thereby “remov[ing] from the
jury the requisite determination necessary for a finding that a defendant
committed an offense which is punishable by a life without the possibility of
parole sentence versus a maximum aggravated sentence of 48 years.” Id. at 4(h).
The state trial court held that Mr. Martinez’s life sentence “falls within the
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presumptive range of punishment, at the lowest end, and is therefore not illegally
enhanced. Defendant’s claim that his sentence is illegal must therefore fail.” R.,
Vol. 2, Post-Conviction Order, at 4.
Obviously, the state trial court did not unreasonably apply Apprendi, which
requires “any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed
statutory maximum [to] be submitted to a jury.” 530 U.S. at 490 (emphasis
added). And, unsurprisingly, Mr. Martinez advances no Supreme Court precedent
barring state legislatures from defining the elements of offenses under state law.
Furthermore, we are not aware of any such clearly established federal law.
Therefore, we conclude that reasonable jurists could not debate the district court’s
determination that the state trial court’s decision was neither contrary to, nor an
unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. Accordingly, Mr.
Martinez is not entitled to a COA on his sentence-enhancing facts claim.
VI. Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis
Finally, to obtain in forma pauperis status, a petitioner must show “a
financial inability to pay the required fees” and “a reasoned, nonfrivolous
argument on the law and facts in support of the issues raised on appeal.”
McIntosh v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 115 F.3d 809, 812 (10th Cir. 1997) (internal
quotation marks omitted). We deny Mr. Martinez’s motion for leave to proceed
in forma pauperis because he has failed to present a reasoned, nonfrivolous
argument in support of the issues raised on appeal.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we DENY Mr. Martinez’s application for a COA
and DISMISS his appeal. We also DENY Mr. Martinez’s motion for leave to
proceed in forma pauperis because his appeal does not present a reasoned,
nonfrivolous argument.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Jerome A. Holmes
Circuit Judge
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