United States v. Pennington ( 1999 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
JAN 15 1999
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
LONNIE C. PENNINGTON,
Defendant - Appellant,
No. 98-3197
v.
(D.C. No. 98-3034-MLB)
(District of Kansas)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRORBY , EBEL and LUCERO , Circuit Judges.
Lonnie C. Pennington appeals the denial of his motion filed under 28
U.S.C. § 2255, seeking to enforce the alleged terms of an oral plea agreement.
The district court ruled that such motion was untimely and that it should be
rejected on the merits without benefit of an evidentiary hearing. Because he is
proceeding pro se, we construe Pennington’s motion liberally. As best we can
ascertain, his motion alleges two separate breaches of his plea agreement: first,
*
The case is unanimously ordered submitted without oral argument pursuant
to Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and
judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and
conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
that the government violated a promise to move under U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 for a
downward departure at sentencing; and second, that the government violated a
promise to move for a post-sentencing departure under Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(b).
We grant Pennington’s request for a certificate of appealability, and affirm.
Pennington’s first claim is untimely. Motions under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 must
be filed within one year of the final judgment of conviction unless certain
statutory exceptions apply to toll the limitations period. With regard to
petitioner’s § 5K1.1 claim, no such exceptions apply because Pennington had
notice of the government’s failure to follow its alleged promise at sentencing, and
therefore before the final judgment against him was filed. The second claim,
however, is timely because Pennington was not on notice of the government’s
failure to file a Rule 35(b) motion until one year after the imposition of his
sentence, which is the period within which Rule 35 motions are normally filed.
See Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2255(4) (tolling limitations
period until “the date on which the facts supporting the claim . . . presented could
have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence”).
The district court did not err, however in refusing to grant an evidentiary
hearing on this second claim. We conduct a two-step inquiry in reviewing the
district court’s refusal, determining first whether the petitioner’s allegations, if
true, would entitle him to relief, and then, if they would, whether the district court
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abused its discretion in summarily denying an evidentiary hearing. See United
States v. Barboa , 777 F.2d 1420, 1422 (10th Cir. 1985). Even if Pennington’s
allegations are true, the plea agreement contains no promise by the government to
move for a sentence reduction under Rule 35(b). Paragraph 6 of the plea
agreement, which Pennington confirmed before the district court , plainly supports
that claim. See I R., doc. 604, Ex. 2, at 7 (“[T]his Plea Agreement is the only
agreement between the United States and defendant, Lonnie C. Pennington,
concerning his plea of guilty . . . and . . . there are no other deals, bargains,
agreements, or understandings which modify or alter this agreement.”). “In
considering whether the plea agreement was violated, we construe the terms of
the plea agreement according to what [defendant] reasonably understood when he
entered the plea.” United States v. Svacina , 137 F.3d 1179, 1185 (10th Cir. 1998)
(quotation omitted). The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Pennington an evidentiary hearing. See United States v. Gines , 964 F.2d 972, 979
(10th Cir. 1992).
AFFIRMED . The mandate shall issue forthwith.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Carlos F. Lucero
Circuit Judge
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