Dorman v. Astrue , 435 F. App'x 792 ( 2011 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
August 16, 2011
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
PATRICK D. DORMAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 10-5166
(D.C. No. 4:07-CV-00673-FHM)
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, (N.D. Okla.)
Commissioner, Social Security
Administration,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before HOLMES and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges, BRORBY, Senior Circuit
Judge.
“The Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) [28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)] provides
for the award of fees and expenses to the prevailing party in a civil action against
the Federal Government, unless the position of the United States was substantially
justified.” Harris v. R.R. Ret. Bd., 990 F.2d 519, 520 (10th Cir. 1993) (quotations
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and
collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent
with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
omitted). In this social security disability case, the district court denied the
plaintiff’s request for an EAJA fee, finding that the Commissioner of Social
Security (Commissioner) had demonstrated his position was substantially
justified. Because the district court abused its discretion, we reverse its order and
remand with instructions to award the plaintiff an EAJA fee.
BACKGROUND
The plaintiff, Patrick D. Dorman, filed his application for social security
disability benefits on November 29, 2004, alleging that he became disabled on
December 30, 2003, due to breathing problems and depression. The agency
denied his applications initially and on reconsideration. Mr. Dorman obtained a
hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ), who determined that he could
return to his past relevant work as a building maintenance supervisor and
construction supervisor, and therefore upheld the denial of his application.
Mr. Dorman then appealed administratively to the Appeals Council, which denied
review of the ALJ’s decision.
Mr. Dorman thereafter sought review of the ALJ’s decision in federal
district court. He asserted that the Commissioner had erred in three respects.
First, he claimed, the ALJ failed to properly consider at step four of his analysis
the effects of his mental impairments and his mental and physical ability to return
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to his past relevant work. 1 Second, he argued that the ALJ failed to perform a
proper evaluation of his treating physician’s opinions concerning his ability to
work. Finally, he contended the ALJ “formulated a faulty credibility
determination” that “was inconsistent, erroneous and incomplete.” Aplt. App.,
Vol. I at 27. The district court considered and rejected these arguments and
affirmed the Commissioner’s decision.
Mr. Dorman then appealed to this court, raising essentially the same issues
he had presented in the district court but focusing his step four argument on the
ALJ’s failure to properly evaluate his mental impairments. As part of his step
four argument, Mr. Dorman contended that “[t]he ALJ failed to perform a proper
analysis of [his past relevant work] and the mental demands of that work.”
Id. at 88. This court found merit to this argument. We concluded that “[b]ecause
the record before us lacks evidence that Mr. Dorman is capable of the mental
demands of his past relevant work, the Commissioner’s determination is not
supported by substantial evidence and cannot be sustained.” Dorman v. Astrue,
368 F. App’x 864, 866 (10th Cir. 2010) (Dorman I). We found unavailing
Mr. Dorman’s other challenges to the Commissioner’s determination, but
remanded to the district court with instructions to remand to the Commissioner
1
The Commissioner follows a five-step sequential evaluation process to
determine whether a claimant is disabled. See Williams v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 748,
750-52 (10th Cir. 1988) (describing process). At step four, the relevant inquiry
concerns the claimant’s ability to return to his past relevant work.
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for further proceedings on the step four issue concerning the mental demands of
Mr. Dorman’s past relevant work.
Mr. Dorman’s counsel thereafter petitioned the district court for an award
of EAJA fees. The district court denied his petition, 2 concluding that the
Commissioner had demonstrated that his position was substantially justified.
ANALYSIS
To obtain an EAJA fee award, the claimant must be a prevailing party who
incurred fees in an action by or against the United States. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2412(d)(1)(A). Mr. Dorman satisfied this requirement by obtaining a remand to
the agency for further proceedings after the Commissioner of Social Security
denied his claim for benefits. The government can defeat an EAJA claim,
however, by showing that its position was substantially justified. See id.
An agency position is substantially justified for purposes of the EAJA if it
is “justified in substance or in the main--that is, justified to a degree that could
satisfy a reasonable person.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988)
(quotation omitted). In other words, the government’s position must have had a
reasonable basis both in law and fact. See id. We review the district court’s
determination that the government’s position was substantially justified for an
abuse of discretion. Id. at 559; Gilbert v. Shalala, 45 F.3d 1391, 1394 (10th Cir.
2
The parties consented to entry of judgment by a magistrate judge, who
entered the Opinion and Order at issue in this appeal. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1).
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1995). “An abuse of discretion occurs when the district court bases its ruling on
an erroneous conclusion of law or relies on clearly erroneous fact findings,”
Kiowa Indian Tribe of Okla. v. Hoover, 150 F.3d 1163, 1165 (10th Cir. 1998), or
when the district court’s decision is “arbitrary, capricious or whimsical, or results
in a manifestly unreasonable judgment,” Moothart v. Bell, 21 F.3d 1499, 1504-05
(10th Cir. 1994) (quotations omitted).
The district court concluded that because the ALJ determined that
Mr. Dorman’s depression and obsessive-compulsive disorder would not
significantly affect his ability to work, the regulations did not put the ALJ on
notice that he had any obligation to inquire about the mental demands of
Mr. Dorman’s past relevant work. It reasoned as follows:
Where, as here, the ALJ is “persuaded that the claimant’s depression
and obsessive-compulsive disorder would not significantly affect his
ability to engage in work related activities,” [Dkt. 12, p. 20], mental
limitations are appropriately omitted from the RFC. In other words,
under the regulations where the ALJ finds that mental limitations
have no impact on the ability to work, the ALJ has no obligation to
inquire about the mental demands of past work. Since the ALJ could
not have anticipated what appears to be a new interpretation of the
regulations by the Tenth Circuit in this case, the ALJ was
substantially justified in failing to inquire about the mental demands
of Plaintiff’s past work.
Aplt. App., Vol. I at 243 (emphasis added).
Having carefully considered this analysis, we respectfully find ourselves
unable to agree with the conclusions reached by the district court. In our view,
the ALJ did not conclude that Mr. Dorman’s mental impairments would have
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“no impact” on his ability to work. Rather, his conclusion was that the
impairments would not “significantly affect his ability to engage in work related
activities.” Id. We believe the ALJ used this precise language deliberately.
Under the regulations, an impairment that “does not significantly limit [the
claimant’s] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities” is classified as
non-severe. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1521(a). Non-severe but medically determinable
mental impairments must be taken into account when establishing a claimant’s
RFC. See id. § 404.1545(a)(2). We therefore find ourselves unable to agree with
the district court’s conclusion that the ALJ need not consider as part of his RFC
mental limitations that do not “significantly affect” the claimant’s ability to
engage in work-related activities. Rather, the ALJ is required to do so.
As we noted in Dorman I, the ALJ in this case concluded “that Mr. Dorman
in fact suffered from some degree of mental impairment.” Dorman, 368 F. App’x
at 866. This being the case, as we had explained in Winfrey v. Chater, 92 F.3d
1017, 1024 (10th Cir. 1996), which was published ten years before the ALJ issued
his decision, the ALJ was obligated “to obtain a precise description of the
particular job duties which are likely to produce tension and anxiety . . . in order
to determine if the claimant’s mental impairment is compatible with the
performance of [his past relevant] work.” Dorman, 368 F. App’x at 866 (quoting
Winfrey, 92 F.3d at 1024). The ALJ erred by failing to do so.
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We also respectfully disagree with the district court’s conclusion that our
result in Dorman I represents a “new interpretation” of the regulations. See Aplt.
App., Vol. I at 243. First of all, no “interpretation” of § 404.1545(a)(2) was
required. Its plain language provides that non-severe mental impairments must be
taken into account when calculating RFC. Moreover, in Dorman I we cited a
number of prior cases whose conclusions concerning the need to evaluate the
mental demands of past relevant work “paralleled” our conclusion in
Mr. Dorman’s case. Dorman, 368 F. App’x at 866.
In its EAJA fee decision, however, the district court emphasized how much
“[t]he instant case is unlike the cases cited in the Tenth Circuit order.” Aplt.
App., Vol. I at 243 (emphasis added). It then attempted to distinguish the cases
we cited in Dorman I, reasoning that they involved mental impairments found to
be more serious than those involved in Mr. Dorman’s case. While we appreciate
the district court’s considered effort on this point, we stand by our reasoning in
Dorman I.
It is true that in one of the cases we cited, Frantz v. Astrue, 509 F.3d 1299,
1303-04 (10th Cir. 2007), the ALJ had found that the claimant’s mental
impairments were severe, a factor not present here. The other two cases,
however, did not characterize the mental impairments involved as severe and
relied instead on findings of only mild to moderate limitations that were similar in
important respects to the one made in Mr. Dorman’s case. See Bridgeman v.
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Chater, No. 96-7047, 1997 WL 174113, at *1-2 (10th Cir. Apr. 10, 1997)
(holding “that substantial evidence supports the Secretary’s finding that
claimant’s mental impairment limited his functional abilities only slightly to
moderately, with no episodes of deterioration or decompensation at work, and that
claimant could perform light work not requiring the toleration of high stress,” but
remanding “because the record does not contain evidence to support the ALJ’s
conclusion that claimant can return to his former work as a light delivery driver
despite his inability to tolerate high stress”); Frederick v. United States Dep’t of
Health & Human Servs., No. 94-6197, 1995 WL 243437, at *1 (10th Cir. Apr. 26,
1995) (affirming “ALJ’s finding that plaintiff suffers from only slight
depression,” but remanding because ALJ failed to consider this slight depression
in light of “the mental demands of his past banking jobs”).
It is the principle for which we cited these cases in Dorman I that is
important: where the claimant suffers from a medically-determinable mental
impairment, before finding that he can return to his past relevant work the ALJ
must determine the mental demands of that work and whether the claimant can
meet them. As we stated in a prior EAJA fee case, “[t]he law is clear . . . that the
ALJ had a duty to develop the record by establishing the mental demands of
plaintiff’s past work and comparing them with her mental limitations before he
could conclude that plaintiff could perform her past work.” Chester v. Apfel,
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1 F. App’x 792, 794 (10th Cir. 2001). Failure to do so was a legal error that
justified an award of fees. Id. at 795.
The district court also concluded that the Commissioner’s litigation
position was substantially justified, because the past relevant work issue was not
the focus of Mr. Dorman’s arguments in the district court and was not
well-developed in his briefing. We need not determine whether this conclusion
represented an abuse of discretion. The Commissioner’s position must generally
be substantially justified at both the administrative and litigation levels. See
Hackett v. Barnhart, 475 F.3d 1166, 1174 (10th Cir. 2007). Even if we accept the
reasons cited by the district court they do not suggest that the government’s
position in litigation somehow “cured” the ALJ’s errors. See id.
CONCLUSION
The district court abused its discretion in denying Mr. Dorman’s EAJA fee
motion. Consequently, we REVERSE the district court’s denial of his EAJA
motion for fees and costs, and REMAND with instructions to grant the motion
and to award a reasonable fee and appropriate costs to Mr. Dorman.
Entered for the Court
Stephen H. Anderson
Circuit Judge
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