United States v. Lopez-Estrada , 446 F. App'x 81 ( 2011 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
October 7, 2011
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
No. 10-3327
v. (D.C. No. 5:10-CR-40013-SAC-2)
(D. Kan.)
EUSEBIO LOPEZ-ESTRADA,
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before GORSUCH, HOLLOWAY, and McKAY, Circuit Judges.
This case began when Kansas Highway Patrol Trooper Josiah Trinkle saw a
pickup truck driving on Interstate 70 with a license plate hanging down on one
side. The trooper suspected a violation of K.S.A. § 8-133, which requires that a
vehicle’s license plate “shall at all times be securely fastened to the vehicle to
which it is assigned so as to prevent the plate from swinging.” Here’s what the
trooper saw:
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
As he followed the truck, the trooper came to think he saw another problem —
that one of the truck’s brake lights wasn’t working, also in violation of Kansas
law. Eventually, the trooper pulled the truck over and issued a warning to the
truck’s driver, Eusebio Lopez-Estrada. The trooper then asked if he could search
the truck. Mr. Lopez-Estrada consented, the trooper found methamphetamine
inside a toolbox, and Mr. Lopez-Estrada was charged with possession of a
controlled substance with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1).
Once before the district court, Mr. Lopez-Estrada filed a motion to suppress
the methamphetamine, arguing that Trooper Trinkle did not have reasonable
suspicion to pull him over because his license plate was securely fastened and
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because his brake lights were working at the time of the stop. The district court
denied Mr. Lopez-Estrada’s motion to suppress, finding that Trooper Trinkle had
reasonable suspicion to think that there had been an infraction of both the Kansas
license plate and brake light laws.
Mr. Lopez-Estrada now appeals, and we affirm because the trooper had, as
a matter of law, reasonable suspicion to think he had witnessed a violation of
K.S.A. § 8-133. Mr. Lopez-Estrada contends otherwise, arguing that Trooper
Trinkle lacked reasonable suspicion because the trooper did not see the license
plate actually “swinging.” The Fourth Amendment’s reasonable suspicion
standard, however, does not require so much. A law enforcement officer need not
witness an ongoing violation of law to effect a traffic stop; he need only have a
reasonable basis for thinking an infraction is taking or has taken place. See, e.g.,
United States v. Tibbetts, 396 F.3d 1132, 1136-37 (10th Cir. 2005). And it was
certainly reasonable for the trooper to think that a jury-rigged job of affixing a
license plate might leave it poorly fastened and cause it to swing in violation of
Kansas law.
Given that the trooper had reasonable suspicion to believe Mr. Lopez-
Estrada had violated K.S.A. § 8-133, the traffic stop was lawful and we don’t
need to decide whether the trooper also and independently had reasonable
suspicion to believe Mr. Lopez-Estrada’s brake lights weren’t working. The
subsidiary question raised by Mr. Lopez-Estrada — whether the district court
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abused its discretion in refusing to permit Mr. Lopez-Estrada to subpoena a
witness to testify about the condition of the truck’s brake lights — is likewise
mooted by our disposition. Affirmed.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Neil M. Gorsuch
Circuit Judge
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