United States v. Swallow ( 1997 )

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Tenth Circuit
Byron White United States Courthouse
1823 Stout Street
Denver, Colorado 80294
(303) 844-3157
Patrick J. Fisher, Jr. Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk Chief Deputy Clerk
April 7, 1997
TO: All recipients of the captioned opinion
RE: 96-8000, USA v. Swallow
March 24, 1997
Please be advised of the following correction to the captioned decision:
On page four of the opinion, in the paragraph which begins “Although there are
minor disputes...”, the phrase in the second sentence which reads “approximately thirty-
five miles from the camp” should read “approximately thirty-five miles from the
reservation headquarters.”
Please make the appropriate correction.
Very truly yours,
Patrick Fisher, Clerk
Susie Tidwell
Deputy Clerk
F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
MAR 24 1997
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
No. 96-8000
STEVEN LEE SWALLOW,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF WYOMING
(D.C. No. 94-CR-0135-D)
Laurence P. Van Court, Assistant Federal Public Defender (Michael G. Katz, Federal
Public Defender and James H. Barrett, Assistant Federal Public Defender with him on the
briefs), Cheyenne, Wyoming for Defendant-Appellant.
James C. Anderson, Assistant United States Attorney (David D. Freudenthal, U.S.
Attorney for the District of Wyoming, Assistant U.S. Attorney with him on the briefs),
Cheyenne, Wyoming for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Before TACHA, HENRY, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.
HENRY, Circuit Judge.
Appellant Steven Lee Swallow was found guilty of two counts of first-degree
murder and two counts of second-degree murder under 18 U.S.C. § 1111(a), and four
counts of carrying a firearm during the commission of a violent crime under 18 U.S.C. §
924(c). Mr. Swallow appeals his convictions for two counts of second-degree murder for
the murders of his wife, Cleo, and his brother, Ethan. Specifically, Mr. Swallow appeals
the district court’s refusal to give his proposed jury instructions regarding intervening
cause arguing: (1) that the unforeseeable gross negligence of a third party may relieve
Mr. Swallow of responsibility, and (2) that the definition of “gross negligence” in this
context includes the failure to act to avert injury to another. The district court did not
erroneously refuse to issue Mr. Swallow’s proposed instructions. We exercise
jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 1153 and 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
In November 1994, Mr. Swallow, his wife Cleo, and his two children lived on the
Wind River Reservation at a location commonly known as the “ditch camp,”
approximately one-half mile from the settlement of Crowheart, Wyoming. Mr. Swallow’s
two brothers, Shawn and Ethan Swallow, resided next door.
On November 24, 1994, sometime after 10:00 p.m., Cleo, recently beaten by Mr.
Swallow, retreated to Shawn’s and Ethan’s home. Rec. vol. VII, at 85, 202. Mr.
Swallow, apparently intoxicated, entered his brothers’ home shortly after Cleo arrived.
After fighting with his brother Ethan, id. at 86, 204, Shawn told Mr. Swallow to go home
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until he had calmed down. Id. at 94, 206. About five minutes later, Mr. Swallow kicked
in the door to his brothers’ home and entered with a gun. Id. at 108. The three brothers
started arguing. Mr. Swallow then shot his brother Shawn, and a guest, Reuben
Lajeunesse, both of whom died almost immediately. Mr. Swallow also shot his brother
Ethan, and his wife. Ethan died approximately ninety minutes later; Mr. Swallow’s wife
died several hours later.
Four adults and Mr. Swallow’s two children were also present at the time of the
shootings. Regina Hill and Mr. Swallow’s son escaped unharmed to the residence of a
neighbor, Tom Presgrove, who was also in the house at the time of the shootings. Mr.
Presgrove, Douglas Willow, Verna No Ear, and Mr. Swallow’s twelve-month-old
daughter escaped and hid behind some other buildings nearby. Eventually the three
adults, with the infant, approached Mr. Swallow, and Mr. Willow attempted to telephone
for help. Mr. Swallow then pulled the telephone cord out of the wall. When Mr. Willow
attempted to render aid to Cleo, Mr. Swallow said, “No, just leave her there.” Rec. vol.
VII, at 126. Ms. No Ear asked if they could take Ethan, and Mr. Swallow replied, “No
Verna, I don’t know what I’m going to do next. Just go.” Id. at 221-22.
After the survivors had left the camp, Mr. Swallow telephoned 911 at 10:38 p.m.
and spoke with the 911 dispatcher at the Fremont County sheriff’s office for
approximately two hours and forty minutes. Mr. Swallow told the dispatcher he “just shot
up half the house.” Rec. vol. V, at 43.
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During the phone call, Mr. Swallow repeatedly asked for medical personnel to
render assistance, but refused to surrender as the 911 operators requested. At one point,
Mr. Swallow stated he would not harm any medical personnel, but early in the
conversation, he threatened to kill any law enforcement personnel who entered the house.
The standard operating procedure for Fremont County emergency responders requires that
law enforcement personnel secure a crime scene before entry.
Although there are minor disputes about the facts, the parties agree to the
following events: The dispatch center mobilized and dispatched emergency medical
personnel shortly after receiving the 911 call. A command post was established sometime
after 11:00 p.m. in the Crowheart Fire Hall, approximately thirty-five miles from the
reservation headquarters and fifty miles from the Fremont County sheriff’s office. The
first ranking law enforcement official arrived at the fire hall at approximately 11:30 p.m.
The rescue squad encountered several delays in reaching the reservation site. The
remote area of the ditch camp presented communications problems between the squad
and the dispatcher, which impeded organization of the rescue team. The distance from
the Fremont County sheriff’s office to the site also added to the response time. The squad
cleared Mr. Presgrove’s residence and then it stopped to interview both the witnesses to
the shootings and a car-load of people seen departing from Shawn and Ethan Swallow’s
residence. After learning that Mr. Swallow was an excellent marksman, and because of
the clear moonlit night and open grazing land surrounding the camp, the squad decided to
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take a more circuitous route to approach the residence. The squad also waited for two
other groups of officers, who approached the site from different directions.
At approximately 1:13 a.m., Mr. Swallow left his brother’s house and returned to
his house. Around 3:15 a.m., the authorities entered Mr. Swallow’s brother’s house and
found all four victims dead. The authorities then proceeded to Mr. Swallow’s residence,
where they found him asleep. The pathologist who performed autopsies upon the bodies
of Cleo and Ethan Swallow testified that both individuals bled to death as the result of
gunshot wounds.
Prior to trial, the government filed a motion in limine to prohibit Mr. Swallow
from “arguing to the jury that [he] should be relieved from criminal responsibility in the
deaths of Cleo Swallow and Ethan Swallow as the result of the acts or omissions of law
enforcement officers and/or emergency technicians.” Rec. vol. I, doc 47, at 1. After Mr.
Swallow filed a response, the court heard argument on the government’s motion. The
court ruled that it would allow Mr. Swallow to lay the foundation for a defense based on
the acts and omissions of the officers and technicians. The court also stated that it would
allow Mr. Swallow’s attorney to “cross-examine witnesses in such a way that will allow
you to assert that there is a legitimate basis for this defense.” Rec. vol. III, at 28.
However, the court added that it would not allow Mr. Swallow’s counsel to “mention this
defense, per se.” Id.5
During the instruction conference, the court again heard argument on the issue.
The court rejected Mr. Swallow’s proposed instructions, ruling they did not contain a
correct statement of the law on intervening cause as applied by a majority of courts.
Furthermore, the district court stated that there was insufficient evidence to justify giving
the instructions. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the district court’s ruling.
II. DISCUSSION
A defendant is entitled to an instruction on his theory of the case if the instruction
is a correct statement of the law and the theory is supported by sufficient evidence for the
jury to find in his favor. United States v. Grissom, 44 F.3d 1507, 1512 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 1720 (1995). We review de novo the instructions as a whole. United
States v. Voss, 82 F.3d 1521, 1529 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 216 (1996). We
review the district court’s refusal to give a particular jury instruction requested by the
defendant for an abuse of discretion. Id.A. Murder under the Major Crimes Act
Under the Major Crimes Act, any Indian who commits murder within Indian
country is subject to the same “law and any penalties as all other persons committing”
murder, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States. 18 U.S.C. § 1153(b); see
also 18 U.S.C. § 3242 (providing that Indians prosecuted under the Major Crimes Act
“shall be tried in the same courts and in the same manner as are all other persons
committing such offense within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States”).
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“Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought.” 18 U.S.C. §
1111(a). First-degree murder includes any kind of “willful, deliberate, malicious, and
premeditated killing.” Id. Any other murder is second-degree murder. Id. Although Mr.
Swallow was charged with four counts of first-degree murder, the jury found Mr.
Swallow guilty of second-degree murder for the deaths of Cleo and Ethan Swallow.
B. Instructions given by the court
Mr. Swallow first argues that the instructions as a whole incorrectly stated the
applicable law. The district court did not give the jury any instructions specifically on
the issue of proximate cause or the defense of intervening cause. Rather, the court
instructed the jury that to find Mr. Swallow guilty of first-degree murder, it must find
beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Swallow committed the “unlawful killing of a human
being with malice aforethought” that was “perpetrated by any kind of willful, deliberate,
malicious and premeditated design unlawfully and maliciously to effect the death of any
human being . . . .” Rec. vol. XIII, at 14. The court defined second-degree murder as the
unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought, “but without the
premeditated intent willfully to take a human life . . . .” Id. at 20-21.
Proximate cause of death is an essential component of both first- and
second-degree murder. See e.g., Rollin M. Perkins & Ronald N. Boyce, Criminal Law
774-821 (3d ed. 1982); State v. Bennis, 457 N.W.2d 843, 846 (S.D. 1990). Although the
trial court did not expressly instruct that the government had the burden to prove that Mr.
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Swallow’s conduct was the proximate cause of the decedents’ deaths, the court did
instruct that the jury that, in order to find Mr. Swallow guilty of first or second-degree
murder, it had to find that Mr. Swallow “kill[ed]” the decedents. See Rec. vol. XIII, at
16, 21; see also 2 Leonard B. Sand et al., Modern Federal Jury Instructions ¶ 41.01, at 41-
7 (1996) (providing definition of “kill”). The record indicates that there was undisputed
expert testimony that the decedents died from blood loss that resulted from the gunshot
wounds. Rec. vol. XII, at 21.
The court also gave carefully phrased pattern instructions defining the key terms of
each element. See Rec. vol. XIII, at 15, 20-21, 23-24. After carefully reviewing the
record and examining the jury instructions as a whole, we believe that the instructions
properly informed the jury that it could only find Mr. Swallow guilty of murder on each
count if it concluded that he proximately caused the victim’s death.
C. Mr. Swallow’s proposed instructions
Mr. Swallow further argues that the district court abused its discretion in refusing
to give two proposed instructions. The first proposed instruction characterizes an
independent intervening cause as the unforeseeable gross negligence of a third party that
relieves the defendant of responsibility for the death of the victim. Rec. Supp. vol. I,
Proposed Jury Instruction A (citing People v. Gentry, 738 P.2d 1188 (Colo. 1987); United
States v. Guillette, 547 F.2d 743 (2d Cir. 1976)). The second proposed instruction
defines gross negligence as “knowledge of a situation requiring the exercise of ordinary
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care and diligence to avert injury to another, the ability to avoid the resulting harm by
ordinary care and diligence . . . and the omission to use such care and diligence to avert
the threat and danger when . . . it must be apparent that the result is likely to prove
disastrous to another.” Rec. Supp. vol. I, Proposed Jury Instruction B (citing People v.
Sealey, 356 N.W.2d 614 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984)).
First, after careful examination of the record, we agree with the district court that
there simply was no evidence of gross negligence by the rescue squad. As the district
court stated, there was no “evidence presented by the defense on their defense that the
conduct of the officers was so deficient as to raise their conduct to a level of gross
negligence.” Rec. vol. XII, at 18-19.
Moreover, the requested instruction provided that the defendant would be relieved
of responsibility for the deaths only if he did not participate in the intervening cause. The
record established that the defendant participated in the intervening cause. By refusing to
surrender, he was a cause of the rescue squad’s delay in reaching the victims. Mr.
Swallow was not entitled to the requested instruction.
Additionally, although the district court allowed him to present evidence in support
of his theory of intervening cause, Mr. Swallow presented no evidence to rebut the
government expert’s findings that Cleo and Ethan bled to death as a result of the gunshot
wounds. An instruction as to intervening cause is not proper absent evidence to sustain it.
See State v. Cole, 154 S.E.2d 506, 511 (N.C. 1967) (citing 26 Am. Jur. Homicide § 533
9
(1940)); see also Carlston v. United States, 671 F. Supp. 1324, 1326 (D.N.M. 1987)
(holding in a civil context, “[w]hen reasonable minds cannot differ on the issue of
intervening cause, the matter can be decided as one of law”). Mr. Swallow introduced no
expert testimony that indicated the wounds were not dangerous or calculated to produce
death. See Baylor v. United States, 407 A.2d 664, 669 (D.C. 1979) (stating “[o]rdinarily
expert medical testimony will be required to show that the wound was not dangerous or
calculated to produce death”). Thus, the court correctly found that defendant’s evidence
failed to support a submission of any instruction regarding intervening cause to the jury.
See State v. Soucy, 653 A.2d 561, 563-64 (N.H. 1995) (stating “if some evidence is
offered, . . . which is reasonably calculated to provide a reasonable doubt on the issue of
causation, it must be admitted and the element of causation, with the supported defense,
must be submitted to the jury”).
Finally, even if we were to accept Mr. Swallow’s invitation to analogize to tort
law, he would not prevail, because we are here concerned with a negative act. See Aplt.’s
Br. at 14-15. Professors Perkins and Boyce insightfully note that “[i]t has seemed
important to recognize the possibility of a negative act being superseding in a civil case,
but even there this applies only in very exceptional situations which seem to have no
counterpart in criminal cases.” Perkins & Boyce, supra at 819-20 (presenting the
following illustration: Automobile negligently driven by A strikes B, leaving B
unconscious on the highway, bleeding to death. C, a passing motorist, stops and surveys
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the situation, and drives on without rendering aid to B. B bleeds to death. “Regardless of
whether C is under any duty to B to render such aid, his failure to do so is not a
superseding cause which will relieve A of liability for [B’s death].”) (emphasis in
original) (citations omitted). The Restatement of Torts similarly indicates that the mere
existence of an unperformed duty does not rise to a superseding cause that can break the
causal chain. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 452, cmt. c, illus. 4 (1965).
Furthermore, “[i]n cases involving death from injuries inflicted in an assault, courts have
uniformly held that the person who inflicted the injury will be liable for the death despite
the failure of third persons to save the victim.” Kusmider v. State, 688 P.2d 957, 959
(Alaska Ct. App. 1984) (citing Wright v. State, 374 A.2d 824, 829 (Del. 1977); Pettigrew
v. State, 554 P.2d 1186, 1193 (Okla. Ct. Crim. App. 1976); People v. McGee, 187 P.2d
706, 714-15 (Cal. 1947)). Thus, Mr. Swallow’s analogy to tort law itself collapses.
In conclusion, the record does not support the issuance of Mr. Swallow’s proposed
instructions. Therefore, the district court did not err in refusing to give Mr. Swallow’s
proposed instructions on intervening cause and gross negligence. Mr. Swallow’s
convictions for second-degree murder are affirmed.
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