Gresham v. Runyon ( 1998 )


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  •                                                                           F I L E D
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    DEC 14 1998
    FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
    PATRICK FISHER
    Clerk
    CHARLES F. GRESHAM,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.                                                   No. 98-6029
    (D.C. No. 96-CV-333)
    MARVIN T. RUNYON, Postmaster                         (W.D. Okla.)
    General, United States Postal Service,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT           *
    Before PORFILIO , BARRETT , and KELLY , Circuit Judges.
    After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
    unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
    this appeal.   See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is
    therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
    *
    This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
    doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
    generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
    and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
    Plaintiff Charles F. Gresham filed suit alleging the United States Postal
    Service violated the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 794, when it declined
    to reinstate him to his former employment with the Postal Service because of his
    disability, epilepsy. Following a jury trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of
    defendant. Plaintiff appeals the district court’s rulings during trial and its order
    denying his post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law and motion for
    a new trial. We affirm.
    Plaintiff worked for the Postal Service until 1986 when he was discharged
    for on-the-job incidents he alleges were caused by his epilepsy. He was
    subsequently granted medical retirement from the Postal Service. Following
    a new drug therapy, plaintiff’s condition improved and he applied to be rehired
    by the Postal Service in 1993. The Postal Service reviewed his work history
    and other documents, but not his medical records, and declined to offer him
    a position. Plaintiff maintains that he was entitled to an individualized
    consideration of his application because his past job problems were caused by his
    disability. He claims the Postal Service’s failure to accommodate him in the
    hiring process violated the Rehabilitation Act.
    Plaintiff first challenges a sentence in jury instruction sixteen informing the
    jury that the Postal Service was not required to consider his application further if
    it had genuine concerns that plaintiff’s past problems would recur. He argues that
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    the instruction erroneously permitted the jury to find that the Postal Service was
    not required to consider his improved medical condition. “We review a district
    court’s decision on whether to give a specific jury instruction for abuse of
    discretion, but we review the instructions themselves de novo to determine
    whether as a whole they state the governing law and provide the jury with
    a proper understanding of the issues.”   Gunnell v. Utah Valley State College   ,
    
    152 F.3d 1253
    , 1259 (10th Cir. 1998). Here, the instructions properly guided the
    jury in its deliberations. The jury was free to conclude that the Postal Service
    believed plaintiff’s problems would recur for reasons not related to his disability
    or that he was not qualified for the position he sought, thereby relieving
    the Postal Service from an obligation to evaluate his application further.
    Cf. 29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 794 (prohibiting disability discrimination against person
    otherwise qualified for job). Therefore, the district court did not abuse its
    discretion in giving the challenged instruction.
    Plaintiff claims he was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law or a new
    trial pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 50 and 59. We review de novo an order denying
    a party’s request for a judgment as a matter of law, and will “upset the jury’s
    conclusion only if the evidence points but one way and is susceptible to no
    reasonable inferences supporting the nonmoving party.”      Webb v. ABF Freight
    Sys., Inc. , 
    155 F.3d 1230
    , 1238 (10th Cir. 1998) (quotation omitted). An order
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    denying a motion for a new trial is reviewed for an abuse of discretion and will be
    reversed “only if [the district court] made a clear error of judgment or exceeded
    the bounds of permissible choice in the circumstances.”     
    Id. at 1246
    (quotation
    omitted).
    Plaintiff argues that the Postal Service violated the Rehabilitation Act when
    it failed to examine whether his past unfavorable work record was caused by his
    disability and failed to evaluate his present medical condition. The jury heard
    evidence and received instructions on plaintiff’s theory of his case. It was not
    required to find in plaintiff’s favor. Rather, the jury was charged with evaluating
    the evidence and making the ultimate conclusions of fact. As stated above, the
    jury was free to find that plaintiff was not qualified for the position or that the
    Postal Service’s hiring decision was not related to his disability. “[O]n appeal we
    view the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict and defer to its
    determinations on all issues of credibility of the witnesses, the inferences it may
    draw from the facts established, its resolution of conflicts in the evidence, and its
    ultimate conclusions of fact.”   Lampkin v. International Union, United
    Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of Am. (UAW)            ,
    
    154 F.3d 1136
    , 1142 (10th Cir. 1998). Under this standard, we affirm the district
    court’s order denying plaintiff’s motion for a judgment as a matter of law or a
    new trial.
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    Plaintiff next claims the district court erred in prohibiting him from
    eliciting the opinion testimony of his friend and former coworker that the Postal
    Service’s stated reasons for not rehiring him were pretextual. We find no abuse
    of discretion in that ruling.   See Wright-Simmons v. City of Oklahoma City     ,
    
    155 F.3d 1264
    , 1268 (10th Cir. 1998) (district court’s evidentiary rulings
    reviewed for abuse of discretion). Finally, we decline to address plaintiff’s
    claims that the Postal Service failed to meet its affirmative burdens because
    the issue was raised for the first time on appeal.   See Walker v. Mather (In re
    Walker) , 
    959 F.2d 894
    , 896 (10th Cir. 1992) (appellate court will not consider
    issue on appeal that was not raised in district court).
    The judgment of the United States District Court for the Western District
    of Oklahoma is AFFIRMED.
    Entered for the Court
    Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
    Circuit Judge
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