United States v. Hardy , 23 F. App'x 922 ( 2001 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
NOV 30 2001
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 01-4083
(D.C. No. 99-CR-595-B)
KENNETH R. HARDY, (D. Utah)
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA, Chief Judge, PORFILIO , Circuit Judge, and BRORBY , Senior
Circuit Judge.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Kenneth R. Hardy appeals the sentence imposed by the United States
District Court for the District of Utah following his entry of a guilty plea to
sexual exploitation of children, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251. He contends
that the court erred in making the minimum statutory sentence of ten years run
consecutively to the sentences imposed by the state of Utah for related offenses.
We affirm.
Mr. Hardy pled guilty in state court to one count of rape of a child, one
count of sodomy of a child, and one count of aggravated sexual abuse of a child,
for which he was sentenced to three consecutive five-year to life terms. He
subsequently pled guilty in federal court to sexual exploitation of a child for
producing a videotape depicting a child engaging in sexually explicit conduct.
Mr. Hardy contends that under USSG § 5G1.3(b) his federal sentence
should run concurrently to the state sentence imposed. Section 5G1.3(b) provides
that the sentence for the instant offense is to run concurrently to an undischarged
term of imprisonment if “the undischarged term of imprisonment resulted from
offense(s) that have been fully taken into account in the determination of the
offense level of the instant offense.”
He argues that the state offenses have been “fully taken into account” in
determining his federal sentence because the base offense level of the federal
sentence was increased because he is the grandfather of the victim and because
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the victim is under 12 years of age. This argument is without merit. The increase
in the base offense level had nothing to do with the conduct alleged in the state
proceedings, but rather his relationship with the victim and her age. See United
States v. Tisdale , 248 F.3d 964, 976 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding that where the base
offense level was increased because of the defendant’s conduct in commission of
the federal offense and not for his conduct in the state offenses, § 5G1.3(b) is
inapplicable); United States v. Contreras , 210 F.3d 1151, 1153 (10th Cir. 2000)
(rejecting the defendant’s contention that § 5G1.3(b) mandated a concurrent
sentence where the district court fully took into account his state robbery
conviction when determining the career offender status). Moreover, the state
charges were not considered in arriving at Mr. Hardy’s criminal history category.
See United States v. Caraballo , 200 F.3d 20, 26 (1st Cir. 1999) (§ 5G1.3(b)
inapplicable where state conviction did not affect federal offense level, did not
impact criminal history category, and federal conspiracy conviction was grounded
in eight other burglaries in addition to state conviction) (cited with approval in
Contreras , 210 F.3d at 1153).
Mr. Hardy also argues that § 5G1.3(b) applies because the state charges
required proof of the same conduct as the federal charges. See Contreras , 210
F.3d at 1153 (§ 5G1.3(b)’s “central aim is to ensure no defendant is punished
twice for the same crime.”). This argument is also without merit. The federal
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charges arose out of the videotaping of the abuse whereas the state charges were
for the commission of the acts themselves. Accordingly the state charges did not
require proof of the same conduct.
Mr. Hardy argues in the alternative that the district court abused its
discretion under § 5G1.3(c). Section 5G1.3(c), a policy statement, provides that a
sentence may be imposed either concurrently, partially concurrently, or
consecutively to a prior undischarged term of imprisonment in order “to achieve a
reasonable punishment for the instant offense.” He contends that it is patently
unreasonable that his ten-year federal sentence be served consecutively to his
state sentence of three consecutive five-year to life terms. We have reviewed the
record and determine that, given the facts and circumstances of this case, the
district court did not abuse its discretion.
AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Deanell Reece Tacha
Chief Judge
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