Bedolla-Izazaga v. United States , 413 F. App'x 20 ( 2011 )


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  •                                                                           FILED
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    January 18, 2011
    TENTH CIRCUIT                   Elisabeth A. Shumaker
    Clerk of Court
    FELIPE BEDOLLA-IZAZAGA,
    Petitioner-Appellant,
    v.                                                      No. 10-3265
    (D.C. No. 5:04-CR-40001-SAC-2)
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                                (D. Kan.)
    Respondent-Appellee.
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
    Before BRISCOE, Chief Judge, TACHA, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
    After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
    unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination
    of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is,
    therefore, submitted without oral argument.
    Petitioner Felipe Bedolla-Izazaga (Izazaga), appearing pro se, appeals the
    *
    This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
    doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
    however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
    Cir. R. 32.1.
    district court’s denial of his petition for a writ of audita querela. 1 Izazaga was
    convicted by a jury of several crimes in connection with methamphetamine
    distribution. He was sentenced on June 20, 2006 to a total term of 360 months’
    imprisonment. 2 He previously filed two motions to vacate, set aside, or correct
    his sentence under 
    28 U.S.C. § 2255
    , both of which were dismissed. He then
    filed the instant petition for a writ of audita querela, in which he cited United
    States v. Booker, 
    543 U.S. 220
     (2005), and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 
    530 U.S. 466
    (2000), to argue that his sentence was invalid because the government was not
    required to prove at trial that the substance at issue was D-methamphetamine,
    rather than L-methamphetamine. 3 The district court dismissed the petition on the
    basis that Izazaga’s arguments were cognizable under 
    28 U.S.C. § 2255
     and,
    therefore, not a proper basis for a writ of audita querela. We affirm.
    1
    Izazaga also filed a motion for a certificate of appealability. A certificate
    of appealability is not required to appeal the dismissal of a petition for a writ of
    audita querela. United States v. Torres, 
    282 F.3d 1241
    , 1247 n.9 (10th Cir.
    2002); see also United States v. Kwan, 
    407 F.3d 1005
    , 1009 (9th Cir. 2005),
    abrogated on other grounds by Padilla v. Kentucky, 
    130 S. Ct. 1473
     (2010);
    United States v. Baptiste, 
    223 F.3d 188
    , 189 n.1 (3d Cir. 2000) (per curiam).
    2
    Izazaga was sentenced to 360 months’ imprisonment on each of four
    counts of conviction, forty-eight months’ imprisonment on each of three counts,
    and 240 months’ imprisonment on one count, all to run concurrently.
    3
    Prior to 1995, D and L methamphetamine were treated differently under
    the sentencing guidelines. “As of November 1, 1995, this distinction between
    methamphetamine types has been eliminated, and L-methamphetamine is now
    treated the same as D-methamphetamine under the Guidelines.” United States v.
    Glover, 
    97 F.3d 1345
    , 1347 n.2 (10th Cir. 1996) (internal quotation omitted).
    2
    The common law writ of audita querela permitted a defendant to obtain
    “‘relief against a judgment or execution because of some defense or discharge
    arising subsequent to the rendition of the judgment.’” United States v. Ayala, 
    894 F.2d 425
    , 427 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (quoting 11 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R.
    Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2867 (1973)). For the purposes of this
    case, we assume without deciding that a prisoner may seek a writ of audita
    querela under the All Writs Act, 
    28 U.S.C. § 1651
    . See Torres, 
    282 F.3d at
    1245
    n.6. However, “a writ of audita querela is ‘not available to a petitioner when
    other remedies exist, such as a motion to vacate sentence under 
    28 U.S.C. § 2255
    .’” 
    Id. at 1245
     (quoting Tavares v. Massachusetts, 
    59 F. Supp. 2d 152
    , 155
    (D. Mass. 1999)). This is because “[t]he exclusive remedy for testing the validity
    of a judgment and sentence, unless it is inadequate or ineffective, is that provided
    for in 
    28 U.S.C. § 2255
    .” Johnson v. Taylor, 
    347 F.2d 365
    , 366 (10th Cir. 1965)
    (per curiam); see also Caravalho v. Pugh, 
    177 F.3d 1177
    , 1178 (10th Cir. 1999)
    (“
    28 U.S.C. § 2255
     is the exclusive remedy for a federal prisoner attacking the
    legality of his detention.”).
    Izazaga’s claims challenge the validity of his sentence, and §2255 is the
    proper avenue to pursue such claims. Izazaga argues that a writ of audita querela
    is appropriate because he cannot meet the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
    Penalty Act of 1996’s (AEDPA) requirements regarding second or successive §
    2255 petitions. See ROA at 51. But, the fact that Izazaga may be barred from
    3
    bringing another §2255 petition does not establish that the § 2255 remedy is
    inadequate or ineffective. Caravalho, 177 F.3d at 1178; see also Massey v.
    United States, 
    581 F.3d 172
    , 174 (3d Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (“Massey may not
    seek relief through a petition for a writ of audita querela on the basis of his
    inability to satisfy the requirements of [AEDPA] for filing a second or successive
    § 2255 motion to vacate sentence.”); United States v. Valdez-Pacheco, 
    237 F.3d 1077
    , 1080 (9th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (“A prisoner may not circumvent valid
    congressional limitations on collateral attacks by asserting that those very
    limitations create a gap in the postconviction remedies that must be filled by the
    common law writs.”). Similarly, the fact that Izazaga disagrees with the
    disposition of his prior § 2255 petitions does not establish that the § 2255 remedy
    is inadequate or ineffective. Izazaga’s claims cannot be brought in a petition for
    writ of audita querela. Therefore, the decision of the district court is affirmed.
    Entered for the Court
    Mary Beck Briscoe
    Chief Judge
    4