New Mexico Ex Rel. Reynolds v. Gutierrez , 440 F. App'x 633 ( 2011 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
October 3, 2011
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
STATE OF NEW MEXICO, ex rel.,
S.E. Reynolds, State Engineer,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
and No. 10-2258
(D.C. No. 6:66-CV-06639-MV-WPL)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, (D. N.M.)
Plaintiff-Intervenor,
v.
JOE GUTIERREZ; BERTHA
GUTIERREZ,
Defendants-Appellants.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before MURPHY, ANDERSON, and HARTZ, Circuit Judges.
This appeal arises out of the adjudication of water rights in the
Nambe-Pojoaque-Tesuque river system (NPT), a tributary of the Rio Grande river
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
in the State of New Mexico. Pro se Defendants-Appellants Joe and Bertha
Gutierrez challenge the district court’s order denying their motion to vacate a
special master’s determination that their priority objection was untimely.
Because we lack jurisdiction, we DISMISS this appeal.
B ACKGROUND
In 1966, New Mexico filed suit to establish the water rights in the NPT.
The suit named a multitude of defendants and sought to determine:
a. The water rights adjudged each party.
b. The source, priority, amount, purpose, periods, and
place of use of each [water] right.
c. The specific tracts of land to which the water right for
irrigation is appurtenant.
d. Such other matters as may be necessary to define a
particular right and its priority.
Supp. R., Vol. 1 at 41. Despite the passage of several decades, numerous issues,
including priority of use, remained unresolved.
In 2008, however, the district court took up the priority issue, and ordered
the claimants to show cause why the priority dates for the “stream system
community and private ditches” should not be the “dates proposed by the State.”
R., Vol. 1 at 206. The district court set a June 15, 2009, deadline for filing a
priority-date objection.
In January 2010, the Gutierrezes objected pro se to the State’s “propos[al]
to assign a priority date of 1832 to the Acequia del Rancho, which feeds the
lateral irrigation ditch situated in [the Gutierrezes’] property.” Id. at 68. They
-2-
claimed that a priority date of 1740 had been established in a civil case decided in
1940.
A special master dismissed the Gutierrezes’ objection as untimely. In
response, the Gutierrezes filed a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) to vacate the
special master’s decision, arguing that their late filing would not
“inconvenience . . . the court or prejudice the plaintiff” or other claimants. Id. at
53; see also Supp. R., Vol. 1 at 106.
The district court denied the motion. It reasoned that the Gutierrezes had
provided no explanation for the six-month delay in filing their objection, and that
the State would be prejudiced if the Gutierrezes were allowed to pursue their
objection because notice would have to be served on thousands of interested
parties at considerable expense to the State.
The Gutierrezes appealed, and we directed the parties to address our
jurisdiction over this matter.
D ISCUSSION 1
This court has appellate jurisdiction over the “final decisions” of district
courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1291. To be final, a decision ordinarily “ends the litigation
on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.”
Cunningham v. Hamilton Cty., Ohio, 527 U.S. 198, 204 (1999) (internal quotation
1
Because the Gutierrezes are proceeding pro se, we construe their arguments
liberally. See de Silva v. Pitts, 481 F.3d 1279, 1283 n.4 (10th Cir. 2007).
-3-
marks omitted). In other words, “[a] final judgment is one that terminates all
matters as to all parties and causes of action.” Utah v. Norton, 396 F.3d 1281,
1286 (10th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The finality
requirement in § 1291 evinces a legislative judgment that restricting appellate
review to final decisions prevents the debilitating effect on judicial administration
caused by piecemeal appeal disposition of what is, in practical consequences, but
a single controversy.” Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 471 (1978)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
The district court’s order denying the Gutierrezes’ motion to vacate is not a
final order, as NPT water-right issues remain unresolved. According to the State,
no final adjudication has been rendered as to the priority of any claimant’s water
rights; moreover, there are water-right issues beyond priority that remain to be
adjudicated. Indeed, trial proceedings are ongoing. Thus, the order denying the
Gutierrezes’ motion “adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and
liabilities of fewer than all the parties [and] does not end the action as to any of
the claims or parties.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b).
Nevertheless, the Gutierrezes argue that the denial of their motion to vacate
is appealable under the collateral order doctrine. In a “small class” of cases, we
have jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals from non-final orders that “finally
determine claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the
action, too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself
-4-
to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is
adjudicated.” Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949).
To establish appellate jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine, an appellant
must show that the district court’s order (1) conclusively determined the disputed
question, (2) resolved an important issue completely separate from the merits of
the case, and (3) is effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment. See
Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United States, 489 U.S. 794, 799 (1989). These
requirements “are stringent, and unless they are kept so, the underlying doctrine
will overpower the substantial finality interests § 1291 is meant to further.” Mesa
Oil, Inc. v. United States, 467 F.3d 1252, 1254 (10th Cir. 2006) (internal
quotation marks omitted). A district court order that “fails to satisfy any one of
[the Cohen] requirements” is not reviewable under the collateral order doctrine.
Id. (alteration in original).
We conclude that the Gutierrezes have not shown that the timeliness of a
priority objection is effectively unreviewable by postjudgment appeal. “[T]he
decisive consideration is whether delaying review until the entry of final
judgment would imperil a substantial public interest or some particular value of a
high order.” Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 130 S. Ct. 599, 605 (2009)
(internal quotation marks omitted). The timeliness of a priority objection is a
procedural issue that can adequately be resolved after a final judgment in the
case. If the objection was erroneously deemed untimely in the district court,
-5-
remand for reconsideration of the water-right claimant’s priority is available on
appeal. We are aware of no substantial public interest or high-order value that
demands interlocutory review of the timeliness of a priority objection.
In short, the collateral order doctrine does not apply here.
The appeal is DISMISSED.
Entered for the Court
Michael R. Murphy
Circuit Judge
-6-