Lundahl v. Pennsylvania Manufacturers Ass'n , 440 F. App'x 629 ( 2011 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
October 3, 2011
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
KATHY LUNDAHL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 11-6050
(D.C. No. 5:09-CV-01186-F)
PENNSYLVANIA (W.D. Okla.)
MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION
INSURANCE COMPANY, a foreign
corporation,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before LUCERO, BALDOCK, and TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges.
Kathy Lundahl appeals from the district court’s order denying leave to
amend her complaint on futility grounds and from the summary judgment entered
in favor of Pennsylvania Manufacturers Association Insurance Co. (“PMAIC”).
Her case was based on PMAIC’s denial of her claim for insurance coverage of a
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
burglary to her apartment. Exercising diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1291 & 1332(a)(1), we affirm.
I. Background
The parties are familiar with the facts, so we provide only a brief summary
necessary to our review. The material facts are undisputed, except as noted. The
disputed facts are construed in favor of Ms. Lundahl.
Ms. Lundahl purchased a renters’ insurance policy when she moved into an
apartment in Oklahoma City. She authorized a monthly withdrawal of $12 from
her checking account for the policy. At the time she purchased the policy, she
was given a brochure from the apartment manager with a brief description of the
insurance coverage. As relevant here, the brochure stated that the insurance
covered burglary, but that there were “limits and exclusions to the coverage. It
[was] not an ‘all risk’ coverage.” Aplt. App. Vol. 2, at 502.
According to PMAIC, on July 13, 2009, it mailed to Ms. Lundahl a
Certificate of Insurance (“Certificate”) and a Summary of Coverage
(“Summary”), both of which provided burglary coverage “provided there are
visible marks of . . . forcible entry upon the exterior of the premises.” Id. at 457,
482. Ms. Lundahl testified that she did not recall whether she received or saw the
brochure and that she did not receive the Certificate or the Summary. Id. Vol. 1,
at 209, 247-48. The Bader Company (“Bader”) received and decided insurance
claims made on the renters’ policy at issue.
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On Wednesday, August 12, 2009, Ms. Lundahl noticed the lock to her
apartment was hard to turn. She asked the apartment management to change the
locks. Several days later, on Sunday, August 16, Ms. Lundahl discovered that
several small items were missing from her apartment—a cell phone, a wedding
ring, a passport, a camera, a watch, a key fob, and a garage door opener. She
filed a police report, and two days later, on August 18, telephoned Bader to report
a burglary at her apartment.
Upon receipt of this information, Bader requested that Ms. Lundahl
complete the claim forms and provide various documents, including the police
report and documents showing the value of the missing items. In addition to
considering Ms. Lundahl’s statement and documents, Bader reviewed the police
report and interviewed the apartment manager by telephone. By letter dated
October 22, 2009, Bader denied Ms. Lundahl’s claim because its investigation
had revealed no evidence of visible signs of forced entry, as required by the
PMAIC policy for burglary coverage.
Ms. Lundahl then sent Bader photos of her door and the lock taken after the
lock had been changed, requesting reconsideration. Bader declined to change its
decision.
Ms. Lundahl filed the underlying lawsuit, alleging that PMAIC’s refusal to
cover her burglary losses breached the duty of good faith and fair dealing. She
sought compensatory and punitive damages.
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Discovery ensued. Eventually, Ms. Lundahl filed a motion to amend her
complaint to allege claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organization Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968, and for fraud under
Oklahoma state law. PMAIC filed a motion for summary judgment.
The district court denied Ms. Lundahl’s motion to amend her complaint,
concluding that amendment would be futile because the proposed amended
complaint was subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim under RICO or state
law. In ruling on the RICO claims, the district court held that the proposed
amended complaint failed to allege with sufficient particularity under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) the requisite two predicate acts, here, mail fraud and wire
fraud. Therefore, the RICO conspiracy claim also failed. Similarly, the state law
fraud claim failed for lack of particularity under Rule 9(b).
In a subsequent order, the district court then granted PMAIC’s motion for
summary judgment on Ms. Lundahl’s surviving cause of action that PMAIC had
breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing by failing to conduct a reasonable
investigation of her insurance claim. The court rejected Ms. Lundahl’s argument
that the insurance documents were ambiguous, thereby also rejecting her claim
that by inserting an ambiguous term in its contracts, PMAIC exhibited bad faith
or that the ambiguity created a dispute as to whether the burglary was covered by
the policy. After discussing the investigation Bader conducted on behalf of
PMAIC, the court held that Ms. Lundahl had presented insufficient evidence that
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PMAIC overlooked material facts in conducting the investigation or that a more
thorough investigation would have produced additional relevant information that
would have resulted in a different disposition of her claim. Accordingly, the
court held that the undisputed evidence did not support a finding that PMAIC’s
investigation was inadequate, and therefore PMAIC was entitled to summary
judgment on Ms. Lundahl’s bad faith claim.
Ms. Lundahl appeals the order denying her request to amend her complaint.
She contends that the district court erred in determining that her proposed
amended complaint failed to allege with sufficient particularity her RICO and
state law fraud claims. In addition, she asserts that she should have been granted
leave to file a supplemental pleading to satisfy the particularity requirement.
Ms. Lundahl also appeals the order granting summary judgment in favor of
PMAIC, arguing that the district court erred in not construing the ambiguous
insurance contract in her favor. She further argues that the district court weighed
disputed material facts and decided them against her.
II. Discussion
“[W]e generally review for abuse of discretion a district court’s denial of
leave to amend a complaint.” Cohen v. Longshore, 621 F.3d 1311, 1314
(10th Cir. 2010). Where leave was denied “based on a determination that
amendment would be futile, our review for abuse of discretion includes de novo
review of the legal basis for the finding of futility.” Id. (internal quotation marks
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omitted). Consequently, we apply the de novo standard to ascertain whether the
proposed amended complaint could survive dismissal. See id. at 1314-15. “To
survive a [motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim], a plaintiff must allege
sufficient facts to make her claim for relief plausible on its face. . . . If the
allegations are so general that they encompass a wide swath of conduct, much of
it innocent, then the plaintiff[] [has] not nudged [her] claims across the line from
conceivable to plausible.” Peterson v. Grisham, 594 F.3d 723, 727 (10th Cir.
2010) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks and ellipses omitted).
“We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo,
applying the same standards that the district court should have applied.”
Cohen-Esrey Real Estate Servs., Inc. v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 636 F.3d 1300,
1302 (10th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). Summary judgment is
appropriate if “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “We examine the record and all reasonable inferences that
might be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.”
Cohen-Esrey Real Estate Servs., Inc., 636 F.3d at 1302 (internal quotation marks
omitted). We apply the substantive law of the forum state, Oklahoma, to the state
law claims. See id.Having carefully reviewed the briefs, the record, and the applicable law in
light of the above standards we AFFIRM the district court’s order denying leave
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to amend the complaint and its entry of summary judgment in favor of PMAIC for
substantially the reasons stated in its Orders issued on February 2, 2011. The
district court denied leave to amend because amendment would have been futile,
given the proposed amended complaint’s failure to plead the RICO and fraud
claims with sufficient particularity under Rule 9(b). The court granted summary
judgment in PMAIC’s favor on the bad faith claim, holding that the undisputed
evidence showed the existence of a legitimate dispute over whether the burglary
was covered by the policy, and that PMAIC’s investigation was reasonable under
the circumstances. Therefore, summary judgment was appropriate because
Ms. Lundahl’s evidence did not show bad faith or unreasonable conduct on the
part of PMAIC.
As for Ms. Lundahl’s claim that she should have been granted leave to file
a supplemental pleading to satisfy the particularity requirement, she has “nowhere
explained how a proposed amendment would cure the deficiencies identified by
the district court.” Hall v. Witteman, 584 F.3d 859, 868 (10th Cir. 2009). She
has not attempted to demonstrate to the district court or this court how she could
successfully again amend her complaint. Therefore, the district court did not
abuse its discretion by not inviting another amended complaint. See id.-7-
III. Conclusion
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Timothy M. Tymkovich
Circuit Judge
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