United States v. Eaton , 614 F. App'x 380 ( 2015 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
TENTH CIRCUIT September 4, 2015
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee, No. 15-5050
v. (D.C. No. 4:15-CV-00035-TCK-FHM
& D.C. No. 4:98-CR-00086-TCK-1)
JASON RYAN EATON, (N.D. Oklahoma)
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER DENYING A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
AND DISMISSING THE APPEAL
Before GORSUCH, McKAY, and BACHARACH, Circuit Judges.
This appeal centers on the issue of timeliness. Mr. Jason Eaton
moved to vacate his conviction, but not until almost fourteen years had
passed since his conviction became final. Based on that delay, the district
court dismissed the action.
Mr. Eaton seeks to appeal. To appeal, however, he must justify a
certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(i)(B) (2012). We can issue
a certificate of appealability only if Mr. Eaton’s argument on timeliness is
at least reasonably debatable. See Laurson v. Leyba, 507 F.3d 1230, 1232
(10th Cir. 2007) (holding that when the district court denies a habeas
corpus petition based on timeliness, the court of appeals can issue a
certificate of appealability only if the district court’s decision on
timeliness is at least reasonably debatable). Because Mr. Eaton has not
presented a reasonably debatable argument on timeliness, we dismiss the
appeal.
Based on a guilty plea, Mr. Eaton was convicted of (1) using a
firearm during a crime of violence and (2) interfering with commerce by
threats or violence. Seeking vacatur of this conviction, Mr. Eaton invokes
28 U.S.C. § 2255 and claims that (1) the crime involved local law, rather
than federal law, because of the absence of an effect on interstate
commerce and (2) the conviction violated the Tenth and Fourteenth
Amendment and principles of federalism.
Mr. Eaton’s initial hurdle involves timeliness. Under § 2255, Mr.
Eaton would ordinarily have only one year to file the motion. See 28
U.S.C. § 2255(f) (2012). The timeliness issue would turn on when the one-
year period started. It ordinarily would begin when the conviction became
final. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(1) (2012). Under this general rule, the period
would have begun in 2001 because that is when the Supreme Court denied
certiorari in the direct appeal. See United States v. Gabaldon, 522 F.3d
1121, 1123 (10th Cir. 2008) (stating that under § 2255, the conviction
becomes final when the Supreme Court denies certiorari).
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Mr. Eaton relies on 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3). Under this section, the
one-year period may be extended when the § 2255 motion is based on a
Supreme Court decision newly recognizing a constitutional right. Invoking
this provision, Mr. Eaton argues that the Supreme Court recognized a new
constitutional right in Bond v. United States, __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2077
(2014). Mr. Eaton is mistaken.
In Bond, the Supreme Court interpreted a statute criminalizing the
possession and use of a chemical weapon. Through this interpretation, the
Court concluded that the statute did not reach a wife’s attempt to injure her
husband’s lover with a chemical irritant. Bond, __ U.S. at __, 134 S. Ct. at
2093. Bond rested on interpretation of a statute, not the Constitution. See
United States v. Hale, 762 F.3d 1214, 1214, 1224 (10th Cir. 2014) (“The
Supreme Court declined to reach the constitutional issue in Bond.” (citing
Bond, __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. at 2087)); see also Sarah H. Cleveland &
William S. Dodge, Defining & Punishing Offenses Under Treaties, 124
Yale L.J. 2202, 2204 (2015) (stating that in Bond v. United States, the
Supreme Court relied on statutory interpretation, avoiding the
constitutional question presented).
Because Bond did not rest on the Constitution, the decision did not
newly recognize a constitutional right. And in the absence of a newly
recognized constitutional right, Mr. Eaton cannot base the start-date of the
limitations period on the Supreme Court’s decision in Bond.
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Instead, the one-year period started in 2001, when the conviction
became final. Mr. Eaton waited almost fourteen years to seek habeas relief,
even though the statute provided a limitations period of only one year. As
a result, no jurist could reasonably debate the timeliness of Mr. Eaton’s
§ 2255 motion. In these circumstances, we (1) decline to issue a certificate
of appealability and (2) dismiss the appeal.
Entered for the Court
Robert E. Bacharach
Circuit Judge
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