Riley v. Snider ( 2000 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 1 2000
TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
CALVIN WESLEY RILEY,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v. No. 99-6339
(D.C. No. CIV-99-343-C)
TWYLA SNIDER; OKLAHOMA (W.D. Okla.)
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS;
STATE OF OKLAHOMA,
Respondents-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, EBEL and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The cause is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Petitioner Calvin Wesley Riley, appearing pro se, seeks a certificate of
appealability to challenge the district court’s order dismissing his 28 U.S.C. §
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
2254 petition as untimely. Because Mr. Riley has not made a substantial showing
of the denial of a constitutional right, see 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c), we deny the
request and dismiss his appeal.
Mr. Riley pled guilty on May 19, 1997, to first degree burglary in state
court and was sentenced to ten years imprisonment, three of which were
suspended. He applied for state post-conviction relief, which was denied, and
then appealed to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA), which
rejected the appeal as untimely. Mr. Riley filed a habeas corpus petition in the
district court alleging that he was factually innocent of the crime charged, his
guilty plea had been defective, and his trial counsel was ineffective. The matter
was referred to a magistrate judge, who recommended the petition be denied as
untimely filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). After consideration of Mr. Riley’s
objections, including the claim of actual innocence, the district court adopted the
recommendation and denied the petition.
Mr. Riley’s conviction became final on May 29, 1997, for purpose of the
one-year statute of limitations contained in § 2244(d)(1). The time Mr. Riley
spent pursuing state post-conviction relief tolled the running of the limitations
period until December 22, 1997, when the state district court denied the
application. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). His subsequent appeal to the OCCA did
not toll the limitations period, because it was untimely filed. See Hoggro v.
Boone, 150 F.3d 1223, 1227 n.4 (10th Cir. 1998). Consequently, Mr. Riley had
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until approximately June 24, 1998 to file his petition for habeas relief. He did not
file until March 15, 1999.
Mr. Riley argues the limitations period should be equitably tolled, based on
the inadequacy of legal materials in the prison library, his lack of legal assistance,
and his ignorance of the law. 1 Section 2244(d) “is not jurisdictional, and as a
limitation may be subject to equitable tolling.” Miller v. Marr, 141 F.3d 976, 978
(10th Cir. 1998). However, inmates must diligently pursue their claims in order
to avail themselves of this tolling. See id.; see also Davis v. Johnson, 158 F.3d
806, 811 (5th Cir.1998) (equitable tolling appropriate only "in rare and
exceptional circumstances"), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1474 (1999); Miller v. New
Jersey State Dept. of Corrections, 145 F.3d 616, 618-19 (3d Cir. 1998) (equitable
tolling applies only where prisoner has diligently pursued claims, but has in some
"extraordinary way" been prevented from asserting his rights). Mr. Riley presents
us with no evidence that he either diligently pursued his claims or was prevented
in some extraordinary way from doing so. Rather, it appears to this court that, as
in Miller, 141 F.3d at 978, he was simply unaware that the months he spent
pursuing his time-barred appeal before the OCCA were not tolled for the purposes
1
Mr. Riley claims that requests to transfer to satellite law libraries for
research are “rarely granted,” and that inmate legal research assistance, “while not
prohibited” is “not encouraged.” He does not, however, argue that he ever made a
request to use the satellite library or assert that he sought inmate legal research
assistance but was prevented from utilizing it.
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of the statute of limitations on his petition for habeas corpus. 2
Mr. Riley also asserts that we should grant equitable tolling based upon his
claim of actual innocence, arguing that failure to do so would result in a
fundamental miscarriage of justice. This court has implied that actual innocence
may be grounds for equitable tolling of the § 2244(d)(1) limitations period. See
id. “The claim of actual innocence itself is not a constitutional claim, but rather a
gateway through which a habeas petitioner must pass to have his otherwise barred
constitutional claim considered on the merits.” Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390,
404 (1993).
If the evidence that Mr. Riley offers us as proof of his actual innocence
were stronger, we would be more inclined to find that he satisfies the fundamental
miscarriage of justice exception that excuses a petitioner’s procedural default.
2
Mr. Riley’s conclusory allegations regarding his lack of access to legal
materials are insufficient to justify equitable tolling. See Miller v. Marr, 141 F.3d
976, 978 (10th Cir. 1998) (“It is not enough to say that the [prison] lacked all
relevant statutes and case law or that the procedure to request specific materials
was inadequate.”). Nor are his allegations regarding the poor quality of his legal
assistance and his own ignorance of the law. See, e.g., Fadayiro v. United States,
30 F. Supp.2d 772, 781 (D.N.J. 1998) (“Ignorance of the law does not justify
equitable tolling of a statute of limitations.”); Henderson v. Johnson, 1 F. Supp.2d
650, 656 (N.D.Tex. 1998) (claims that petitioner did not have professional legal
assistance are not the extraordinary circumstances required to toll the statute).
The Fifth Circuit recently faced a situation similar to the case at bar. In Felder v.
Johnson, No. 98-21050, 2000 WL 144178 (5th Cir. Feb. 9, 2000), the court
refused to apply equitable tolling where an inmate claimed he missed the deadline
because he was proceeding pro se and was unaware of relevant case law due to
inadequacies in the prison library.
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See id. (“The fundamental miscarriage of justice exception is available ‘only
where the prisoner supplements his constitutional claim with a colorable showing
of factual innocence.’”). Mr. Riley’s evidence consists of (1) a sworn affidavit
signed by himself, in which he asserts his innocence, and (2) a sworn affidavit
signed by Kim Riley, the owner of the house and his wife, asserting that no crime
had occurred. Unlike scientific evidence or verifiable testimony, such self-
serving and conclusory statements are insufficient to establish actual innocence,
particularly in light of the fact that Mr. Riley admitted he committed the crime
when he pled guilty.
Mr. Riley failed to convince us that we should grant him equitable tolling
for the habeas corpus petition he filed almost nine months after his statute of
limitations expired. There is no indication that he diligently pursued his petition
or was prevented from doing so by an extraordinary obstacle. His claim of actual
innocence does not satisfy the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception
because it is based solely on conclusory statements by two obviously interested
parties.
Accordingly, we DENY the certificate of appealability and DISMISS the
petition.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Stephanie K. Seymour
Chief Judge
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