United States v. Galindo-Martinez ( 2000 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
JAN 26 2000
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 99-4018
(D.C. No. 98-CR-88)
JULIO GALINDO-MARTINEZ, aka (D. Utah)
Jesus Galindo-Martinez,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before EBEL , KELLY , and BRISCOE , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Defendant Julio Galindo-Martinez appeals his conviction and sentence for
illegal re-entry of a deported alien in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. Specifically,
he asserts that the district court erred in denying his pretrial motion to suppress
statements he made at a prior Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)
administrative interview. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and
18 U.S.C. § 3742, and we affirm.
I.
Defendant was first deported on October 7, 1997, following a conviction in
Utah for possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute. On or
about January 11, 1998, defendant was arrested by the Salt Lake City police on
suspicion of possession of a controlled substance. The INS placed a detainer on
defendant, and in February 1998, he was interviewed by INS agent Jeffrey Hoover
at the Salt Lake City INS office. Agent Hoover conducted the interview in
Spanish, defendant’s native language. At the beginning of the interview,
defendant was given a copy of a Miranda warning printed in both English and
Spanish. The Miranda warning was read to defendant in Spanish from INS Form
214 which differs from a standard Miranda warning in that it advises that any
statements made can be used in either a court of law or an immigration or
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administrative proceeding. 1
See R. Vol. I, Plaintiff’s exs. 1 and 2. The waiver
also was read to defendant in Spanish. When queried, defendant indicated to
Agent Hoover that he had no questions, that he understood the rights he was
waiving, and that he wanted to waive those rights. He subsequently signed a
waiver written in Spanish. See id. , ex. 1. During the interview, defendant made
incriminating statements to Agent Hoover, including a confession that he had
entered the United States illegally following prior deportation after conviction of
an aggravated felony. Defendant’s statements were noted on a “Record of Sworn
Statement in Affidavit Form,” which he signed. See id. , Defendant’s ex. A.
Following the custodial interview, defendant was indicted for reentering the
United States without obtaining the consent of the Attorney General to reapply for
admission. See 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). The government sought an enhancement of
sentence pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §§ 1326(b)(2) and 1101(a)(43) due to defendant’s
prior conviction for an aggravated felony. Defendant filed a motion to suppress
the statements given to the INS. Following a hearing, the magistrate judge
recommended that defendant’s motion be denied. On November 6, 1998, the
district court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation, and on January 20,
1
In Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436, 468-71 (1966), the Supreme Court
imposed upon law enforcement personnel, the obligation to advise a suspect of
the possible use of his statements against him in a criminal proceeding and of his
right to have counsel present during interrogation.
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1999, found defendant guilty and sentenced him to forty-six months’
imprisonment. On appeal, defendant challenges as error the district court’s denial
of his motion to suppress.
II.
“When reviewing a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress, we
consider the totality of the circumstances and view the evidence in a light most
favorable to the government.” United States v. Long , 176 F.3d 1304, 1307 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied 120 S. Ct. 283 (1999). The district court’s factual findings are
reviewed for clear error. See id.A.
Initially, defendant alleges that his inculpatory statements to the INS were
obtained through force, coercion, and deception. Defendant asserts that the fact
that he had been held in a Salt Lake City jail for a period of time before the
interview, and was transferred to the INS office for the interview in handcuffs is
evidence of coercion. We do not agree.
“The ultimate question of whether a statement was voluntary is a question
of law reviewed de novo.” United States v. Hernandez , 93 F.3d 1493, 1501 (10th
Cir. 1996). In Moran v. Burbine , 475 U.S. 412 (1986), the Supreme Court
defined two “dimensions” of the Miranda inquiry as follows:
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First, the relinquishment of the right must have been voluntary in the
sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather
than intimidation, coercion, or deception. Second, the waiver must
have been made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right
being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.
Only if the “totality of the circumstances surrounding the
interrogation” reveals both an uncoerced choice and the requisite
level of comprehension may a court properly conclude that the
Miranda rights have been waived.
Id. at 421 (quoting Fare v. Michael C. , 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979)).
Here, the INS does not dispute that the interview was conducted in a
custodial setting , thus triggering the need for a Miranda advisement. See United
States v. Solano-Godines , 120 F.3d 957, 961 (9th Cir. 1997) (“The test to
determine whether questioning is ‘interrogation’ within the meaning of Miranda
is whether under all of the circumstances involved in a given case, the questions
are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.”)
(further quotation omitted). The INS correctly points out, however, that
defendant has offered no evidence of duress or coercion. Agent Hoover testified,
and defendant does not refute, that defendant was not restrained with handcuffs
during the interview, he was seated at Agent Hoover’s desk, no weapons were
visible, he was talkative and did not complain about the conditions or anything
else, and no threats were made. The INS asserts that the interview was very
short, lasting only a few minutes. Therefore, we conclude that defendant’s claim
of force and coercion in obtaining his statements is without merit.
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B.
Next, defendant claims that he did not understand Agent Hoover when he
was advised of his Miranda rights in Spanish. He contends that “his native
language is not English and he only has a limited understanding of Spanish,” and
that “he was deceived by an INS Spanish speaker who advised him of complex
concepts in a language he was not proficient in.” 2
Appellant’s Br. at 10. Here, it
is clear that defendant is an Hispanic male, born and raised in Mexico. He is a
Mexican citizen with family residing in Mexico. He indicated to Agent Hoover at
the time of the Miranda advisement in Spanish that he understood the rights he
was waiving.
Following his waiver, Agent Hoover asked defendant questions including
his name, birth place, country of citizenship, when he entered the United States,
whether he had been previously deported, and whether he was illegally in the
country. Although it is undisputed that defendant answered these questions in a
manner which tended to incriminate him, it is equally clear that he answered the
questions in a manner which indicated that he fully understood the questions and
the implications of his answers.
2
Although defendant states to this court that he does not understand English
and has only limited proficiency in Spanish, he does not advise this court as to
what language he does communicate in. We also note that Agent Hoover testified
that, during the interview, defendant answered a few of the questions in English.
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The INS contends, and we agree, that defendant understood that he did not
have to speak to Agent Hoover, and that if he elected to waive his right not to
speak, any statements he made could be used against him in either an
administrative proceeding or a court of law. Despite defendant’s beliefs to the
contrary, these are not complex concepts, and we conclude that defendant
understood and voluntarily waived these rights. Therefore, under these facts, it is
clear that defendant’s allegation that he did not understand his rights and his
waiver because of his deficient Spanish is unsupported, and his claim of
involuntary waiver is not meritorious.
C.
Finally, defendant argues that the Record of Sworn Statement states that the
statements contained therein are to be used in administrative proceedings
exclusively. We do not agree with defendant’s interpretation of the language in
the form. The form states in pertinent part that defendant acknowledged that he
was informed that “any statement [he made] may be used against [him] in any
administrative proceeding.” R. Vol. I, Defendant’s ex. A. Our reading of this
statement does not reveal an intent to limit the statements made therein only to
administrative proceedings. When defendant was given the Miranda warning
orally in Spanish, he was informed that any statements he made in the course of
the interview could be used in either an administrative proceeding or a court of
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law. Defendant indicated his understanding of this advisement, asked no
questions, and consented to the interview. Therefore, defendant’s attempt to
construe the language of the form to denote an exclusive use of the statements
fails.
III.
We conclude that defendant’s waiver of his Miranda rights was voluntary
and informed. He was adequately advised, in his native language, of the nature of
his rights and the fact that if he chose to waive those rights, his statements could
be used against him in a criminal proceeding. See Moran , 475 U.S. at 421.
Therefore, the district court’s denial of defendant’s motion to suppress was
appropriate, and the judgment of the United States District Court for the District
of Utah is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
David M. Ebel
Circuit Judge
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