Muniz v. Richardson , 371 F. App'x 905 ( 2010 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS March 31, 2010
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
FRANK M. MUNIZ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 09-2229
(D.C. No.1:09-CV-00202-MCA-RLP)
BILL RICHARDSON, Governor of the (D. of N.M.)
State of New Mexico; JOE R.
WILLIAMS, Secretary of The New
Mexico Corrections Department; THE
NEW MEXICO CORRECTIONS
DEPARTMENT, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before HARTZ, ANDERSON, and TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges. **
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
**
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge
panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material
assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th
Cir. R. 34.1(G). The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Frank M. Muñiz, a New Mexico state prisoner proceeding in forma
pauperis and pro se, 1 appeals the dismissal of his civil rights complaint alleging
11 claims related to prison conditions.
We exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we AFFIRM the
district court’s rulings.
I. Background
Muñiz’s civil rights complaint alleges numerous unconstitutional conditions
in New Mexico state prisons, running the gamut from inadequate disciplinary and
grievance procedures to substandard food service. Muñiz groups his allegations
into 11 broad claims: (1) improper inmate classification, (2) violations of the
prison’s disciplinary policies, (3) deficient medical care, (4) denial of postage for
legal correspondence, (5) inadequate access to legal materials, (6) denial of
postage for international correspondence, (7) general concerns about living
conditions, (8) substandard food service, (9) insufficient recreational activities,
(10) inconsistently-applied grievance procedures, and (11) a discriminatory goods
purchasing service.
The district court held that res judicata barred all but the food service
claim. The remaining claim was dismissed because it was not cognizable.
1
We construe Muñiz’s “pro se pleadings and other papers liberally, but we
do not assume the role of advocate, and his pro se status does not relieve him of
his obligation . . . to comply with the fundamental requirements of the Federal
Rules of Civil and Appellate Procedure.” Merryfield v. Jordan, 584 F.3d 923,
924 n.1 (10th Cir. 2009) (internal punctuation omitted).
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II. Discussion
We review the district court’s legal conclusion that res judicata bars all but
one of Muñiz’s claims de novo, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to
Muñiz. See Pelt v. Utah, 539 F.3d 1271, 1280 (10th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he question
of application of res judicata to the facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party, is a pure question of law to be reviewed de novo.”) (internal
punctuation omitted). We also review de novo the district court’s dismissal of
Muñiz’s other claim under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Christy
Sports, LLC v. Deer Valley Resort Co., 555 F.3d 1188, 1191 (10th Cir. 2009). In
reviewing the district court’s decision, “we can affirm on any ground adequately
supported by the record, so long as the parties have had a fair opportunity to
address that ground.” Thomas v. City of Blanchard, 548 F.3d 1317, 1327 n.2
(10th Cir. 2008) (internal punctuation omitted).
A. Claims properly dismissed under res judicata
The district court correctly dismissed several of Muñiz’s claims on res
judicata grounds. “Res judicata requires the satisfaction of four elements: (1) the
prior suit must have ended with a judgment on the merits; (2) the parties must be
identical or in privity; (3) the suit must be based on the same cause of action; and
(4) the plaintiff must have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the claim in
the prior suit.” Nwosun v. Gen. Mills Rests., Inc., 124 F.3d 1255, 1257 (10th Cir.
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1997); but see Yapp v. Excel Corp., 186 F.3d 1222, 1226 n.4 (10th Cir. 1999)
(discussing whether the fourth prong is a “requirement” or an “exception”).
Liberally construed, Muñiz disputes that his current claims are based on the
same causes of action as his prior claims. “[A] cause of action includes all claims
or legal theories of recovery that arise from the same transaction, event, or
occurrence. All claims arising out of the transaction must therefore be presented
in one suit or be barred from subsequent litigation.” Nwosun, 124 F.3d at 1257.
We have cautioned that “[d]etermining what constitutes a single cause of action
has long been a troublesome question.” Clark v. Haas Group, Inc., 953 F.2d
1235, 1238 (10th Cir. 1992). The Restatement of Judgments provides guidance:
“What factual grouping constitutes a ‘transaction’, and what groupings constitute
a ‘series’ [of transactions], are to be determined pragmatically, giving weight to
such considerations as to whether the facts are related in time, space, origin, or
motivation . . . .” R ESTATEMENT (S ECOND ) OF J UDGMENTS § 24 (1982).
Muñiz’s claims relating to (1) improper inmate classification, (2) denial of
postage for legal correspondence, and (3) denial of postage for international
correspondence are part of the same series of transactions as his previous claims.
In Muñiz v. Moore, No. CIV 08-714 JB/ACT (D.N.M. July 30, 2009), Muñiz
alleged he was improperly classified based on false charges and fabricated
information, and in violation of the prison’s policies. The allegations in Muñiz v.
Moore are substantially identical to the improper inmate classification claim
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Muñiz brings now, and therefore res judicata bars this claim. Similarly, in Muñiz
v. Williams, No. CIV 08-1106 WJ/ACT (D.N.M. Aug. 11, 2009), Muñiz alleged
prison officials unconstitutionally denied him adequate postage for various
mailings. The allegations in Muñiz v. Williams are substantially identical to the
mail-related claims Muñiz brings now, and therefore res judicata bars these
claims as well.
B. Other dismissed claims
The remainder of Muñiz’s claims do not present grounds for relief and
therefore are dismissed. Federal courts must dismiss in forma pauperis
complaints if they “fail[] to state a claim on which relief may be granted . . . .”
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Federal courts may dismiss complaints under Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) if “it is patently obvious that the plaintiff could
not prevail on the facts alleged, and allowing him an opportunity to amend his
complaint would be futile.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir.
1991) (internal punctuation omitted).
1. Eighth Amendment claims
Muñiz attempts to state several Eighth Amendment claims. The Supreme
Court has held that “[n]o static ‘test’ can exist by which courts determine whether
conditions of confinement are cruel and unusual, for the Eighth Amendment must
draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress
of a maturing society.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981) (internal
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punctuation omitted). The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition encompasses
punishments that “involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain or are
grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime . . . .” Id. (internal
punctuation omitted). At the same time, “the Constitution does not mandate
comfortable prisons,” and penal “considerations properly are weighed by the
legislature and prison administration rather than a court.” Id. at 349.
The district court properly dismissed Muñiz’s Eighth Amendment claim
relating to substandard food service for failure to state a legally cognizable claim.
For the same reason, we dismiss his claims relating to deficient medical care,
general concerns about living conditions, and insufficient recreational activities.
In his substandard food service claim, Muñiz argues that New Mexico
prisons’ food is of such poor quality and so lacking nutrition that it violates the
Eighth Amendment. However, Muñiz’s specific allegations show—at most—that
prisoners do not enjoy the food that is served. This plainly does not rise to the
“serious deprivation of basic human needs” that offends the Eighth Amendment.
Id. at 347.
Muñiz’s deficient medical care claim involves denials of referrals to
outside physicians and extended wait times for optometry and dental care. Again,
Muñiz’s specific allegations do not approach the “deliberate indifference to
serious medical needs” that constitutes an Eighth Amendment violation. Estelle
v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).
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Muñiz’s general concerns about living conditions center on excessive
heating and air conditioning, dirty mops, insufficiently sized showers, and
television programs played continuously in a loop. Even if the prison conditions
are as he describes them, they do not violate the Eighth Amendment. Muñiz
comes closest to stating a cognizable claim when he describes the repeated
television programs being used as a harassment tool. But even assuming prison
officials’ ill intent, Muñiz does not allege that he is required to sit near the
televisions as the programs are repeated. We find no plausible Eighth
Amendment violation arising from Muñiz’s living conditions claims.
Finally, we dismiss Muñiz’s Eighth Amendment claim regarding
recreational activities. The gravamen of his complaint is that the prison’s
recreational facilities—which he acknowledges include a basketball hoop and
fitness equipment—are too small. It is unclear what, if any, constitutional
argument Muñiz makes on this count. Liberally construed as an Eighth
Amendment claim, it fails.
2. Due process claims
Muñiz attempts to state several due process claims. He claims that prison
officials violate their own disciplinary policies and are unfair to prisoners in
grievance hearings. He also claims the official in charge of the prison’s goods
purchasing service, the canteen, discriminates against him due to his filing of
grievances and legal actions. Prison officials must follow their own policies,
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Mitchell v. Maynard, 80 F.3d 1433, 1445 (10th Cir. 1996), and they may not
retaliate against prisoners for filing grievances or legal actions, Smith v.
Maschner, 899 F.2d 940, 947 (10th Cir. 1990). Muñiz makes only general, not
specific, allegations about the grievance hearings and the prison’s canteen.
“[C]onclusory allegations without supporting factual averments are insufficient to
state a claim on which relief can be based,” Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110, and therefore
those claims are dismissed.
Muñiz makes an additional due process claim, which he states in more
detail. He claims that he has inadequate access to legal materials because the
prison staff is not legally trained and cannot provide federal or state case law. It
is well-settled that prisoners have a constitutional right to access the court system,
and that access must be “adequate, effective, and meaningful.” Bounds v. Smith,
430 U.S. 817, 822 (1977). Muñiz’s claim founders because he admits that he has
access to case law through a mail service. Indeed, his brief’s extensive case
citations belie a lack of legal access. Muñiz later vaguely asserts that his legal
correspondence is censored, but, much like his other due process claims, he does
not provide any specific details about that censorship.
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III. Conclusion
For the forgoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s rulings. We
DENY Muñiz’s motion for leave to proceed without prepayment of costs and fees.
We remind Muñiz of his continuing obligation to make partial payments of his
filing fees until they are paid in full.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Timothy M. Tymkovich
Circuit Judge
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