Christian v. Commandant, USDB , 436 F. App'x 870 ( 2011 )


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  •                                                                         FILED
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS August 18, 2011
    Elisabeth A. Shumaker
    TENTH CIRCUIT                       Clerk of Court
    DAVID CHRISTIAN,
    Petitioner-Appellant,
    No. 11-3079
    v.                                            (D.C. No. 5:08-CV-03060-RDR)
    (D. of Kan.)
    COMMANDANT, UNITED STATES
    DISCIPLINARY BOARD,
    Respondent-Appellee.
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
    Before O’BRIEN, McKAY, and TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges. **
    David Christian, proceeding pro se, 1 appeals the district court’s denial of
    his petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. In military court,
    Christian pleaded guilty to charges relating to multiple acts of sexual misconduct
    *
    This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
    doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
    however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
    Cir. R. 32.1.
    **
    After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge
    panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material
    assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th
    Cir. R. 34.1(G). The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
    1
    Because Christian is proceeding pro se, we construe his filings liberally.
    See Van Deelan v. Johnson, 
    497 F.3d 1151
    , 1153 n.1 (10th Cir. 2007).
    with underage females. In his § 2241 petition, he claims his guilty plea was not
    knowing and voluntary, his conviction and sentence were unconstitutional, and
    his counsel’s assistance was ineffective.
    We find these issues received full and fair consideration by the military
    courts. Therefore, we AFFIRM the denial of Christian’s § 2241 petition.
    I. Background
    Christian is a former active duty member of the United States Army. While
    on active duty, he committed multiple acts of sexual misconduct with underage
    females. He agreed to plead guilty to several counts of sexual misconduct on the
    condition his sentence would not be greater than fifteen years. Christian’s plea
    agreement was based on the assumption the maximum penalty for his offenses
    included life without parole. Christian was sentenced to 15 years’ confinement, a
    dishonorable discharge, a reduction in rank, and other penalties.
    After Christian’s guilty plea and sentencing, his case was forwarded to the
    United States Army Court of Criminal Appeals (ACCA) for review. Christian
    asserted four grounds for relief through new counsel and personally raised eleven
    additional grounds for relief. In a summary opinion, the ACCA held
    On consideration of the entire record, including consideration of the
    issues personally specified by the appellant, we hold the findings of
    guilty and the sentence as approved by the convening authority
    correct in law and fact. Accordingly, those findings of guilty and the
    sentences are AFFIRMED.
    R. at 200.
    -2-
    Christian then petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed
    Forces (CAAF) for review of his conviction. The CAAF granted the petition and
    considered (1) whether life without parole was an authorized punishment at the
    time of Christian’s offenses, and (2) whether Christian received ineffective
    assistance of counsel when trial counsel failed to seek credit for Christian’s pre-
    trial confinement and advised Christian to affirmatively waive the issue. United
    States v. Christian, 
    63 M.J. 205
    , 206 (C.A.A.F. 2006). Christian was again
    represented by new counsel before the CAAF. The CAAF determined life without
    parole was an authorized sentence and concluded Christian’s guilty plea was
    provident. Also, the CAAF found Christian’s defense counsel was not ineffective
    when he made a tactical decision not to request credit for pre-trial confinement
    since there were reasonable grounds for the restrictions imposed on Christian.
    Christian petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari and
    was denied.
    While incarcerated at the Unites States Disciplinary Barracks in Fort
    Leavenworth, Kansas, Christian filed his § 2241 petition. The district court
    denied the petition, finding the military courts had given full and fair
    consideration of certain claims and rejected the remaining issues on the merits.
    This appeal followed.
    -3-
    II. Discussion
    A.     Standard of Review
    A federal prisoner may obtain habeas corpus relief under § 2241 if he can
    demonstrate he “is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws . . . of the
    United States.” 2 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c). A § 2241 petition is the proper means to
    collaterally challenge a conviction in military court. Ackerman v. Novak, 
    483 F.3d 647
    , 649 (10th Cir. 2007); see also Prost v. Anderson, 
    636 F.3d 578
    , 588
    (10th Cir. 2011) (“[R]esort to § 2241 is the norm rather than the exception when a
    military prisoner seeks to challenge the results of his court martial.”).
    We review a district court’s denial of a § 2241 habeas petition de novo.
    Fricke v. Sec’y of the Navy, 
    509 F.3d 1287
    , 1289 (10th Cir. 2007). But our
    review of military court proceedings is very limited. See Burns v. Wilson, 
    346 U.S. 137
    , 142 (1953). “[W]hen a military decision has dealt fully and fairly with
    an allegation raised in that application, it is not open to a federal civil court to
    grant the writ simply to re-evaluate the evidence.” 
    Id. “The limited
    function of
    the civil court is to determine whether the military have given fair consideration
    to each of the petitioner’s claims.” Thomas v. U.S. Disciplinary Barracks, 625
    2
    After the district court’s denial of his § 2241 petition, Christian was
    released from detention at Fort Leavenworth. His petition is not moot, however,
    because he continues to suffer collateral consequences of his conviction,
    including sex offender registration requirements. See Spencer v. Kemna, 
    523 U.S. 1
    , 7 (1998); United States v. Meyers, 
    200 F.3d 715
    , 718 (10th Cir. 2000).
    -4-
    F.3d 667, 670 (10th Cir. 2010); see also Lips v. Commandant, U.S. Disciplinary
    Barracks, 
    997 F.2d 808
    , 811 (10th Cir. 1993).
    “To assess the fairness of the consideration, our review of a military
    conviction is appropriate only if the following four conditions are met: (1) the
    asserted error is of substantial constitutional dimension, (2) the issue is one of
    law rather than disputed fact, (3) no military considerations warrant a different
    treatment of constitutional claims, and (4) the military courts failed to give
    adequate consideration to the issues involved or failed to apply proper legal
    standards.” 
    Thomas, 625 F.3d at 670
    –71 (citing Dodson v. Zelez, 
    917 F.2d 1250
    ,
    1252–53 (10th Cir. 1990)). “While we continue to apply this four-part test, our
    recent cases have emphasized the fourth consideration as the most important.” 
    Id. at 671.
    In addition, we have “consistently held full and fair consideration does
    not require a detailed opinion by the military court.” 
    Id. Even when
    the military
    court summarily disposes of an issue, if the issue was briefed and argued before
    the military court, the issue was given fair consideration. 
    Id. B. Military
    Court Consideration of Christian’s Claims
    Christian raises four issues 3 on appeal: (1) whether his guilty plea was
    improvident because it was not informed, knowing, and voluntary, (2) whether he
    3
    Christian raised five issues in his § 2241 petition below. However, on
    appeal, he has withdrawn his fifth claim for relief, which argued he was denied
    effective assistance of counsel when the Army’s Defense Appellate Division
    failed to provide representation before the United States Supreme Court.
    -5-
    received ineffective assistance when defense counsel advised him the maximum
    possible sentence was life without parole, (3) whether his conviction and sentence
    were unconstitutional due to an ex post facto application of the law, and (4)
    whether he received ineffective assistance when defense counsel failed to request
    credit for Christian’s allegedly illegal pretrial restraint and advised Christian to
    waive the issue.
    After a careful review of the record and proceedings before the military
    courts, we conclude the military courts gave full and fair consideration to
    Christian’s claims. The claims were briefed and argued before both the ACCA
    and the CAAF. Although the ACCA summarily affirmed Christian’s conviction,
    it noted that it considered the entire record and arguments raised by Christian. In
    addition, the CAAF issued a thorough written opinion affirming the ACCA.
    Christian does not argue his claims failed to receive full and fair consideration
    before the military courts but merely attacks the merits of the military court
    decisions.
    While Christian raises four issues on appeal, and the CAAF only discussed
    two discrete issues in its opinion, all four issues still received full and fair
    consideration. Christian’s first three issues all rest on the argument that the
    sentence of life without parole was inapplicable to Christian’s offenses at the time
    he committed them. The CAAF considered this argument and determined this
    sentence was an “authorized punishment” at the time of Christian’s offenses.
    -6-
    
    Christian, 63 M.J. at 207
    . Accordingly, the CAAF concluded Christian’s “guilty
    plea was provident” and he “was not misled as to the maximum permissible
    punishment of [life without parole].” 
    Id. at 209.
    Thus, the military courts gave
    full and fair consideration of Christian’s claim that life without parole was not an
    authorized sentence at the time of his offenses.
    Even if the military courts did not give full and fair consideration to the
    two issues not specifically addressed by the CAAF, the claims have no merit.
    The CAAF concluded life without parole was an authorized sentence at the time
    of Christian’s offenses. Therefore, Christian’s counsel did not render ineffective
    assistance when he provided Christian with the correct information that he faced
    a maximum sentence of life without parole. And Christian’s sentence and
    conviction were not an unconstitutional ex post facto application of the law
    because life without parole was an authorized sentence.
    As to Christian’s fourth issue on appeal, the CAAF expressly addressed
    whether trial counsel was ineffective for not seeking credit for pre-trial
    confinement. The CAAF determined Christian’s defense counsel “could
    reasonably conclude that the initial restrictions imposed on [Christian] upon his
    return to the military post were not tantamount to confinement” and any claim
    “may be held meritless at trial.” 
    Id. at 210.
    The court found his counsel “appears
    to have made a reasonable tactical decision” of arguing pre-trial confinement as a
    mitigating factor at sentencing rather than requesting credit for any confinement.
    -7-
    
    Id. Thus, Christian’s
    argument that his counsel provided ineffective assistance
    for not seeking credit for pre-trial confinement was given full and fair
    consideration by the military courts.
    III. Conclusion
    Because the military courts gave full and fair consideration to Christian’s
    claims, we AFFIRM the district court’s denial of Christian’s § 2241 petition.
    ENTERED FOR THE COURT
    Timothy M. Tymkovich
    Circuit Judge
    -8-