Magallanes v. Harding ( 2018 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT July 12, 2018
_________________________________
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
EDDIE MAGALLANES,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
No. 17-8077
P. HARDING, individually and in his (D.C. No. 2:16-CV-00278-SWS)
official capacity; SECURITY MAJOR (D. Wyo.)
DOE, individually and in his official
capacity; EDDIE WILSON, individually
and in his official capacity; DAN
SHANNON, individually and in his official
capacity; ROBERT LAMPERT,
individually and in his official capacity;
STEVE LUNDLY, individually and in his
official capacity; STEVE HARGETT,
individually and in his official capacity;
CORPORAL KENNEDY, individually and
in his official capacity; MATTHEW
MEAD, individually and in his official
capacity; MICHAEL GROOMAN,
individually; JOSEPH MARTINEZ,
individually; BOBBY SCHAPER; STATE
OF WYOMING; WYOMING
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS;
WYOMING STATE PENITENTIARY;
JOHN AND JANE DOES, 1-30,
individually and in his/her/their official
capacity(ies),
Defendants - Appellees.
_________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously
that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. See
Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted
_________________________________
Before LUCERO, HARTZ, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
Plaintiff Eddie Magallanes brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Wyoming law
against several prison officials and inmates arising out of his beating while incarcerated
at the Wyoming State Penitentiary (WSP). The United States District Court for the
District of Wyoming dismissed all his claims. On appeal Magallanes challenges only the
dismissal of his § 1983 claims against prison officials based on his failure to exhaust
prison administrative remedies and qualified immunity. Exercising jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm. Because the district court correctly dismissed his claims with
prejudice for failure to exhaust, we need not address qualified immunity.
“Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), [prisoners are] required to
exhaust all available administrative remedies prior to filing . . . suit in federal court.”
Braxton v. Zavaras, 614 F.3d 1156, 1161 (10th Cir. 2010). “Proper exhaustion demands
compliance with an agency’s deadlines and other critical procedural rules because no
adjudicative system can function effectively without imposing some orderly structure on
the course of its proceedings.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90–91 (2006). Wyoming
prisoners are required to submit their initial grievances within 30 days of the relevant
incident.
without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under
the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R.
32.1.
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In 2012 Magallanes was placed in an administrative-segregation unit at the WSP
after he was involved in an altercation with a corrections officer. On November 19,
2014, he was released back into a general-population unit. Soon after being released into
general population, three fellow inmates assaulted him, causing a traumatic brain injury
that placed him in a coma for a month. The State conducted an investigation into the
assault that began on the date of the assault and concluded in April 2015.
On December 10, 2014, Magallanes was moved to the infirmary at the Wyoming
Medium Correctional Institute (WMCI), which had better treatment capabilities. He was
moved from the infirmary to a segregation unit in April 2015. In August 2015, nine
months after his assault, an outside medical consultant concluded that he had made
significant improvements in his recovery and might no longer require physical,
occupational, or speech therapy. By January 2016 he was able to file a grievance asking
to be returned to general population at the WMCI or to be returned to WSP, although this
request was denied since classification and housing decisions could not be addressed
under the grievance policy.
On March 30, 2016, while still housed at the WMCI, Magallanes filed a separate
grievance concerning his 2014 assault. His grievance was forwarded to the WSP. The
grievance asserted that prison officials placed him in general population at the WSP
knowing that he would be assaulted by other inmates. The WSP rejected the grievance as
untimely. The grievance manager indicated that although Magallanes’s injuries excused
him from having to meet the 30-day requirement, his grievance was still filed too late
after his 2014 assault. On April 3, 2016, he filed two separate appeals: one to the
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Director of the Wyoming Department of Corrections (WDOC) and another to the WMCI,
where he was still housed. The Director summarily rejected his appeal since it was not
accepted by the WSP and thus could not be considered by the Director. A few days later,
the WMCI rejected his other appeal. Ignoring any issue of timeliness, the WMCI
explained that the State had already conducted an investigation into the assault and did
not intend further action.
We agree that the grievance was untimely. Magallanes filed his initial grievance
in March 2016, far after the 30-day deadline to grieve his November 2014 beating.
Although he was certainly entitled to additional time because of his coma, he fails to
explain why he could not have filed a grievance much earlier. He had been released from
the infirmary about a year before he filed the grievance, and he had even filed a grievance
on an unrelated issue two months earlier.
We are not persuaded by Magallanes’s suggestion that the State waived the 30-day
limit because the WMCI did not reject his appeal on timeliness grounds. Even if we
make the doubtful assumption that the WMCI had authority to hear an appeal from denial
of a grievance by the WSP, the Director of the WDOC is the highest authority, and he
affirmed the untimeliness dismissal.
Because Magallanes did not file a timely grievance, he failed to exhaust
administrative remedies and his § 1983 claim was properly dismissed. Although
Magallanes argues that the district court should have permitted him to amend his
complaint, he does not explain how he could overcome his failure to exhaust. The
district court’s dismissal with prejudice was therefore proper. See McKinney v.
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Oklahoma, 925 F.2d 363, 365 (10th Cir. 1991) (court need not permit plaintiff to amend
when amendment would be futile).
We AFFIRM the district court’s judgment.
Entered for the Court
Harris L Hartz
Circuit Judge
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