Barocio v. Ward , 243 F. App'x 398 ( 2007 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
July 25, 2007
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
M ER CE R . B AR OC IO ,
Petitioner - A ppellant,
No. 07-7025
v. (D.C. No. CIV-04-126-RAW )
(E.D. Okla.)
R ON W A R D ,
Respondent - Appellee.
O RD ER DEN YIN G A CER TIFIC ATE O F
APPEALABILITY
Before L UC ER O, HA RTZ, and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges.
M erce R. Barocio, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, requests a certificate
of appealability (“COA”) to appeal the district court’s denial of his § 2254 habeas
petition. In challenging his state court conviction, Barocio claims that evidence
used against him was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, that the
prosecutor failed to perform a plea agreement, and that his counsel was
ineffective. W e D EN Y the application for a COA.
On M ay 20, 1999, the Choctaw County Sheriff’s Office received
information that Barocio was making methamphetamine at the home of his aunt.
W hen officers approached the house, they smelled a strong chemical odor
associated with methamphetamine and observed Barocio running out the back
door. Barocio was apprehended, and a search of the home revealed a
methamphetamine laboratory. Officers found Barocio’s fingerprints on several
items in the laboratory. At Barocio’s trial, a witness testified that she had
purchased methamphetamine-production supplies with Barocio, and returned with
him to his aunt’s house to make the drugs. On November 6, 2001, Barocio was
found guilty of manufacturing methamphetamine in violation of Okla. Stat. tit. 63,
§ 2-401(F), and sentenced to 25 years’ imprisonment. On direct appeal, Barocio
challenged the admission of evidence from the search, claimed the prosecutor
failed to perform a plea agreement, and alleged cumulative error. After that
appeal was denied, Barocio sought post-conviction relief in state court, alleging
ineffective assistance of counsel and cumulative error. The district court denied
Barocio’s petition, and the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (“OCCA”)
affirmed. W hile his state petition was pending, Barocio filed the present habeas
petition in federal district court. Adopting the m agistrate judge’s
recom mendation, the district court dismissed his petition. He now seeks a COA
from this court to appeal that decision. 1
A COA may issue “only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of
the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Barocio must show
1
Because the district court did not address the issue of a COA, it is deemed
denied. See 10th Cir. R. 22.1(C). Consequently, Barocio may not appeal the
district court’s decision absent a grant of a COA by this court.
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“that reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the
petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues
presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Slack v.
M cDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (quotations omitted). M oreover, because
Barocio raised these claims in his state court proceedings, a grant of habeas may
only issue if those proceedings resulted in a decision that was “contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,” or
“based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence
presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2).
Barocio first asserts that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated when
evidence was introduced against him at trial that was obtained from an illegal
search of his aunt’s home. State prisoners are not entitled to federal habeas relief
for alleged violations of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule “where the
State has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of the Fourth
Amendment claim.” Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976). Barocio
challenged the admission of the evidence at a preliminary hearing, in two written
suppression motions, at trial, and again on direct appeal. The OCCA determined
that Barocio lacked standing to challenge the search. Barocio had ample
opportunities to litigate his claim in state court, and is not entitled to habeas relief
on this ground.
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Next, Barocio claims that he made an oral agreement with an assistant
district attorney to identify certain individuals in exchange for dismissing his case
without prejudice or continuing it indefinitely. He contends that although he
named two drug traffickers, the district attorney’s office did not perform its end
of the bargain. After conducting a hearing on Barocio’s motion to enforce the
agreement, the trial court found that there was no agreement and, alternatively,
that Barocio had failed to show compliance with the alleged agreement. Barocio
has offered no evidence to call into question the trial court’s determination, and
on review of the record, we determine that the trial court’s conclusions were
reasonable. Accordingly, Barocio has failed to allege a ground upon which relief
can be granted.
Barocio raises several claims regarding the quality of his representation,
specifically that: (1) Trial counsel was ineffective; (2) Trial counsel had a
conflict of interest; and (3) Appellate counsel was ineffective. His claims of
ineffective assistance of trial counsel and conflict of interest w ere first raised in
his application for post-conviction relief. Because Barocio failed to raise these
claims on direct appeal, the OCCA concluded that, under Oklahoma law, they
were waived. See Okla. Stat. tit. 22, § 1086. Claims that are procedurally
defaulted in state court are generally barred on habeas review. See Coleman v.
Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991). However, when a state procedural rule
would bar a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, we will only apply
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this bar if trial and appellate counsel were different, and the ineffectiveness claim
can be resolved on the trial record. English v. Cody, 146 F.3d 1257, 1264 (10th
Cir. 1998). In this case, Barocio had separate trial and appellate counsel, and
after careful review of the record, we conclude it is sufficient to resolve his claim.
Thus Barocio’s claims are barred, absent a showing of cause and actual prejudice
or a fundamental miscarriage of justice. See Coleman, 501 U .S. at 750. Because
Barocio has not met either standard, we determine that his claim of ineffective
assistance of trial counsel is barred.
Barocio has also failed to establish an actual conflict of interest w ith
respect to his trial counsel. Because Barocio raised this claim for the first time on
collateral attack, he “must demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest adversely
affected his lawyer’s performance.” Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348
(1980). “An actual conflict of interest exists only if counsel was forced to make
choices advancing interests to the detriment of his client.” W orkman v. M ullin,
342 F.3d 1100, 1107 (10th Cir. 2003) (quotation and alteration omitted).
Barocio’s claim amounts to an allegation that his counsel had some tangential
prior contact with his family members, and in no way establishes a present
conflict requiring counsel to choose between Barocio’s interests and another’s.
In addition, Barocio claims that in his direct appeal, his appellate counsel
was ineffective in failing to raise the issue of the ineffectiveness of trial counsel.
Applying the test in Strickland v. W ashington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), the
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OCCA concluded that Barocio failed to show trial counsel’s deficiency.
Appellate counsel’s failure to raise an issue does not constitute ineffective
assistance if the issue itself is meritless. Hawkins v. Hannigan, 185 F.3d 1146,
1152 (10th Cir. 1999). W e agree with the OCCA, and determine that Barocio has
failed to demonstrate that appellate counsel was ineffective.
Finally, Barocio asserts that the cumulative effect of all alleged errors
deprived him of his right to a fair trial. However, because he has failed to show
any error in his case, there is no cumulative error. See Castro v. W ard, 138 F.3d
810, 832 (10th C ir. 1998) (“C umulative error analysis applies where there are tw o
or more actual errors. It does not apply, however, to the cumulative effect of
non-errors.” (quotation and citation omitted)).
Because Barocio has failed to make “a substantial showing of the denial of
a constitutional right,” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), we DENY his application for a
C OA .
Entered for the Court
Elisabeth A . Shumaker, Clerk
By:
Deputy Clerk
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