Crawford v. Frasier , 21 F. App'x 883 ( 2001 )


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  •                                                                          F I L E D
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    NOV 15 2001
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                      PATRICK FISHER
    Clerk
    VERYL D. CRAWFORD,
    Plaintiff - Appellant,
    v.                                                     No. 01-3265
    (No. 01-CV-3244-GTV)
    ALLAN DALE FRASIER, Plant                          (District of Kansas)
    Manager, Century Manufacturing Inc.,
    El Dorado, KS; ROBERT SAPIEN,
    Unit Team Manager, El Dorado
    Correctional Facility,
    Defendants - Appellees.
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT           *
    Before EBEL , KELLY , and LUCERO , Circuit Judges.
    Plaintiff Veryl D. Crawford, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s
    dismissal of his prisoner’s civil rights complaint pursuant to 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
    , for
    *
    The case is unanimously ordered submitted without oral argument
    pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). This order and
    judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case,
    res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The Court generally disfavors the citation of
    orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the
    terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
    failure to exhaust administrative remedies and failure to state a claim for relief.
    We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
     and affirm, but we remand
    with instructions to modify the judgment.
    Plaintiff is incarcerated in the El Dorado Correctional Facility (“EDCF”) in
    El Dorado, Kansas. In his complaint, he seeks damages for the alleged violation
    of his constitutional rights concerning a workplace incident that resulted in
    disciplinary action being taken against him.
    In June 1999, plaintiff was employed at Century Manufacturing, a private
    prison industry associated with the EDCF facility. After a verbal altercation with
    one of Century’s supervisors, plaintiff was removed from his work assignment by
    Allan Dale Frasier, the plant manager. Plaintiff received a work performance
    disciplinary report, which he claims was based on a false charge. He was found
    guilty of the offense specified in the charge and sanctioned with the loss of sixty
    days of good time.
    Plaintiff sought damages in district court from Robert Sapien, his EDCF
    unit team manager, for failing to investigate adequately the workplace
    disciplinary report, failing to protect him from the false charge, and failing to
    restore him to his workplace assignment. Plaintiff, who is African American, also
    seeks damages from plant manager Frasier for having treated him differently from
    white inmates who were either not fired or were later rehired.
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    Plaintiff first contends that the district court erred in dismissing his
    complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. We review de novo a
    dismissal for failure to exhaust.   See Miller v. Menghini , 
    213 F.3d 1244
    , 1246
    (10th Cir. 2000). Before both the district court and this Court, plaintiff has
    documented his failure to exhaust the prison’s administrative grievance
    procedure, but has argued that no formal exhaustion of administrative remedies is
    required. Prisoners bringing 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     c    laims must, however, exhaust
    available administrative remedies before proceeding in federal court. See 42
    U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (“No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions
    under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined
    in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies
    as are available are exhausted.”). This provision requires full exhaustion of the
    available formal grievance procedure, regardless of the nature of the relief being
    sought. See Booth v. Churner , 
    121 S. Ct. 1819
    , 1825 (2001) (holding exhaustion
    requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) applicable even where prisoner seeks only
    monetary relief). Here, plaintiff has not fully and completely exhausted available
    administrative remedies. Thus, the district court properly held that he may not
    proceed on his claims in federal court.
    Plaintiff next suggests that the district court erred in dismissing his
    complaint against Century plant manager Frasier for failing to state a claim for
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    relief. We review de novo a dismissal for failure to state a claim.         See Perkins v.
    Kan. Dep’t of Corrs. , 
    165 F.3d 803
    , 806 (10th Cir. 1999) (a         pplying de novo
    review to dismissals under § 1915(e)). To the extent plaintiff seeks damages from
    Frasier as a private individual and not a person acting under color of state law, no
    claim for relief can be stated under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
    .           See West v. Atkins , 
    487 U.S. 42
    , 48 (1988) (“To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the
    violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and
    must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under
    color of state law.”). Moreover, as the district court noted, even if state action
    and the lack of administrative remedies in this prison related industry were to be
    presumed, plaintiff’s broad and conclusory allegations of racial discrimination
    and retaliation by Frasier would not state a claim for relief.        See Hall v. Bellmon ,
    
    935 F.2d 1106
    , 1110 (10th Cir. 1991) (conclusory allegations are insufficient to
    state a claim on which relief can be based). The district court thus committed no
    error.
    Plaintiff also argues that the district court abused its discretion in
    dismissing his complaint without affording him notice and an opportunity to be
    heard in opposition. A prisoner’s complaint that fails to state a claim for relief
    may be dismissed at any time by the district court.       See 
    28 U.S.C. § 1915
    (e)(2)
    (“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or portion thereof, that may have been paid, the
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    court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action
    or appeal . . . fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.”). The district
    court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint against Frasier was thus proper. In
    addition, although the dismissal provision of § 1915(e)(2) does not authorize the
    court’s sua sponte dismissal of a prisoner’s claims due to lack of exhaustion of
    administrative remedies, courts may dismiss actions on their own motion in a
    broad range of circumstances where they are not explicitly authorized to do so by
    statute or rule.   See, e.g. , Link v. Wabash R.R. Co. , 
    370 U.S. 626
    , 629–32 (1962)
    (district court has inherent power to dismiss sua sponte for failure to prosecute);
    Costello v. United States , 
    365 U.S. 265
    , 286–87 (1961) (district court may
    dismiss sua sponte for plaintiff’s failure to comply with an order of the court). In
    his brief before the district court in the present case, plaintiff fully documented
    his failure to exhaust the administrative remedies available to him and fully
    argued that his failure to exhaust should be excused. Under these circumstances,
    the district court’s sua sponte dismissal was proper and did not prejudice plaintiff.
    Plaintiff is correct, however, that the district court did not make clear
    whether his claims against Sapien and Frasier were dismissed with or without
    prejudice. With respect to plaintiff’s complaint against Frasier, dismissal for
    failure to state a claim should be with prejudice. With respect to plaintiff’s
    complaint against Sapien, dismissal for failure to exhaust should be without
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    prejudice.
    Finally, we note that the district court granted plaintiff’s application to
    proceed without prepayment of the appellate filing fee. Plaintiff’s motion before
    this Court to proceed without prepayment of costs will thus be denied as moot.      1
    We AFFIRM the district court but REMAND with directions to modify the
    judgment to reflect that plaintiff’s complaint against defendant Frasier is
    dismissed with prejudice, and that his complaint against defendant Sapien is
    dismissed without prejudice. Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed on Appeal
    without Prepayment of Costs or Fees is     DENIED .
    The mandate shall issue forthwith.
    Entered for the Court,
    Carlos F. Lucero
    Circuit Judge
    1
    We also note that plaintiff, as per the district court’s order of August 17,
    2001, must continue making partial payments for his district court and appellate
    filing fees until the entire balance of these fees is paid.
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