United States v. Trapp ( 1997 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
JUN 24 1997
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
No. 96-7054
v.
(E. District of Oklahoma)
(D.C. No. CR-95-60-1-S)
JOHN WILLIAM TRAPP, also known
as J.W. Trapp,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before PORFILIO, LUCERO, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
Appellant John William Trapp was indicted on one count of conspiracy to
manufacture marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 and one count of
racketeering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). The jury found him guilty of the
racketeering charge. Trapp now appeals his conviction on four grounds: (1) the
government failed to prove that at least one of the predicate acts of which Trapp
was found guilty was within the statute’s five year limitation period; (2) the
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
evidence was insufficient to sustain the jury’s guilty verdict; (3) the court abused
its discretion with respect to three different evidentiary rulings; and (4) the
government failed to deliver all requested discovery, and Trapp discovered new
evidence. This court exercises jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and
AFFIRMS Trapp’s conviction.
BACKGROUND
Trapp was elected Sheriff of Choctaw County, Oklahoma, on January 3,
1989 and served until he resigned in October 1995. In January 1990, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) began investigating Trapp and his employees for
requesting and receiving bribes from marijuana growers and night club owners.
After a five-year investigation, the grand jury returned an indictment against
Trapp on September 27, 1995, charging conspiracy to manufacture marijuana in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 and racketeering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c).
In support of the racketeering charge, the government alleged Trapp committed
ten predicate bribery acts constituting a pattern of racketeering. 1
Racketeering act six alleged Trapp received and agreed to receive bribes
from Jimmy Allen Foley and Joe Collvins. In 1989, Foley and Collvins were
growing marijuana on leased land in Choctaw County. In September or October
Because the jury found Trapp guilty of predicate acts six, seven, and eight,
1
we limit our discussion to only those three acts.
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of 1989, Mike Mitchell, the undersheriff, arranged a meeting with Foley at which
Mitchell solicited bribes in return for Mitchell and Trapp’s abstention from
arresting Foley and Collvins for marijuana production. Foley and Mitchell
arranged a subsequent meeting at which Trapp was present. At this subsequent
meeting, Trapp also solicited bribes from Collvins. Foley and Collvins agreed to
pay Trapp and Mitchell $10,000 for protection from prosecution for growing
marijuana. Mitchell later requested an additional $2,500 because Trapp “thought
the ten was about what he should get.” R. at 716-17. In either December 1989 or
January 1990, Mitchell again approached Foley and told him that the payoff for
1990 growing season would be $20,000. Foley and Collvins decided not to grow
marijuana in 1990.
Racketeering act seven alleged Trapp solicited a bribe from David Edward
Grant, a chef who had previously been arrested for marijuana cultivation. In
1991, Trapp began investigating several complaints from Grant’s neighbors about
Grant shooting toward them or their property. Sometime in the summer of 1991,
Trapp reprimanded Grant for the shootings and told him that if he was planning to
grow marijuana on his property, he would need to pay Trapp $12,000. Later, in
the summer of 1992, Trapp arrested Grant for extortion, telling Grant “that’s what
that twelve thousand dollars could help take care of.” R. at 863-64. The charges
against Grant were later dismissed.
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Racketeering act eight alleged Trapp solicited a bribe from Randy Lee
Chappell who ran the Fish Market in Choctaw County. Chappell sold speed and
crank at the Fish Market and split the profits with Gene Wynn, owner of the Fish
Market. On January 10, 1990, Trapp met with Chappell at the Fish Market and
inquired about the drug sales. Trapp stated “he didn’t mind a man making some
money but he wanted his part of it,” and indicated that he expected twenty-five
percent of the money from any drug sales. R. at 563-65. Later the same day, the
Fish Market was raided by state drug agents. After Chappell was arrested, Trapp
met with Chappell to be sure that Chappell had said nothing to the drug agents
about his solicitations. Trapp then instructed Chappell to tell the agents that
Trapp had been at the fish market only to investigate rumors. While out of jail on
bond two days after his arrest, Chappell contacted the FBI about the activities at
the fish market and about Trapp’s solicitation of bribes.
ANALYSIS
A. WAIVER
Trapp argues that predicate acts six, seven and eight did not occur within
the five year limitation period for criminal violations of the Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968. 2 In this case,
2
Predicate Acts one, two, five, and ten, as alleged in the indictment, were
all within the five year statute of limitations. [Record at 15, 18-21, 25, 30]
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Trapp raised the statute of limitations defense for the first time in his post-trial
motions. Whether an affirmative defense has been waived is a mixed question of
law and fact which “require[s] us to accept the district court’s factual conclusions
unless clearly erroneous but review the application of the facts to the law under a
de novo standard.” F.D.I.C. v. Oaklawn Apartments, 959 F.2d 170, 173 (10th Cir.
1992). Because whether Trapp has waived his statute of limitations defense
involves primarily a consideration of legal principles, we review that claim under
a de novo standard. Mullan v. Quickie Aircraft Corp., 797 F.2d 845, 850 (10th
Cir. 1986) (mixed question of law and fact is reviewed de novo when issue
involves primarily consideration of legal principles); see also Sheet Metal
Workers Int’l Assoc. v. Air Systems Eng’g, Inc., 831 F.2d 1509, 1510 (9th Cir.
1987) (whether statute of limitations defense was waived was question of law
subject to de novo review). We find Trapp waived his statute of limitations
defense.
In order to prevail on a criminal RICO charge, the government must prove
that one of the alleged predicate acts occurred within the five year statute of
limitations. Although RICO does not expressly provide for a statute of
limitations, 18 U.S.C. § 3282 contains a residual five-year criminal statute of
limitations. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Associates, Inc., 483 U.S.
143, 146, 155 (1987) (“[T]he 5-year statute of limitations applies to criminal
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RICO prosecutions [] because Congress has provided such a criminal limitations
period when no other period is specified.”).
Trapp relies on Waters v. United States for the proposition that the statute
of limitations poses a jurisdictional bar and can thus be raised at any time. 328
F.2d 739, 743 (10th Cir. 1964). However, in United States v. Gallup, this court
held, under circumstances remarkably similar to this case, the statute of
limitations to be an affirmative defense, not a jurisdictional bar. 812 F.2d 1271,
1280 (10th Cir. 1987). 3 In Gallup, the defendant contended that “there was
insufficient evidence of an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy under § 371,
3
In United States v. Cooper, 956 F.2d 960, 961-62 (10th Cir. 1992), this
circuit reaffirmed the principal holding of Waters. However, both Cooper and
Waters are inapposite to this case. Those cases stood for the proposition that a
“substantive offense could not be prosecuted if it was not filed before the
expiration of the limitation period.” Cooper, 956 F.2d at 961 (emphasis added)
(holding when information filed after expiration of statute of limitations, statute
of limitations served as bar to prosecution without express waiver by defendant).
In fact, the court in Cooper specifically distinguished Gallup because it “does not
deal with the issue of whether the statute of limitation is a bar to prosecution of a
substantive offense[, but rather] . . . whether, in a conspiracy case, the
government had to prove an overt act charged in the indictment was committed
before the limitation expired.” Id.
United States v. Stoner dealt with the question whether the statute of
limitations for a conspiracy charge is jurisdictional. 98 F.3d 527, 532-33 (10th
Cir. 1996), reh’g en banc granted Mar. 3, 1997. Stoner involved a situation
where the government had failed to allege at least one specific act in furtherance
of the conspiracy within the limitations period. Id. Here, however, the
government did allege certain predicate acts were committed within the RICO
statute of limitations. It just so happened, however, that the jury only found the
occurrence of three predicate acts, none of which occurred within the five-year
limitations period. Thus, Stoner is also inapplicable to this case.
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occurring within the statutory period of limitation.” Id. The court held that
Gallup had waived the statute of limitations defense because he failed to raise the
issue during trial. Id.
It was in post-trial motions that Trapp first raised the statute of limitations
as a bar. This is insufficient to preserve this issue for appeal. See Gallup, 812
F.2d at 1280; see also Lyons v. Jefferson Bank & Trust, 994 F.2d 716, 722 (10th
Cir. 1993) (holding issue raised for first time in post-trial motion not preserved
for appeal). In fact, this court has even held that a statute of limitations defense
which was raised in the defendant’s answer and pretrial order was waived because
it was never mentioned again until after trial. See Cavic v. Pioneer Astro Indus.,
Inc., 825 F.2d 1421, 1425 (10th Cir. 1987).
B. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
Trapp argues the government presented insufficient evidence to prove
predicate acts six, seven, and eight. This court reviews “the evidence in the light
most favorable to the government to determine whether any rational[] trier of fact
could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v.
Horn, 946 F.2d 738, 741 (10th Cir. 1991). To prove a pattern of racketeering
activity under RICO, the government “must establish two or more predicate
offenses which are related to the activities of the enterprise.” United States v.
Zang, 703 F.2d 1186, 1194 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 828 (1983).
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Trapp claims the evidence supporting predicate act six was insufficient to
show that Trapp, rather than Mitchell, solicited and received bribes from Collvins
and Foley. A reasonable juror, however, could have found Trapp and Mitchell
shared a common objective to solicit and receive bribes. Both Collvins and Foley
testified as to their conversations with Mitchell and Trapp and the circumstances
of the meeting between the four. This was sufficient evidence for a reasonable
juror to have found Trapp guilty of predicate act six.
Trapp alleges that his conviction on predicate act seven involves an
impermissible variance between the evidence at trial and the allegation in the
indictment. The propriety of a variance in the evidence is a question of law
reviewed de novo. United States v. Cardall, 885 F.2d 656, 670 (10th Cir. 1989).
In the indictment, the government alleged that the solicitation constituting
predicate act seven took place in “about the summer of 1989.” At trial, however,
the key witness, Grant, testified that the solicitation occurred in 1991. 4 Trapp
appears to claim that this variance in dates precludes any reasonable jury from
finding him guilty of predicate act seven. A variance in date alone does not
establish that no rational trier of fact could have believed the witness’ testimony.
See United States v. Nunez, 668 F.2d 1116, 1127 (10th Cir. 1981) (finding jury
We note that based on this testimony adduced at trial, predicate act number
4
seven would have indeed fallen within the five year statute of limitations.
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could reasonably convict defendant even though there was variance in time
alleged in indictment and time proven at trial).
Trapp claims witness Chappell was not credible and that his testimony
concerning predicate act eight was uncorroborated. Trapp thus seems to argue
that no reasonable jury could have found him guilty. This court, however, has
“recognized the general rule that in a criminal case a jury may convict a defendant
on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice.” United States v. Sloan, 65
F.3d 861, 863 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 824 (1996). Moreover,
this court has held that “[c]redibility choices are resolved in favor of the jury’s
verdict.” Horn, 946 F.2d at 741. There is thus no reason to disturb the jury’s
finding that Trapp was guilty of predicate act eight.
C. EVIDENTIARY RULINGS
Trapp claims the trial court erred in making three specific evidentiary
rulings. First, Trapp takes issue with what he characterizes as hearsay testimony
of Mitchell, Trapp’s undersheriff. We review this claim under an abuse of
discretion standard. United States v. Wolf, 839 F.2d 1387, 1393 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 923 (1988) (stating district court’s decision to admit statements
of co-conspirator under Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E) is reviewed for abuse of
discretion).
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Co-conspirator statements are not considered hearsay under Fed. R. Evid.
801(d)(2)(E) and may properly be admitted if the trial court finds: “1) a
conspiracy existed; 2) both the declarant and the defendant against whom the
declaration is offered were members of the conspiracy; and 3) the statement was
made in the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy.” United States v.
Caro, 965 F.2d 1548, 1557 (10th Cir. 1992). Any factual findings made by the
district court underlying the decision to admit are reviewed under a clearly
erroneous standard. United States v. Peveto, 881 F.2d 844, 852 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 943 (1989).
Trapp claims the district court did not make a finding that a conspiracy
existed and thus the first element of Caro was not met. The record, however,
shows that the court in fact made two such findings. Based on the cumulative
testimony of several witnesses regarding Trapp’s collaboration with others to
solicit bribes, the district court was not clearly erroneous in finding there was
sufficient evidence a conspiracy existed. Accordingly, we find the district court
did not abuse its discretion by admitting Mitchell’s testimony.
Trapp further claims the trial court erred when it failed to strike testimony
elicited through the government’s improper use of leading questions. In
reviewing cases involving leading questions under Fed. R. Evid. 611(c), “we . . .
reverse on the basis of improper leading questions only if ‘the judge’s action . . .
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amounted to, or contributed to, the denial of a fair trial.’” Miller v. Fairchild
Industries, Inc., 885 F.2d 498, 514 (10th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1056
(1990) (quoting McCormick on Evidence 12 (Cleary, ed., 1984)).
During direct examination of witness Collvins, the government improperly
used leading questions. Pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 611(c), the court admonished
the government to refrain from using leading questions. Trapp, however, argues
the court should have further corrected the situation by striking the testimony.
Trapp claims he was prejudiced and made to look less credible when he was
forced to object and to request curative admonitions in front of the jury. We find
this argument unpersuasive. Having to object and to request the court to
admonish the government in front of the jury do not necessarily amount to the
denial of a fair trial. The district court corrected the impropriety by both
sustaining Trapp’s objections and admonishing the government. The district court
was required to do no more. United States v. Gant, 487 F.2d 30, 35 (10th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 941 (1974) (finding district court made genuine
effort to prevent improper use of leading questions).
Trapp’s third evidentiary claim is that the court should have stricken
Foley’s testimony because he invoked his Fifth Amendment right against self
incrimination on certain questions during cross examination. When Foley
invoked this right during trial, Trapp neither made a motion to strike nor to order
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the witness to answer. We thus review this claim under a plain error standard.
United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1985).
Trapp relies on United States v. Montgomery to argue the trial judge should
have stricken Foley’s testimony. 998 F.2d 1468 (9th Cir. 1993). In Montgomery,
the Ninth Circuit found the district court did not abuse its discretion in striking a
witness’ entire testimony after the witness refused to submit to cross examination.
Montgomery, 998 F.2d at 1479. It does not follow from Montgomery, however,
that a court is always required to strike testimony when a witness invokes the
Fifth Amendment. Rather, “‘[t]he district court’s power to control the conduct of
trial is broad.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Parza, 612 F.2d 432, 438 (9th Cir.
1979)).
In United States v. Esparsen, 930 F.2d 1461, 1469 (10th Cir. 1991), cert
denied, 502 U.S. 1036 (1992), this court stated:
Courts have balanced [the competing concerns of the right to present
witnesses with the goal of eliciting the truth through cross
examination] by drawing a line between direct and collateral matters.
. . . When the refusal to answer cross-examination questions
involves collateral matters, we have held in the analogous situation
of a prosecution witness who invokes the fifth amendment that the
testimony should not be struck.
The questions which Foley refused to answer dealt with factual issues in pending
charges against him in a different state. These were clearly not matters directly
affecting Trapp’s case. Trapp claims the questions were relevant to credibility.
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Before he refused to answer Trapp’s questions, however, Foley had already
admitted several times that he had grown marijuana in the past. Thus, Trapp’s
desire to diminish the witness’ credibility had already been achieved; his ability to
search for the truth during cross examination was not impaired.
We therefore find the district court did not err in making the three
challenged evidentiary rulings.
D. FAILURE TO PRODUCE DISCOVERY AND NEW EVIDENCE
Trapp claims the government violated Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(D) by
failing to deliver all requested discovery. Here again, Trapp claims the evidence
purportedly withheld was relevant to credibility of witnesses. He asserts the
following matters were withheld by the government: 1) evidence of a felony
check charge against a witness; 2) evidence of prior state charges against a
witness; 3) dismissal of state charges against the same witness; and 4) results of a
witness’ polygraph test.
According to Trapp, the government’s failure to disclose the witness’
complete criminal records and polygraph test violates Brady v. Maryland, 373
U.S. 83 (1963). “[C]laims that the prosecution violated Brady, including the
determination of whether suppressed evidence was material,” are reviewed de
novo. United States v. Hughes, 33 F.3d 1248, 1251 (10th Cir. 1994). “To
establish a Brady violation, the defendant must establish: 1) that the prosecution
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suppressed evidence; 2) that the evidence was favorable to the accused; and 3)
that the evidence was material.” Id.
Trapp presented no evidence to establish the government suppressed any
evidence. Trapp merely states that the government should have turned over all
evidence of an exculpatory nature with respect to the witnesses. Counsel’s cross
examination of those witnesses, however, indicates that Trapp knew of the
criminal charges against the witnesses.
With respect to Trapp’s claim that the government suppressed the results of
a witness’ polygraph test, it is true the government did not disclose those results.
The government, however, states it had no intention of introducing the evidence
and the test results were in fact never introduced. Under those conditions, there
was no Brady violation. See United States v. Hall, 805 F.2d 1410, 1417-18 (10th
Cir. 1986) (finding when government does not intend to introduce results of
polygraph at trial, “the charts and reports [are] not discoverable under the
provisions of Rule 16(a)(1)(D) Fed. R. Crim. P.”).
Trapp also seeks a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. “The
allegedly newly discovered evidence must be more than impeaching or
cumulative; it must be material to the issues involved; it must be such that it
would probably produce an acquittal; and a new trial is not warranted if the new
evidence is such that, with reasonable diligence, it could have been discovered
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and produced at the original trial.” United States v. Youngpeter, 986 F.2d 349,
356 (10th Cir. 1993).
The newly discovered evidence is a witness’s statement that he “was going
to lie about everything to just hang J.W. Trapp.” R. at 1469. Trapp gives no
explanation why he could not have discovered this evidence with reasonable
diligence prior to or during the trial. More important, Trapp makes no showing
that this evidence is material. He argues that the evidence would have been used
for impeachment purposes and states that “[i]f the jury had known the true
circumstances surrounding the witnesses,” the jury would have acquitted Trapp as
to predicate acts six and seven. This alone is insufficient. According to
Youngpeter, the “newly discovered evidence must be more than impeaching.” 986
F.2d at 356. Trapp is therefore not entitled to a new trial.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, we AFFIRM the conviction entered in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT,
Michael R. Murphy
Circuit Judge
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