Jamieson v. Jones , 444 F. App'x 239 ( 2011 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
October 6, 2011
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
JEREMIAH D. JAMIESON,
Petitioner-Appellant,
No. 11-6139
v. (D.C. No. 5:10-cv-01176-M)
(W.D. Okla.)
JUSTIN JONES, Director,
Respondent-Appellee.
ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY *
Before KELLY, HARTZ, and HOLMES, Circuit Judges.
Jeremiah Jamieson is a prisoner in the custody of the State of Oklahoma.
Proceeding pro se, 1 he seeks a Certificate of Appealability (“COA”) to appeal the
district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C § 2254 petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
*
This Order is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law
of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its
persuasive value consistent with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and
Tenth Circuit Rule 32.1.
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge panel
has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material
assistance in the determination of this matter. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th
Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
1
Because Mr. Jamieson is proceeding pro se, we construe his filings
liberally. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam); Van
Deelen v. Johnson, 497 F.3d 1151, 1153 n.1 (10th Cir. 2007).
We deny his request for a COA and dismiss this appeal.
I. Background
Mr. Jamieson was charged with first degree murder in Oklahoma state court
on March 30, 2007. Mr. Jamieson entered a “blind” plea of guilty to the charge in
2008. At the plea hearing, “[t]he record demonstrates that [he] was advised of
and admitted that he understood the rights he was waiving by entering the plea
and the possible punishment for his offense.” R., Vol. 1, at 370 (Magistrate
Judge’s Report and Recommendation, dated Apr. 5, 2011). Mr. Jamieson was
sentenced on April 3, 2008, to a term of imprisonment of life with the possibility
of parole, effectively requiring him to serve slightly over thirty-eight years before
becoming eligible for parole consideration.
In April 2008, he filed a motion seeking to withdraw his plea of guilty on
the grounds that it was not entered knowingly and voluntarily because he
assumed, based upon his attorney’s alleged representations, that he would be
given, at the most, a fifteen-year sentence due to the court’s lenient treatment of
another defendant in a similar case. The court denied Mr. Jamieson’s motion to
withdraw, and he filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the Oklahoma Court
of Criminal Appeals (“OCCA”), raising the ground again that his plea was not
made knowingly and voluntarily. The OCCA denied his petition, finding that his
plea was “knowing, intelligent and voluntary.” R., Vol. 1, at 44 (Summ. Op. Den.
Cert., filed Apr. 15, 2009).
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On January 28, 2010, Mr. Jamieson filed an application for post-conviction
relief in the District Court of Garfield County, Oklahoma, raising various grounds
of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. The court denied the
application summarily. After an appeal, however, the OCCA remanded the
matter, ordering the district court to conduct a more detailed examination of Mr.
Jamieson’s claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. After a hearing
was held, his remaining claims were dismissed. The dismissal was affirmed on
appeal.
On November 1, 2010, Mr. Jamieson filed a federal habeas petition, raising
nine grounds of error, some of which are duplicative. In grounds one and two,
Mr. Jamieson claims that he was denied effective assistance of trial and appellate
counsel because his attorneys failed to properly research and present his motion
to suppress statements he gave to investigators.
In grounds three and four, he contends that he was denied effective
assistance of trial and appellate counsel in that his trial attorneys failed to
properly advise him that he was eligible only for a mandatory minimum sentence
of life with parole on his blind plea, and because his appellate counsel failed to
raise this claim on appeal.
Ground five states a claim of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate
counsel on the grounds both that Mr. Jamieson’s trial attorneys failed to pursue a
defense to the charge by attacking the reliability of the State’s eyewitness
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testimony and that his appellate attorney failed to assert the latter claim in his
certiorari appeal.
In ground six, he claims that his plea was not entered into knowingly and
voluntarily because the judge who presided did not appropriately and clearly
advise him that the minimum sentence he could receive was life with parole.
Also, he claims that he was denied effective assistance of appellate counsel
because the claim was not raised in his certiorari appeal.
In ground seven, Mr. Jamieson claims that he was denied effective
assistance of trial and appellate counsel inasmuch as trial counsel did not solicit
the testimony of his father and sister in support of his claim to withdraw his plea,
and because his appellate counsel failed to raise this claim in his certiorari appeal.
In ground eight, he contends that he was denied effective assistance of appellate
counsel because his appellate attorney “failed to assert the claims of ineffective
assistance of trial counsel urged . . . in grounds three, four, and seven,” and failed
to obtain evidence from his father and sister in order to support his claims in the
certiorari appeal. R., Vol. 1, at 374.
Finally, in ground nine, he contends that he was not provided reasonable
notice of the District Court of Garfield County’s decision to grant an evidentiary
hearing on his claims, and was therefore unable to properly present evidence in
support of his petition at the hearing.
The magistrate judge rejected Mr. Jamieson’s claims and recommended that
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the petition be denied. The district court adopted the Report and
Recommendation in full and denied Mr. Jamieson’s request for a COA. Mr.
Jamieson timely filed a notice of appeal.
II. Discussion
We lack jurisdiction to consider the merits of a habeas appeal unless a
petitioner obtains a COA. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). We may issue a COA
“only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right.” Id. § 2253(c)(2). Further, where the district court denies a
petition on procedural grounds, the petitioner must demonstrate “that jurists of
reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the
denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable
whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v.
McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).
The magistrate judge, in a thorough Report and Recommendation, reasoned
that the district court should reject Mr. Jamieson’s claims—in grounds three, four,
and six—that his plea was entered into involuntarily and unintelligently because
his plea colloquy established both that no promises or guarantees were made to
him in terms of his sentence and that he was given all pertinent information
relevant to the minimum sentence he would receive under his plea. The
magistrate judge next concluded that the “OCCA determined [that Mr.
Jamieson’s] Sixth Amendment claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel
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were procedurally barred for purposes of post-conviction review due to [his]
failure to show cause for not raising the claims in his certiorari appeal.” 2 R., Vol.
1, at 383. The magistrate judge found that Mr. Jamieson could not show “cause”
and “prejudice” to excuse his procedural default in that his trial and appellate
attorneys’ decisions were not unreasonable, and in any event, that Mr. Jamieson
could not show that he would not have pleaded guilty if the alleged errors were
not made (i.e., Mr. Jamieson could not make an adequate showing of prejudice).
Finally, the magistrate judge construed Mr. Jamieson’s claim in ground
nine as a request for a hearing in federal court. The magistrate judge found that
such a hearing was not warranted because Mr. Jamieson “had multiple
opportunities to present the factual bases for his claims” and they could be
“resolved on the basis of the record.” R., Vol. 1, at 398. After reviewing the
Report and Recommendation, Mr. Jamieson’s objections, and the rest of the
record, the district court concurred with the magistrate judge’s determinations and
adopted the Report and Recommendation in its entirety. It then denied Mr.
2
The Report and Recommendation notes that, under Okla. Stat. tit. 22,
§ 1089(C), ineffectiveness claims that could have been raised on direct appeal,
but were not, are waived. The magistrate judge applied our inquiry regarding the
adequacy of Oklahoma’s procedural bar rule—namely, the rule will apply where
“trial and appellate counsel differ; and the ineffectiveness claim can be resolved
upon the trial record alone. All other ineffectiveness claims are procedurally
barred only if Oklahoma’s special appellate remand rule for ineffectiveness
claims is adequately and evenhandedly applied.” Snow v. Sirmons, 474 F.3d 693,
726 n.35 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting English v. Cody, 146 F.3d 1257, 1264 (10th
Cir. 1998)).
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Jamieson’s request for a COA and dismissed his petition. Mr. Jamieson timely
filed a notice of appeal.
Having reviewed the record and Mr. Jamieson’s petition, we conclude that
jurists of reason could not disagree with the magistrate judge’s resolution of his
claim or with the district court’s adoption of that resolution. 3 Therefore, his
request for a COA must be rejected.
III. Conclusion
For substantially the same reasons articulated by the magistrate judge and
adopted by the district court, we DENY Mr. Jamieson’s request for a COA and
DISMISS this appeal.
Entered for the Court
JEROME A. HOLMES
Circuit Judge
3
With regard to Mr. Jamieson’s ninth ground for relief, we note that
insofar as Mr. Jamieson sought to place before the district court in a hearing
evidence that was not before the state court (i.e., evidence that was not part of the
state court record)—in addition to the sound rationale for rejecting this ground
articulated by the magistrate judge, and adopted by the district court, which
pertained to the factual circumstances of this case—as a matter of law, the
Supreme Court has recently foreclosed the possibility of relief on such a claim.
See Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011) (holding that habeas
“review under § 2254(d)(1) is limited to the record that was before the state court
that adjudicated the claim on the merits”).
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