Rhatigan v. Ward ( 2006 )


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  •                                                                       F I L E D
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    July 6, 2006
    UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
    Elisabeth A. Shumaker
    TENTH CIRCUIT                        Clerk of Court
    W E SLEY RH A TIG A N ,
    Petitioner - A ppellant,
    No. 05-6388
    v.
    (D.C. No. 05-CV -654-HE)
    (W .D. Okla.)
    R ON W A R D ,
    Respondent - Appellee.
    OR DER DENY ING CERTIFICATE
    OF APPEALABILITY
    Before KELLY, M cKA Y, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
    W esley Rhatigan, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, requests a certificate
    of appealability (“COA”) to appeal the district court’s denial of his 
    28 U.S.C. § 2241
     habeas petition. For substantially the same reasons set forth by the district
    court, we D EN Y a COA and DISM ISS.
    Rhatigan is currently serving an eight year sentence for armed robbery by
    force in Lawton Correctional Facility in Oklahoma. A correctional officer, M att
    Ferrell, found in Rhatigan’s cell a soda can with a small metal tube struck through
    it, enabling it to be used to smoke marijuana. The can smelled heavily of
    mariuana and Ferrell prepared a misconduct report.
    Prison officials held a disciplinary hearing, during which the doctored soda
    can was entered into evidence. They did not conduct a laboratory test to
    determine that the can was used for smoking marijuana and instead relied on
    Officer Ferrell’s report. Rhatigan was found guilty of Possession of Contraband,
    and, as a result, lost 365 days of earned good time credits and was assigned to
    disciplinary segregation for 30 days. The disciplinary hearing’s result was
    affirmed on administrative appeal.
    Rhatigan then filed this habeas petition, alleging that errors during the
    prison disciplinary hearing violated his rights under the Due Process Clause. The
    district court dismissed his petition and denied his subsequent application for
    COA. Having failed to receive a COA from that court, Rhatigan now seeks a
    COA from this court. 1
    1
    Rhatigan’s petition was filed after April 24, 1996, the effective date of
    the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”); as a result,
    AEDPA 's provisions apply to this case. See Rogers v. Gibson, 
    173 F.3d 1278
    ,
    1282 n.1 (10th Cir. 1999) (citing Lindh v. M urphy, 
    521 U.S. 320
     (1997)).
    AEDPA conditions a petitioner's right to appeal a denial of habeas relief under
    § 2241 upon a grant of a CO A. 
    28 U.S.C. § 2253
    (c)(1)(A); M ontez v. M cKinna,
    
    208 F.3d 862
    , 867 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding that § 2253(c)(1)(A ) requires a state
    prisoner to obtain a COA regardless of whether he is seeking relief under § 2254
    or under § 2241). A COA may be issued “only if the applicant has made a
    substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” § 2253(c)(2). This
    requires Rhatigan to show “that reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for
    that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different
    manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to
    proceed further.” Slack v. M cDaniel, 
    529 U.S. 473
    , 484 (2000) (quotations
    omitted). Because the district court did not grant a COA, Rhatigan may not
    appeal the district court's decision absent a grant of a COA by this court.
    -2-
    Prison disciplinary proceedings can only be challenged under the Due
    Process Clause if the resulting disciplinary action implicates a state-created
    liberty interest. Stephens v. Thomas, 
    19 F.3d 498
    , 501 (10th Cir. 1994).
    Oklahoma has clearly created a liberty interest in good time credits. W aldron v.
    Evans, 
    861 P.2d 311
    , 313 (Okla. Crim. App. 1993); M itchell v. M aynard, 
    80 F.3d 1433
    , 1445 (10th Cir. 1996). In this case, Rhatigan lost 365 good time credits.
    Thus, his liberty interest in the credits cannot be taken away “without the minimal
    safeguards afforded by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”
    M itchell, 
    80 F.3d at 1445
     (internal quotations omitted).
    Although Rhatigan was entitled to due process, “[p]rison disciplinary
    proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution, and the full panoply of rights
    due a defendant in such proceedings does not apply.” W olff v. M cDonnell, 
    418 U.S. 539
    , 556 (1974). To satisfy due process in a prison disciplinary proceeding,
    “the inmate must receive: (1) advance w ritten notice of the disciplinary charges;
    (2) an opportunity, when consistent with institutional safety and correctional
    goals, to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense; and (3)
    a written statement by the factfinder of the evidence relied on and the reasons for
    the disciplinary action.” Superintendent, M ass. Corr. Inst., W alpole v. Hill, 
    472 U.S. 445
    , 454 (1985). Further, there must be “some evidence in the record”
    supporting the charge. 
    Id.
     “Ascertaining whether this standard is satisfied does
    not require examination of the entire record, independent assessment of the
    -3-
    credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the evidence. Instead, the relevant
    question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the
    conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.” 
    Id. at 455-56
    .
    Rhatigan alleges that prison officials erred by failing to conduct a
    laboratory test to determine whether the doctored soda can found in his room was
    actually used to smoke marijuana. 2 Under H ill, this is not a due process violation.
    Rhatigan does not allege any failure on the part of prison officials to give him
    notice, an opportunity to call witnesses and present evidence, or a written
    statement explaining the decision. Further, there is clearly “some evidence” in
    the record that Rhatigan possessed marijuana; Officer Herrell reported that the
    can discovered in Rhatigan’s room smelled of marijuana and the can itself had
    been modified such that it could be used for smoking marijuana. Thus, there is no
    due process violation.
    For the reasons set forth above, Rhatigan’s request for a COA is DENIED
    and the appeal is DISM ISSED. Appellant’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis
    is GR ANTED .
    ENTERED FOR THE COURT
    Carlos F. Lucero
    Circuit Judge
    2
    In his original petition, Rhatigan argued that the chain of control of the
    doctored soda can was not established. He does not raise this argument on
    appeal. Even had he, this claim would not be sufficient under Hill. 
    472 U.S. at 454
    .
    -4-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 05-6388

Judges: Kelly, McKay, Lucero

Filed Date: 7/6/2006

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024