United States v. Mims , 191 F. App'x 794 ( 2006 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
August 16, 2006
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
U N ITED STA TES O F A M ER ICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee, No. 05-3447
v. (D. Kansas)
M ARLO J. M IM S, (D.C. No. 05-CR-20079-JW L)
Defendant - Appellant.
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before HA RTZ, EBEL, and T YM KOVICH, Circuit Judges.
M arlo J. M ims was charged in the United States District Court for the
District of Kansas with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, see 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He was convicted by a jury and sentenced to 235 months’
imprisonment. On appeal he challenges one of the jury instructions. W e affirm.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and
collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and
judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and
conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
I. B ACKGR OU N D
On the night of February 2, 2005, Officer Jeffrey Gardner of the Kansas
City, Kansas, Police Department was patrolling the area near Thirteenth and
Quindaro Streets w hen he observed a speeding car. After a brief pursuit,
M r. M ims, the driver, lost control of the car and struck a utility pole. Officer
Gardner stopped his patrol car behind M r. M ims’s now-disabled vehicle.
M r. M ims got out of the car and ran away. Officer Gardner pursued M r. M ims on
foot, catching up to him only after M r. M ims tripped over a fence that he had
knocked down with his car. M r. M ims then punched Officer G ardner in the face.
Officer Gardner struck back, and they exchanged further blows. During the fight
M r. M ims grasped Officer Gardner’s service firearm and attempted to pull it out
of the holster. The two proceeded to fight for control of the gun, with M r. M ims
initially unable to get control of it because Officer Gardner kept his hand on the
holster snap. At some point the snap popped open and, according to Officer
Gardner, M r. M ims stumbled backwards with the gun in his hands. Officer
Gardner testified that M r. M ims was then “in complete and sole possession of
th[e] firearm.” R. Vol. II at 43. Officer Gardner eventually managed to seize the
gun and aim it at M r. M ims, who fled. Officer Gardner later apprehended
M r. M ims.
-2-
II. D ISC USSIO N
M r. M ims w as charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), which makes it
unlawful for a convicted felon “to ship or transport in interstate or foreign
commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to
receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in
interstate or foreign commerce.” Jury Instruction No. 12 gave the following
explanation of possession:
A person has actual possession of something if he or she knowingly
has direct physical control over it at a given time. If you find beyond
a reasonable doubt that M r. M ims held the firearm even for a mere
second or two, then you may find that the firearm was in his
possession within the meaning of the w ord “possess” as used in these
instructions, unless you are not persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt
that M r. M ims knew what he possessed was a firearm.
R. Vol. I Doc. 24 at 14.
On appeal M r. M ims challenges the jury instruction because it “improperly
narrow[ed] the jury inquiry from ‘direct physical control’, to whether the weapon
was ‘held.’” Aplt. Br. at 15. He contends that the “instruction permitted the jury
to find [him] guilty from the moment . . . he grabbed the pistol grip” because he
could be considered to have “held” the gun although he did not possess sole
control over it (inasmuch as Officer G ardner also had his hand on the gun). Id.At trial, however, M r. M ims did not object on this ground. His entire objection to
the instruction was:
-3-
W ith respect to Instruction 12, we would object to that, specifically,
the second sentence of that. While I’m familiar w ith both Tenth
Circuit and other case law defining transitory or momentary
possession, the case at least in the Tenth Circuit that I recall
specifically was the one where the person was charged, I think, with
an AK-47 or some other kind of assault rifle and the allegation was
he carried it from the gun shop and put it in the back of someone’s
pickup, and the Tenth Circuit basically said you didn’t get a
momentary or transitory possession instruction in that— based on that
base because he denies ever having the gun at all, and so I think in
the— I think the court is taking out of context the second-or-two
holding of a firearm because the cases that I recall— perhaps the
court’s research is more extensive than mine because I obviously
missed them. I think the instruction as given deprives the jury of the
opportunity to evaluate the entire context or totality of the
circumstance or the overall fight between M r. Gardner and M r. M ims
and that, accepting M r. Gardner’s testimony that there was some
brief, transitory possession in the context of that fight, I think that
deprives the jury of the opportunity to evaluate whether or not in the
context of the fight that constitutes the actual ability to have direct
physical control over the object.
R. Vol. II at 93-94.
“A party who objects to an instruction . . . must do so on the record, stating
distinctly the matter objected to and the grounds of the objection.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 51(c)(1). M r. M ims’ objection to Jury Instruction 12 did not distinctly state
the issue he now raises on appeal. W e therefore review his current claim under
the plain-error doctrine. See United States v. Atencio, 435 F.3d 1222, 1230 (10th
Cir. 2006). On plain-error review we will reverse the judgment below only if
“there is (1) error, (2) that is plain, which (3) affects substantial rights, and which
(4) seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
-4-
proceedings.” United States v. Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d 727, 732 (10th Cir.
2005) (en banc).
Although M r. M ims points out that the word “held” in the second sentence
of the jury instruction may suggest that M r. M ims could be guilty if he merely
had his hand on the gun without having exclusive control over it, such a reading
would contradict the clear import of the prior sentence, which equates possession
with “direct physical control.” The purpose of the second sentence was to clarify
the temporal element of the crime, not to alter the meaning of the prior sentence.
Even if the possible ambiguity of the second sentence caused the instruction to be
erroneous, it was not plainly so. Apparently neither party nor the district court
perceived this ambiguity at trial. In particular, M r. M ims does not suggest that
the prosecutor argued to the jury that the offense was complete the mom ent he
had his hand on the gun. M r. M ims has not established plain error.
III. C ON CLU SIO N
W e AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Harris L Hartz
Circuit Judge
-5-