Denny v. Richardson ( 2007 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
May 18, 2007
FO R TH E TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
IN A JEA N D EN N Y ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 06-2234
(D.C. No. 05-CV -415-JP/RH S)
BILL RICH AR DSON; KEN OR TIZ; (D . N.M .)
NEW M EXICO M OTO R V EHICLE
DIVISION ; STATE OF NEW
M EX ICO,
Defendants-Appellees.
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before L UC ER O, M cKA Y, and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges.
In this civil rights action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Ina Jean
Denny, a resident of New M exico who is proceeding pro se, claims that
defendants violated her right to procedural due process when they refused to
allow her to renew her New M exico driver’s license. Following a bench trial, the
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
consistent w ith Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
district court entered judgement in favor of defendants on M s. Denny’s procedural
due process claim, and she is now appealing that judgment. Exercising
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we conclude that M s. Denny does not
have standing to assert a procedural due process claim. W e therefore dismiss this
appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and remand w ith instructions to the
district court to vacate its prior judgment and dismiss M s. Denny’s complaint
without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
I.
At the bench trial, the district court heard testimony from M s. Denny and
defendant K en Ortiz, the Director of the New M exico M otor V ehicle Division.
M s. Denny has not submitted a transcript of the trial to this court. Following the
trial, however, the district court entered written findings of fact and conclusions
of law, and we can resolve the issues in this appeal based on those findings and
conclusions. Specifically, the district court made the following findings of fact:
1. On November 16, 2003, an Arizona Department of Public
Safety law enforcement officer stopped Plaintiff in Kingman,
Arizona because he believed that Plaintiff was driving erratically.
2. This stop resulted in the State of Arizona issuing Plaintiff a
traffic citation for failure to provide proof of automobile insurance,
improper use of a two way left hand turn lane, unsafe lane use, and
failure to carry an automobile registration card. . . .
3. The fines and fees associated with the Arizona traffic
citation total $1,194.24. . . .
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4. Plaintiff has not paid the fines and fees associated with the
Arizona traffic citation and does not intend to do so because Plaintiff
sincerely believes that she was not driving erratically and that she
did not violate any of the Arizona traffic laws and because she did, in
fact, furnish proof of insurance to the Arizona police officer who
stopped her.
5. Plaintiff has taken no actions under Arizona procedures in
Arizona to have the traffic citation, fines, and fees nullified or set
aside.
6. The State of Arizona and the State of New M exico as w ell
as other states have entered into the Nonresident Violator Compact.
NM SA 1978, § 66-8-137.1 to § 66-8-137.4 (1981).
7. Article IV, section A of the Nonresident Violator Compact
states that:
Upon receipt of a report of a failure to comply from the
licensing authority of the issuing jurisdiction, the
licensing authority of the home jurisdiction shall notify
the motorist and initiate a suspension action, in
accordance with the home jurisdiction’s procedures, to
suspend the motorist’s driver’s license until satisfactory
evidence of compliance with the terms of the traffic
citation has been furnished to the home jurisdiction
licensing authority. Due process safeguards will be
afforded.
8. W hen the Plaintiff went to the New M exico M otor Vehicle
Division to renew her driver’s license which expired on September
13, 2004, the New M exico M otor Vehicle Division refused to renew
Plaintiff’s New M exico driver’s license, because it had been notified
by the State of Arizona that Plaintiff had not paid the fines and fees
of the November 16, 2003 Arizona traffic citation. This decision to
not renew Plaintiff’s driver’s license was made in order to comply
with Article IV, section A of the Nonresident Violator Compact.
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9. The New M exico M otor Vehicle Division will not renew
Plaintiff’s driver’s license until Plaintiff has paid the outstanding
Arizona fines and fees.
R., Doc. 50 at 1-2.
After noting that M s. Denny brought “this lawsuit . . . under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 for alleged violations of constitutional rights of due process resulting from
the Defendants’ refusal to renew [her] driver’s license,” id. at 3, the district court
rejected M s. Denny’s due process claim for two reasons. First, the court
concluded that “D efendants State of New M exico and New M exico M otor Vehicle
Division are immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment of the United
States Constitution.” Id. M s. Denny has not challenged this ruling in this appeal,
and we therefore do not need to consider it. 1 See Lifewise M aster Funding v.
Telebank, 374 F.3d 917, 927 n.10 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding that appellant waived
right to appeal district court rulings that it did not substantively address in its
opening brief). Second, the court found that M s. Denny failed to prove that
defendants Richardson (the Governor of New M exico) and Ortiz were liable under
§ 1983 in their individual capacities. See R., Doc. 50 at 4 (stating that “Plaintiff
1
M s. Denny has likew ise failed to challenge the district court’s
determination that she failed to comply with the notice requirements in the New
M exico Tort Claims Act and “failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that she is entitled to relief against Defendants Richardson and Ortiz under the
New M exico Tort Claims Act.” R., Doc. 50 at 4. As a result, to the extent that
plaintiff was pursuing tort claims under the New M exico Tort Claims Act in the
district court proceedings, those claims have been waived in this appeal.
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has not proven by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendants Richardson
and Ortiz have violated any of her constitutional rights by following the law as
set forth in the Nonresident Violator Compact”).
II.
Construing her pro se appellate briefs and district court pleadings liberally,
as we are required to do, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U .S. 519, 520-21 (1972), M s.
Denny’s main complaint is that the New M exico M otor Vehicle Division did not
provide her w ith a hearing, either before or after the refusal to renew her driver’s
license, so she could prove that she was not guilty of the underlying Arizona
traffic offenses. Like the district court, we will analyze M s. Denny’s due process
claim with the understanding that the M otor Vehicle Division’s refusal to renew
her driver’s license was in effect a de facto suspension of her license. See R.,
Doc. 50 at 2, ¶ 7-8.
The United States Supreme Court has held without qualification that a state
may not suspend a person’s driver’s license “w ithout that procedural due process
required by the Fourteenth Amendment.” Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539
(1971); accord Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 112 (1977); see also M aso v. N.M .
Taxation and Revenue D ep’t, 96 P.3d 286, 289 (N.M . 2004) (“Due process
requires notice and an opportunity for a hearing before the State can suspend or
revoke a person’s driver’s license.”). It is also clear that: (1) “[d]ue process
protections apply to an administrative proceeding [under the Nonresident Violator
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Compact] to suspend . . . a driver’s license,” Davidson v. Colo. Dep’t of Revenue,
981 P.2d 696, 697 (Colo. Ct. App. 1999); and (2) “[d]ue process requires, at a
minimum, that there be notice and an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful
time and in a meaningful manner,” id. W e also note that the N ew M exico driver’s
license suspension statute specifically provides for such procedural protections, as
the statute provides that “[u]pon suspending the license of a person as authorized
by this section, the [M otor Vehicle Division] shall immediately notify the
licensee in writing and upon his request shall afford him an opportunity for a
hearing as early as practicable w ithin not to exceed twenty days.” N.M . Stat.
Ann. § 66-5-30(B).
In the context of a license suspension action under the Nonresident Violator
Compact, however, the right to a hearing in the driver’s home state does not
include a right to litigate the issue of guilt as to the underlying traffic offense
charged in the other state. Instead, the scope of the hearing is quite limited. As
the Colorado Court of Appeals explained in Davidson:
Contrary to plaintiff’s arguments, we perceive no basis for
concluding that a driver facing license suspension pursuant to the
Compact is entitled to a hearing that is broader in scope than that
afforded a driver facing license revocation. In neither case does due
process require that the driver be permitted to litigate the issue of
guilt as to the offense upon which the suspension or revocation is
based.
W e note that this interpretation of the scope of a suspension
hearing under the Compact is consistent with the procedural manuals
provided to state agencies that administer the Compact. These
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manuals indicate that suspension hearings should afford a motorist an
opportunity to show either that he or she is not the person to whom
the citation was issued or that the citation has been resolved, but are
not intended to determine guilt or innocence as to the charged traffic
violations. See Non-Resident Violator Compact Operations M anual
13 (1990); Non-Resident Violator Compact (Guidelines for M otor
Vehicle Adm inistrators) Administrative Procedures M anual 19
(1994).
Davidson, 981 P.2d at 698.
There is no indication in the record before this court that M s. Denny was
afforded an opportunity for a hearing to challenge the de facto suspension of her
driver’s license. M s. Denny has never claimed, however, that she is not the
person to w hom the A rizona traffic citation was issued, and it is likew ise
undisputed that M s. Denny has not paid the fines and fees associated with the
citation. Consequently, M s. Denny has failed to assert a cognizable legal basis
for challenging the New M exico M otor Vehicle Division’s de facto suspension of
her driver’s licence. W e therefore conclude that she has no standing to pursue a
procedural due process claim against defendants Richardson and Ortiz. 2 This
2
Although the parties have not addressed standing in this appeal, “[s]tanding
. . . raises jurisdictional questions and we are required to consider the issue sua
sponte to ensure that there is an Article III case or controversy before us.” Rector
v. City and County of Denver, 348 F.3d 935, 942 (10th Cir. 2003) (quotation
omitted). “The irreducible constitutional minimum of standing requires plaintiffs
to show (1) that they have suffered an injury in fact, (2) that the injury is fairly
traceable to the challenged action of the defendant, and (3) that the injury is
likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.” Doctor John’s, Inc. v. City of
Roy, 465 F.3d 1150, 1155 (10th Cir. 2006) (quotations omitted). As set forth
herein, M s. Denny has failed to satisfy the threshold “injury in fact” requirement.
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result is dictated by our decision in Rector v. City and County of Denver, 348
F.3d 935, 942-45 (10th Cir. 2003), which we have summarized as follow s:
[In Rector,] plaintiffs brought a § 1983 action challenging the
adequacy of the due process protections afforded to individuals who
received parking tickets from the [City of Denver]. Finding one of
the main plaintiffs lacked standing to maintain her claim, the court
explained that because that plaintiff presented no basis for
challenging the ticket on the merits, she sustained no injury in fact
from a deprivation of due process. Id. at 945.
In an exceptionally lucid discussion of this issue, the court
made clear that although the right to due process in connection with a
deprivation of a property interest is absolute, “the Constitution does
not protect procedure for procedure’s sake.” Id. at 943. The court
explained that the determination whether the denial of due process
constitutes an injury in fact “lies in the adoption of an ex ante
perspective.” Id. at 944. In other words, because the plaintiff in
Rector proffered no defense on the merits, due process would not
have affected the outcome, thus the plaintiff sustained no injury
through the denial of due process. See M ichael H. v. Gerald D., 491
U.S. 110, 127 n.5 . . . (1989) (plurality opinion) (holding that right to
a hearing must be premised upon a claim of substantive entitlement
to the right sought to be vindicated).
By contrast, had the plaintiff in Rector offered to defend
against the parking tickets on the merits, an ex post determination
that such a defense would not have succeeded would not alleviate the
injury plaintiff would have sustained by the city’s failure to afford
due process. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266 . . . (1978). In
such a case, plaintiff would have sustained an injury in fact through
her lack of opportunity to convince the city that her ticket was issued
erroneously.
M organ v. M cCotter, 365 F.3d 882, 888-89 (10th Cir. 2004).
Like the plaintiff in Rector, M s. Denny has failed to proffer a cognizable
legal basis for challenging the de facto suspension of her driver’s license (i.e., she
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is not the person to whom the Arizona traffic citation was issued or she has paid
the fines and fees associated with the citation). Thus, “[a]ny deficiencies in [the
New M exico procedures] . . . caused her no injury, because there was nothing for
a hearing to decide.” Rector, 348 F.3d at 945. Accordingly, M s. Denny does not
have standing to pursue a procedural due process claim. 3 Id. W e note, however,
that nothing in this order and judgment prevents M s. Denny from attempting to
challenge the Arizona traffic citation in the courts of Arizona, and it would
appear that such a challenge is the only form of relief available to her.
W e DISM ISS this appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and
REM AND with instructions to the district court to vacate its prior judgment and
dismiss M s. Denny’s complaint without prejudice for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.
Entered for the Court
M onroe G. M cKay
Circuit Judge
3
In light of our determination that M s. Denny lacked standing to pursue her
district court action, we do not need to address M s. Denny’s arguments that the
district court erred by: (1) refusing to grant her a default judgment; (2) refusing to
grant her a jury trial; and (3) refusing to grant her recusal motion.
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