Vaupel v. Ortiz ( 2007 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
August 9, 2007
FO R TH E TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
JON STEPHA N V AU PEL,
Petitioner-A ppellant,
v. No. 06-1103
(D.C. No. 05-cv-327-W DM -M JW )
M ARIO ORTIZ; J. ALEXAN DER; (D . Colo.)
M ICHAEL CHERTOFF; M ICHAEL J.
GARC IA; ALBERTO GONZA LES,
Respondents-Appellees.
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before HA RTZ, EBEL, and T YM KOVICH, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner Jon Stephan Vaupel appeals from the district court’s denial of his
petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. On appeal, he
challenges the validity of an expedited removal order and his continued detention.
W e dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
consistent w ith Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
I. Background
M r. Vaupel is an Australian citizen. He married a United States citizen,
Stacy Schwab, in 2002. Prior to 2003, he entered the United States several times
under the Visa W aiver Program (“VW P”). See 8 U.S.C. § 1187. Under the VW P,
nonimmigrant visitors from certain participating countries may enter and remain
in the United States for a period not exceeding 90 days, without having to obtain
and present a visa. See id. § 1187(a). He admits that he overstayed his
authorized 90-day period on at least one occasion. On January 31, 2003, he again
attempted to enter the United States under the VW P, but his application was
denied based on his previous overstay. At that time he was enroute to the United
States to be with M s. Schwab, who was experiencing medical complications in
connection with the birth of the couple’s child. Based on the circumstances,
M r. V aupel was granted humanitarian parole into the United States for 30 days.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A ). His period of parole w as later extended to
M arch 7, 2003. On that date he and M s. Schwab signed application forms to
adjust M r. Vaupel’s status to legal permanent resident (“LPR”), based upon his
marriage to a United States citizen. Their application forms w ere not filed until
April 10, 2003.
A year later, in A pril 2004, M s. Schwab was arrested and charged with
harassment and child abuse following an altercation with M r. Vaupel. In June
2004, he was arrested and charged with menacing and harassment of M s. Schwab,
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as well as forgery related to false identification documents. M s. Schwab
withdrew her petition in support of M r. Vaupel’s application to become an LPR
on June 25, 2004. C onsequently, his application was automatically denied. He
filed a divorce petition in Colorado state court on July 2.
M r. Vaupel was detained by Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(“ICE”) on October 12, 2004. On October 14, ICE issued a Determination of
Inadmissibility and Order of Removal. The Determination of Inadmissibility
stated that M r. Vaupel was inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I)
because his application under the VW P had been denied and he thereafter failed
to depart the United States following expiration of his period of parole. It stated
further that he was “an immigrant not in possession of a valid, unexpired
immigrant visa and [he was] not exempt from having one.” R., Doc. 12,
Ex. A-16. The Order of Removal found him inadmissible as charged and ordered
him removed from the United States under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1), which provides
for “expedited removal” of certain inadmissible arriving aliens. On October 15,
M r. Vaupel submitted a Violence Against W omen Act (“VAW A”) petition
seeking to self-adjust to LPR status on the ground that he is a former spouse of an
abusive United States citizen.
M r. Vaupel filed his habeas petition in the district court on February 22,
2005, alleging that he was being held illegally and asking the court to enjoin
respondents from deporting him. He also sought interim relief, seeking to be
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released from detention pending resolution of his habeas petition or a
determination on his VAW A petition, whichever occurred later. The district court
issued an order to show cause why the petition for writ of habeas corpus should
not be granted and respondents then filed motions to dismiss the petition. The
district court referred the motions to dismiss and M r. Vaupel’s motion for interim
relief to a magistrate judge, who recommended granting respondents’ motions and
denying M r. Vaupel’s motion. The district court adopted in part the magistrate
judge’s recommendations, denied the habeas petition and denied the motion for
interim relief. M r. Vaupel filed a timely notice of appeal. On February 25, 2007,
he was deported.
II. Discussion
W e must first determine whether we have jurisdiction to review any of the
claims on appeal.
A. Challenges to the Expedited Rem oval Order
M r. Vaupel makes several arguments addressing the validity of the
expedited removal order entered pursuant to § 1225(b)(1): (1) he is not an
inadmissible arriving alien subject to expedited removal because (i) he was
improperly granted humanitarian parole when other options for relief were
available and (ii) he was eligible for an exception to inadmissibility as a VAW A
petitioner under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A )(ii); (2) expedited removal is
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inapplicable to VW P applicants; and (3) the expedited removal procedures denied
him due process.
The scope of judicial review of orders of removal under § 1225(b)(1) is
extremely narrow. W ith very limited exceptions, “no court shall have jurisdiction
to review . . . any individual determination or to entertain any other cause or
claim arising from or relating to the implementation or operation of an order of
removal pursuant to section 1225(b)(1).” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(A)(i).
Specifically, no court has jurisdiction to review “a decision by the Attorney
General to invoke the provisions of [§ 1225(b)(1)],” “the application of [that]
section to individual aliens,” or “procedures and policies adopted by the Attorney
General to implement [that section].” Id. at § 1252(a)(2)(A)(ii) - (iv). Judicial
review of determinations made under § 1225(b)(1) is available in habeas corpus
proceedings, but such review is
limited to determinations of–
(A) whether the petitioner is an alien,
(B) whether the petitioner was ordered removed under such section,
and
(C) whether the petitioner can prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the petitioner is an alien lawfully admitted for
permanent residence, has been admitted as a refugee . . . or has been
granted asylum.
Id. at § 1252(e)(2)(A )-(C). Section 1252(e)(5) provides further that:
In determining whether an alien has been ordered removed under
section 1225(b)(1) of this title, the court’s inquiry shall be limited to
whether such an order in fact was issued and whether it relates to the
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petitioner. There shall be no review of whether the alien is actually
inadmissible or entitled to any relief from removal.
The district court recognized the limited scope of its jurisdiction to review
the validity of M r. Vaupel’s expedited removal order and therefore considered
only whether he is an alien, whether he was ordered removed under § 1225(b)(1),
and whether he could prove he was an LPR, had been admitted as a refugee, or
had been granted asylum. He does not assert that the district court’s findings on
these issues were in error. But he argues that the district court erred in construing
the scope of its jurisdiction under § 1252(e) too narrowly. For this proposition he
relies on a district court case from outside this circuit which held that, in
ascertaining whether an order of removal “relates to” the alien under
§ 1252(e)(5), a court may determine whether the expedited removal statute was
lawfully applied to the alien. See Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v.
Ashcroft, 272 F. Supp. 2d 650, 663 (E.D. M ich. 2003). W e respectfully disagree.
The language of the statute clearly and unambiguously precludes review in a
habeas proceeding of “whether the alien is actually inadmissible or entitled to any
relief from removal.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(5). See also Brumme v. INS, 275 F.3d
443, 447-48 (5th Cir. 2001) (rejecting claim that § 1252(e) permits habeas review
of whether § 1225(b)(1) was applicable to petitioner); Li v. Eddy, 259 F.3d 1132,
1134 (9th Cir. 2001) (“On its face, [§ 1252(e)(2)] does not appear to permit the
court to inquire into whether section 1225(b)(1) was properly invoked, but only
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whether it was invoked at all. W ere there any doubt of congressional intent, it is
resolved by [§ 1252(e)(5)], that expressly declares that judicial review does not
extend to actual admissibility.”), vacated as moot, 324 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2003).
M r. Vaupel does not specifically address whether we have jurisdiction to
consider his claim that the expedited removal procedures violate his right to due
process. Respondents assert, without supporting citation, that the court has
jurisdiction because he presents a constitutional challenge to the expedited
removal procedures. W e hold that under § 1252(a)(2)(A) we do not have
jurisdiction to consider that claim. Nor is there an exception in § 1252(e)
providing authority to review constitutional claims related to the application of
§ 1225(b)(1). 1 M oreover, § 1252(e)(3) sets forth the process for bringing a
constitutional challenge to § 1225(b) or its implementing regulations. Such a
claim may be brought in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia and must have been filed no later than 60 days after the date the
challenged section or regulation was first implemented. See id. at
§ 1252(e)(3)(A )-(B); see also Am. Immigration Lawyers Ass’n v. Reno,
18 F. Supp. 2d 38, 46-7, 60 (D.D.C. 1998) (dismissing as time-barred aliens’
1
In another context, Congress has specifically authorized judicial review of
constitutional claims, notwithstanding statutory limitations on judicial review.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D). But that provision applies to the construction of
subparagraphs (B) and (C) of § 1252(a)(2), which are inapplicable here, and
explicitly does not apply to other provisions of § 1252 limiting judicial review. It
is also applicable only to constitutional claims raised in petitions for review filed
in an appropriate court of appeals. See id. § 1252(a)(2)(D).
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claims filed beyond the 60-day deadline; dismissing on the merits other aliens’
timely due process challenge to expedited removal procedures). Thus, to the
extent M r. Vaupel raises a systemic challenge to the constitutionality of the
expedited removal procedures, such a claim may not be brought in the courts in
this circuit. See Li, 259 F.3d at 1136 (holding under § 1252(e)(3) that alien’s
challenge to expedited removal system could not be brought in courts in Ninth
Circuit).
Because M r. Vaupel’s claims on appeal seek review of the expedited
removal order beyond the limited scope of review permitted in habeas corpus
proceedings by § 1252(e), we do not have jurisdiction to consider them.
B. Challenges to Continued D etention
M r. Vaupel also contends that his continued detention in ICE custody for
over two years, w ithout an opportunity for supervised release, is contrary to
statute and violates his constitutional rights of due process and equal protection.
He argues as w ell that the district court erred in denying his request for interim
relief from detention. After making these contentions in his opening appeal brief,
M r. Vaupel was released from detention upon his removal to Australia in
February 2007. W e must therefore consider whether these claims regarding his
previous detention are now moot. See Riley v. INS, 310 F.3d 1253, 1256-57
(10th Cir. 2002).
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Our inquiry then becomes whether Appellant meets one of the
exceptions to the mootness doctrine. W e will not dismiss a petition
as moot if (1) secondary or collateral injuries survive after resolution
of the primary injury; (2) the issue is deemed a wrong capable of
repetition yet evading review; (3) the defendant voluntarily ceases an
allegedly illegal practice but is free to resume it at any time; or (4) it
is a properly certified class action suit.
Id. (holding that claim in habeas petition for release from detention was moot
after petitioner w as granted supervised release) (quotations omitted).
Based on the record before us, none of these exceptions applies in this case.
Notably, M r. Vaupel did not make a claim for damages in his habeas petition,
seeking instead only a release from custody and declaratory relief. See R., Doc. 1
at 19. Thus, he has not demonstrated any secondary or collateral injury surviving
his detention. See Ferry v. Gonzales, 457 F.3d 1117, 1132 (10th Cir. 2006)
(holding that challenge to detention without opportunity for bond was mooted by
deportation where petitioner did not seek monetary damages for loss of liberty or
consortium); see also Abdala v. INS, 488 F.3d 1061, 1064-65 (9th Cir. 2007)
(collecting cases where habeas claims were fully resolved and rendered moot by
release from custody). W e decline to issue an advisory opinion regarding the
legality of M r. Vaupel’s detention, “because a declaratory judgment on that
question would have no meaningful effect on the [Department of Homeland
Security’s] future conduct towards [him].” Ferry, 457 F.3d at 1132.
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C. Rem aining Claim s on Appeal
M r. Vaupel also contends on appeal that his due process rights would be
violated if he were removed to Australia prior to a determination on his VAW A
petition. But in the same brief he waived his only requested relief on this claim
by withdrawing “any and all requests for a stay of removal.” Aplt. Opening Br. at
48. Therefore, we hold that M r. Vaupel has w aived appellate review of this
claim. Even without this express waiver, we would conclude that this claim is
also mooted by M r. Vaupel’s deportation because he has not demonstrated a
collateral injury surviving his removal. W e agree with the district court that there
is no basis to his claim that his removal would prevent the continued adjudication
of his VAW A petition. See R., Doc. 12, Ex. A-19 at 2 (declaration by
representative of agency processing petition that it would not be abandoned upon
him leaving the U nited States).
Finally, he raises two additional claims on appeal. He contends that the
district court abused its discretion in denying him leave to file a supplemental
brief. He also argues that the district court erred in granting the motion to
dismiss by respondents M ario Ortiz, M ichael Chertoff, M ichael J. Garcia, and
Alberto G onzales on the basis that they did not have custody of M r. Vaupel. In
light of our previous rulings that we lack jurisdiction to consider his other claims
on appeal, we find it unnecessary to decide these issues. Even if M r. Vaupel were
to prevail on either or both of these claims of error, the resulting determination
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would have no impact on his ability to obtain the relief he seeks in his habeas
petition or on the outcome of this appeal. See United States v. Torres, 182 F.3d
1156, 1164 & n.2 (10th Cir. 1999) (finding “no reason to abandon principles of
judicial restraint and render an opinion that is unnecessary and meaningless as
applied to the defendant in this case”).
III. Conclusion
W e do not have jurisdiction to consider M r. Vaupel’s claims on appeal
challenging the validity of the expedited removal order. His claims related to his
continued detention are moot. We therefore DISM ISS the appeal. His motion to
proceed in forma pauperis is G RANTED.
Entered for the Court
David M . Ebel
Circuit Judge
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