Weiss v. Barnhart , 92 F. App'x 743 ( 2004 )


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  •                                                                           F I L E D
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    MAR 12 2004
    FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
    PATRICK FISHER
    Clerk
    MICHELE T. WEISS,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.                                                   No. 03-2128
    (D.C. No. CIV-01-1427 MV/ACT)
    JO ANNE B. BARNHART,                                  (D. N.M.)
    Commissioner of the Social Security
    Administration,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT            *
    Before EBEL , HENRY , and MURPHY , Circuit Judges.
    After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
    unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
    this appeal.   See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
    therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
    *
    This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
    doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
    generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
    and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
    Claimant Michele T. Weiss appeals     the district court’s order 1 affirming the
    Commissioner’s determination to cease her social security disability benefits on
    the ground that medical improvement in her condition terminated her eligibility.
    She claims disability from lupus, major depression, dysthymic disorder, anxiety
    and obsessive-compulsive behaviors. We affirm.
    Ms. Weiss received benefits from December of 1979 until October of 1998
    because she suffered from lupus and related conditions. After the Commissioner
    notified her that she was no longer considered disabled, she requested
    reconsideration and eventually received a hearing before an administrative law
    judge (ALJ). She asserted that her mental disorders were disabling, especially in
    conjunction with her continuing physical challenges associated with lupus. The
    ALJ found that Ms. Weiss’ lupus was in remission and that her mental
    impairments did not significantly erode her capacity to perform sedentary work.
    Accordingly, the ALJ determined that her disability ceased in October of 1998.
    On appeal, Ms. Weiss claims (1) the ALJ failed to assess properly the
    severity of her mental impairments; (2) the ALJ should have obtained evidence
    from a vocational expert, but instead, improperly applied the grid, 20 C.F.R.
    Pt. 404, subpt. P, App. 2, rules 201.18 & 201.21; (3) the ALJ failed to give
    controlling weight to her treating physician’s opinion; and (4) the ALJ
    1
    The parties proceeded before a magistrate judge.     See 
    28 U.S.C. § 636
    .
    -2-
    erroneously applied the medical improvement standard because the evidence did
    not demonstrate that her medical condition had improved.
    We review the Commissioner’s decision to determine whether it is
    supported by substantial evidence and whether correct legal standards were
    applied. Glenn v. Shalala, 
    21 F.3d 983
    , 984 (10th Cir. 1994). We may neither
    reweigh the evidence nor substitute our judgment for that of the Commissioner.
    Barnett v. Apfel, 
    231 F.3d 687
    , 689 (10th Cir. 2000). The Commissioner’s
    decision to terminate benefits must be based on
    a finding that the physical or mental impairment on the basis of
    which such benefits are provided has ceased, does not exist, or is not
    disabling [and must be] supported by –
    (1) substantial evidence which demonstrates that –
    (A) there has been any medical improvement in the
    individual’s impairment or combination of impairments (other than
    medical improvement which is not related to the individual’s ability
    to work), and
    (B) the individual is now able to engage in substantial gainful
    activity . . . .
    
    42 U.S.C. § 423
    (f). Medical improvement is defined as
    any decrease in the medical severity of [the] impairment(s) which
    was present at the time of the most recent favorable medical decision
    that [the claimant was] disabled or continued to be disabled. A
    determination that there has been a decrease in medical severity must
    be based on changes (improvement) in the symptoms, signs and/or
    laboratory findings associated with [the] impairment(s).
    -3-
    
    20 C.F.R. § 404.1594
    (b)(1); accord Shepherd v. Apfel, 
    184 F.3d 1196
    , 1199
    (10th Cir. 1999).
    We have carefully reviewed the record on appeal, as well as the briefs
    submitted by the parties. Applying the standards set out above, we affirm the
    denial of benefits for the reasons stated in the magistrate judge’s January 17, 2003
    recommendation, as adopted by the district court.
    The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
    Entered for the Court
    Michael R. Murphy
    Circuit Judge
    -4-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 03-2128

Citation Numbers: 92 F. App'x 743

Judges: Ebel, Henry, Murphy

Filed Date: 3/12/2004

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/6/2024