United States Ex Rel. Erickson v. Uintah Special Services District , 268 F. App'x 714 ( 2008 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS March 6, 2008
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
ex rel., KATHRYN ERICKSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
and No. 07-4031
(D.C. No. 2:02-CV-581-DAK)
LONNIE HOGAN, (D. Utah)
Plaintiff,
v.
UINTAH SPECIAL SERVICES
DISTRICT,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRISCOE, BALDOCK, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Plaintiff-appellant Kathryn Erickson, appearing pro se, appeals the district
court’s grant of summary judgment to defendant-appellee Uintah Special Services
District (USSD) on her claim of retaliatory discharge under the False Claims Act
(FCA). Ms. Erickson alleged that she was suspended and then terminated from
her job because, as USSD’s General Manager from June 1996 through January
2001, she brought to light several allegedly illegal and fraudulent practices of
USSD and Uintah County involving the alleged misuse of federal funds. USSD
countered that Ms. Erickson was lawfully terminated in response to a report
prepared by an independent auditor that contained questions and concerns
regarding various payments made by USSD that failed to conform with USSD’s
stated policies.
The district court granted USSD summary judgment, holding that
Ms. Erickson had failed to prove her prima facie case of retaliation and, in the
alternative, that even if the prima facie case had been established, Ms. Erickson
failed to demonstrate that the audit report was not a legitimate,
non-discriminatory reason for termination.
On appeal, Ms. Erickson argues that USSD failed to follow proper
procedures in suspending and terminating her, that she was terminated because
she insisted that USSD bring legal action against Uintah County, that the district
court’s grant of summary judgment was improper because material questions of
fact remained unanswered, that USSD’s reliance on the audit report was
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pretextual because the report was unfinished at the time of her termination, that
the district court erred in referencing her subsequent indictment as support for its
decision, and that USSD should have been required to defend and indemnify her
in regard to the criminal indictment.
Exercising our jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we AFFIRM.
I.
Summary judgment “should be rendered if the pleadings, the discovery and
disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
We review the grant of a summary judgment motion de novo,
applying the same standards as the district court. In reviewing the
record, we view all evidence and draw reasonable inferences
therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. We
will affirm a district court’s grant of summary judgment unless the
evidence in the record demonstrates a genuine issue of material fact.
Proctor v. United Parcel Serv., 502 F.3d 1200, 1205-06 (10th Cir. 2007)
(citations omitted).
Under 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h): “Any employee who is discharged [or]
suspended . . . by his or her employer because of lawful acts done by the
employee . . . in furtherance of an action under [the FCA] . . . shall be entitled to
all relief necessary to make the employee whole.” According to the legislative
history, this whistleblower protection statute:
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provides relief only if the whistleblower can show by a
preponderance of the evidence that the employer’s retaliatory actions
resulted “because” of the whistleblower’s participation in a protected
activity. Under other Federal whistleblower statutes, the “because”
standard has developed into a two-pronged approach. One, the
whistleblower must show the employer had knowledge the employee
engaged in “protected activity” and, two, the retaliation was
motivated, at least in part, by the employee’s engaging in protected
activity. Once these elements have been satisfied, the burden of
proof shifts to the employer to prove affirmatively that the same
decision would have been made even if the employee had not
engaged in protected activity.
S. Rep. No. 345 at 35, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5300.
We need not recite the facts of the case in detail as the parties are well
aware of their respective claims. Ms. Erickson essentially claimed in the district
court that the timeline of her firing was sufficient proof of its retaliatory nature.
She claimed that when she initially began to bring her claims to light, USSD
defended her despite pressure applied by Uintah County to have her fired. She
claims that eventually, when she began pushing USSD to take legal action against
the County, USSD caved to the pressure and terminated her.
The district court held that in order to make out her prima facie case,
Ms. Erickson had to prove that “(1) the employer is covered by the act at issue,
(2) the employee engaged in protected activity, (3) the employee suffered adverse
action, and (4) there is an inference of causation between the protected activity
and the adverse action.” R., Vol. VII, Doc. 73 at 4 (quoting Mann v. Olsten
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Certified Healthcare Corp., 49 F. Supp. 2d 1307, 1313 (M.D. Ala. 1999)). The
court held that Ms. Erickson failed to make out her prima facie case because,
considered as a whole, the record did not support an inference of causation.
In the alternative, the district court applied the burden-shifting framework
of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973), holding that
even if Ms. Erickson had established her prima facie case, the burden shifted to
USSD to articulate a facially nondiscriminatory reason for her termination. R.,
Vol. VII, Doc. 73 at 5 (citing Marx v. Schnuck’s Markets, 76 F.3d 324, 327 (10th
Cir. 1996), a case which applies the McDonnell Douglas framework in an ADEA
context). The court held that “[a]t the summary judgment stage, it then becomes
the plaintiff’s burden to show that there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to
whether the employer’s proffered reason for the challenged action is pretextual”
Id. (citing Ingels v. Thiokol Corp., 42 F.3d 616, 622 (10th Cir.1994)). The court
held that Ms. Erickson had failed to establish that the audit was merely a
pretextual reason for her termination by “showing either that a discriminatory
reason more likely motivated the employer or . . . that the employer’s proferred
explanation[, that she was fired because of the audit, was] unworthy of credence.”
Id. (quoting Marx, 76 F.3d at 327-28) (alteration in original).
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II.
Turning to Ms. Erickson’s appellate arguments, we agree with USSD that
she never properly argued in district court that USSD failed to follow proper
procedures in suspending and terminating her, that the pretextual nature of
USSD’s reliance on the audit report in terminating her was obvious because the
report was unfinished at the time of her termination, and that the USSD should
have been required to defend and indemnify Ms. Erickson in regard to her
criminal indictment. Her failure to raise these arguments in the district court
means we will not consider them on appeal. Sussman v. Patterson, 108 F.3d
1206, 1210 (10th Cir. 1997) (“In general, we will decline to consider issues first
raised on appeal.”).
As to the remainder of Ms. Erickson’s claims, we need only consider the
district court’s determination that even if Ms. Erickson proved her prima facie
case, she failed to demonstrate that the audit report was not a legitimate,
non-discriminatory reason for her termination. In the district court, Ms. Erickson
attacked the charges made in the audit as both wrong and not worthy of belief by
USSD. The court found that the audit was the product of an outside, independent
auditor, and that “any one of its findings would be sufficient grounds for
terminating [Ms.] Erickson.” R., Vol. VII, Doc. 73 at 10. The court found that
“[i]n at least one case, the written contract appears to be an after-the-fact
fabrication. Another document appears to have been created specifically to
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conceal some of this misconduct from the grand jury investigation.” Id. Further
the court held:
this court does “not sit as a kind of ‘super-personnel department,’
free to second guess the propriety of an employer’s business
decision.” Eilam v. Children’s Hospital Ass’n, 1999 U.S. App. Lexis
5880, 10 (10th Cir. 1999[]). The burden is on [Ms.] Erickson to
demonstrate that USSD’s stated basis for termination “is so weak,
implausible, contradictory, inconsistent, or incoherent as to be
unworthy of belief.” Stover[ v. Martinez], 382 F.3d [1064,] 1073
[(10th Cir. 2004)].
Id. at 9. The court held that the fact that Ms. Erickson was later indicted for
obstruction of justice for knowingly falsifying USSD documents was relevant to
her argument that the audit’s findings were too weak to be believed. 1 To the
extent that Ms. Erickson renews this argument on appeal or argues that the
indictment was irrelevant, these arguments are denied for the reasons set forth in
the court’s decision.
However, Ms. Erickson expends most of her time arguing that the audit
report was a pretextual reason for termination because two prior audits had shown
no wrong-doing, the independent auditor was not actually independent, and USSD
personnel falsified documents and took other actions to mislead the auditor.
Ms. Erickson failed to properly present any of these arguments in the district
court and they lack evidentiary support in the record.
1
One of the documents Ms. Erickson was indicted for falsifying was a
document that the audit report also viewed with suspicion.
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Ms. Erickson also argues that the audit report was not the USSD’s
proffered non-discriminatory reason for her termination. She claims that “[t]he
USSD Board never expressed a reliance on any audit report . . . as cause for my
dismissal.” Aplt. Br. at 14. It is too late for this argument. Ms. Erickson’s own
memorandum in opposition to summary judgment treats the audit report as
USSD’s proffered non-discriminatory reason. See R., Vol. V at xvii (“The audit
was a pretextual reason for her termination. The real reason was to retaliate for
her whistleblowing claims.”).
III.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. Ms. Erickson’s motion
to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED.
Entered for the Court
Bobby R. Baldock
Circuit Judge
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