Daniel Johnson v. Justin Jones , 274 F. App'x 703 ( 2008 )


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  •                                                                       FILED
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    April 21, 2008
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    Elisabeth A. Shumaker
    TENTH CIRCUIT                      Clerk of Court
    DANIEL LAMONT JOHNSON,
    Petitioner - Appellant,                   No. 08-6024
    v.                                            (W.D. Oklahoma)
    JUSTIN JONES, Director,                        (D.C. No. 5:07-CV-1013-F)
    Respondent - Appellee.
    ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
    Before BRISCOE, MURPHY, and HARTZ, Circuit Judges.
    On September 13, 2007, Daniel Lamont Johnson filed in the United States
    District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma an application for a writ of
    habeas corpus under 
    28 U.S.C. § 2254
    . The district court dismissed his
    application as time-barred. Mr. Johnson now seeks a certificate of appealability
    (COA) to appeal that dismissal. See 
    id.
     § 2253(c) (requiring COA to appeal
    denial of application). We deny his request for a COA and dismiss this appeal.
    Mr. Johnson pleaded guilty in Oklahoma state court on October 19, 2004,
    to robbery with firearms, shooting with the intent to kill, and kidnapping. He was
    sentenced the same day. He did not pursue an appeal, but on October 14, 2005,
    he filed a motion to modify his sentence, which the court denied on November 23,
    2005. On August 3, 2006, he filed in the state court an application for
    postconviction relief. The court denied the application on November 3, 2006, and
    he did not appeal that decision. He filed a second application for postconviction
    relief in state court on March 16, 2007; it was denied on April 3, 2007. He
    appealed that decision to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, which
    affirmed the denial on May 29, 2007.
    A COA will issue “only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of
    the denial of a constitutional right.” 
    28 U.S.C. § 2253
    (c)(2). This standard
    requires “a demonstration that . . . includes showing that reasonable jurists could
    debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been
    resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to
    deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Slack v. McDaniel, 
    529 U.S. 473
    ,
    484 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, an applicant must
    show that the district court’s resolution of the constitutional claim was either
    “debatable or wrong.” 
    Id.
     If the application was denied on procedural grounds,
    the applicant faces a double hurdle. Not only must the applicant make a
    substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right, but he must also show
    “that jurists of reason would find it debatable . . . whether the district court was
    correct in its procedural ruling.” 
    Id.
     “Where a plain procedural bar is present and
    the district court is correct to invoke it to dispose of the case, a reasonable jurist
    could not conclude either that the district court erred in dismissing the petition or
    that the petitioner should be allowed to proceed further.” 
    Id.
    -2-
    The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act provides that a habeas
    application from a prisoner in state custody must be filed within one year of “the
    date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the
    expiration of the time for seeking such review.” 
    28 U.S.C. § 2244
    (d)(1)(A). The
    limitations period, however, is tolled for “[t]he time during which a properly filed
    application for State post-conviction relief or other collateral review with respect
    to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending . . . .” 
    Id.
     §2244(d)(2); but see
    Bridges v. Johnson, 
    284 F.3d 1201
    , 1203-04 (11th Cir. 2002) (motions to modify
    sentences do not toll the limitations period). In addition, equitable tolling of the
    one-year period may be granted, but only in “rare and exceptional circumstances.”
    York v. Galetka, 
    314 F.3d 522
    , 527 (10th Cir. 2003).
    Mr. Johnson’s application under § 2254 is clearly time-barred. He pleaded
    guilty on October 19, 2004. Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 4.2(A)
    states: “In all cases, to appeal from any conviction on a plea of guilty . . . , the
    defendant must have filed in the trial court clerk’s office an application to
    withdraw the plea within ten (10) days from the date of the pronouncement of the
    Judgment and Sentence . . . .” Okla. Stat. tit. 22, ch. 18, App. Rule 4.2(A)
    (2003). Because Mr. Johnson failed to file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea,
    his conviction became final for § 2244(d) purposes on October 29, 2004, ten days
    after the entry of his judgment and sentence. See Thomas v. Hargett, 
    162 F.3d 1174
    , at *1 (10th Cir. 1998) (unpublished decision table). The § 2244 limitations
    -3-
    period therefore expired by October 30, 2005. Even assuming that all
    Mr. Johnson’s state proceedings tolled the one-year limitations period, the
    untolled period between October 30, 2004, and the filing of his § 2254 application
    for relief on September 13, 2007, well exceeded a year.
    Mr. Johnson argues that the limitations period should be equitably tolled.
    In district court he claimed that he was delayed by inadequate access to the prison
    law library (6 hours per week), his low intelligence, and trial counsel’s ineffective
    assistance. But he asserted only that these circumstances “may be the reason why
    [he] was not able to[] timely appeal [sic],” R. Doc. 17 at 2 (emphasis added), and
    failed to elaborate on how these circumstances in fact caused the delay. He has
    not explained why the limitation on his access to the prison law library precluded
    a timely § 2254 application, and the other circumstances, without more, do not
    justify tolling. See Steed v. Head, 
    219 F.3d 1298
    , 1300 (11th Cir. 2000)
    (“attorney’s . . . mistake is not a basis for equitable tolling.”); United States v.
    Richardson, 
    215 F.3d 1338
     (10th Cir. 2000) (unpublished decision table)
    (learning disability does not toll limitations period). Thus, his application for
    relief under § 2254 is untimely.
    Because no reasonable jurist could debate the correctness of the district
    court’s ruling, we DENY Mr. Johnson’s request for a COA and DISMISS this
    appeal. We DENY Mr. Johnson's motion to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal.
    -4-
    We remind him of his obligation to pay the filing fee even on an appeal that has
    been dismissed.
    ENTERED FOR THE COURT
    Harris L Hartz
    Circuit Judge
    -5-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 08-6024

Citation Numbers: 274 F. App'x 703

Judges: Briscoe, Murphy, Hartz

Filed Date: 4/21/2008

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024