Watkins v. Leyba ( 2008 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
September 24, 2008
TENTH CIRCUIT
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
ROBERT WATKINS,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v. No. 07-1222
(D.C. No. 06-cv-00310-ZLW)
RONALD LEYBA and (D. Colo.)
JOHN SUTHERS, Attorney General
of the State of Colorado,
Respondents-Appellees.
ORDER *
Before HENRY, Chief Judge, TYMKOVICH, and HOLMES, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner-Appellant Robert Watkins, a Colorado state prisoner appearing
pro se, seeks a certificate of appealability (“COA”) in order to challenge the
district court’s dismissal of his habeas petition. The district court dismissed his
petition without prejudice because he failed to submit a certified copy of his trust
fund statement as directed by the magistrate judge. Mr. Watkins also seeks leave
*
This Order is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law
of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its
persuasive value consistent with F ED . R. A PP . P. 32.1 and 10th C IR . R. 32.1.
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge panel has
determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material assistance in
the determination of this appeal. See F ED . R. A PP . P. 34(a); 10th C IR . R. 34.1(G).
The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§
1291 and 2253(a). Reviewing Mr. Watkins’s filings liberally, 1 we conclude that
he failed to file a timely notice of appeal, thus, we lack jurisdiction to address his
application for COA, or the merits of his appeal. We therefore DISMISS his
appeal. We GRANT Mr. Watkins’s request to proceed IFP.
I. BACKGROUND
On March 5, 1998, Robert Watkins was convicted of first degree murder,
aggravated robbery and felony murder. On direct appeal, the Colorado Court of
Appeals affirmed his conviction and sentence. Mr. Watkins then filed a post-
conviction motion, pursuant to C OLO . R. C RIM . P. 35(c), claiming ineffective
assistance of both trial and postconviction counsel. On July 8, 2004, the
Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of his motion for
postconviction relief. The Colorado Supreme Court subsequently denied his
petition for certiorari on November 15, 2004.
On February 13, 2006, Mr. Watkins submitted for filing both a motion for
leave to proceed IFP and an application for writ of habeas corpus to the United
States District Court for the District of Colorado. Identifying deficiencies in Mr.
Watkins’s pleadings—particularly that he had failed to include a certified copy of
his trust account statement with his motion for leave to proceed IFP—the
1
Because Mr. Watkins is proceeding pro se, we review his pleadings and
filings liberally. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); Howard v.
U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 487 F.3d 808, 815 (10th Cir. 2007).
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magistrate judge directed the court clerk to commence a civil action. The court
clerk promptly filed the habeas petition Mr. Watkins had submitted ten days
earlier. The magistrate judge commanded Mr. Watkins to cure the identified
deficiencies within thirty days, and warned that failure to do so would result in
the dismissal of his action without prejudice.
More than thirty days later, 2 Mr. Watkins filed an application for habeas
and a motion for leave to proceed IFP on March 29, 2006. Although he attached a
copy of his trust account statement to his motion for leave to proceed IFP, the
copy was not certified as required by both the magistrate judge’s order and the
express language of 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (“in addition to filing the affidavit filed
under paragraph (1), [a prisoner] shall submit a certified copy of the trust fund
account statement (or institutional equivalent) for the prisoner for the 6-month
period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint or notice of appeal,
obtained from the appropriate official of each prison at which the prisoner is or
was confined.”). Therefore, on April 3, 2006, the district court denied the habeas
petition, dismissed the action without prejudice, and denied the motion to proceed
IFP as moot.
2
March 25, 2006, thirty days after February 23, 2006, marked the end
of the court-ordered filing period. That date fell on a Saturday. Therefore, by
operation of F ED . R. C IV . P. 6(a), Mr. Watkins’s curative pleadings were due on
Monday, March 27, 2006.
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On April 21, 2006, Mr. Watkins filed a notarized copy of his trust account
statement but did not otherwise seek reconsideration of the district court’s April
3, 2006 order. Over a year after the district court entered its April 3, 2006
judgment, Mr. Watkins filed a notice of appeal. The district court denied both his
motion to proceed on appeal IFP and his request for a COA.
II. DISCUSSION
Mr. Watkins’s application for a COA seeking to appeal the district court’s
April 3, 2006 order denying his habeas petition is untimely and must be dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction. We acquire jurisdiction only on the filing of a timely
notice of appeal. See Alva v. Teen Help, 469 F.3d 946, 950 (10th Cir. 2006);
Bowles v. Russell, 127 S. Ct. 2360, 2363 (2007) (“[T]he taking of an appeal
within the prescribed time is mandatory and jurisdictional.”) (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted). 28 U.S.C. § 2107(a)—from which Federal
Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a) derives—requires that an appeal be brought in a
civil case “within 30 days after the entry of [the] judgment, order or decree.”
Here, the record is undisputed that Mr. Watkins filed his notice of appeal on May
21, 2007, more than a year after the district court entered its April 3, 2006 order
denying the habeas petition and dismissing the action without prejudice.
Our review of the record reveals that Mr. Watkins filed no motion which
would toll the running of the statutory thirty-day period. See F ED . R. A PP . P.
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4(a)(4). 3 Thus, his time to appeal the April 3, 2006 order expired on May 3,
2006. Because he failed to file a notice of appeal or to seek a COA before that
date, he cannot now appeal the order.
The record indicates that Mr. Watkins may not have immediately received
notice of the district court’s April 3, 2006 order. 4 Nevertheless, we are not
situated to consider this as a ground for excusing his failure to timely file a notice
of appeal. As previously explained, timely filing of a civil appeal is
jurisdictional. Courts have “no authority to create equitable exceptions to
jurisdictional requirements.” 5 Bowles, 127 S. Ct. 2366.
3
Rule 4(a)(4) provides that certain motions filed within ten days of the
entry of judgment toll the time to file a notice of appeal. Notably, he filed
nothing within the operative period. Also absent from the record is any
suggestion that Mr. Watkins sought to reopen the time in which to file an appeal.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c), “the district court may, upon motion filed within
180 days after entry of the judgment or order or within 7 days after receipt of
such notice, whichever is earlier, reopen the time for appeal . . . .” (emphasis
added). Assuming Mr. Watkins never received notice of the district court’s order,
a motion to reopen was due no later than 180 days from April 3, 2006, or
approximately September 30, 2006. See Clark v. Lavallie, 204 F.3d 1038, 1040
(10th Cir. 2000).
4
On June 29, 2006, Mr. Watkins notified the district court of a
change of address. Evidently, he was transferred to another facility before he
received the district court’s April 3, 2006 order because he later informed the
district court twice, on July 31, 2006, and April 13, 2007, of his address change
and requested information regarding the status of his case. On April 16, 2007, the
court clerk mailed a copy of the April 3, 2006 order to Mr. Watkins. He filed his
notice of appeal within thirty days after the clerk mailed the order.
5
Mr. Watkins filed a motion to supplement the record. In light of our
jurisdictional determination, we deny that motion as moot.
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Mr. Watkins also seeks to proceed IFP. To do so, he must comply with the
filing requirements and demonstrate “a financial inability to pay the required
[filing] fees and the existence of a reasoned, nonfrivolous argument on the law
and facts in support of the issues raised on appeal.” McIntosh v. U.S. Parole
Comm’n, 115 F.3d 809, 812 (10th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting DeBardeleben v. Quinlan, 937 F.2d 502, 505 (10th Cir. 1991)). Though
we dismiss Mr. Watkins’s appeal for failure to timely file a notice of appeal and
application for COA, we nonetheless conclude that the arguments he raised in
support of his appeal are not frivolous. Therefore, we GRANT Mr. Watkins
leave to proceed IFP subject to the requirements in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b).
This appeal is DISMISSED.
Entered for the Court
Jerome A. Holmes
Circuit Judge
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