Williams v. Broaddus ( 2009 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS July 15, 2009
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
PAUL CHAYNE WILLIAMS,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v. No. 08-1444
(D. Colorado)
MARK A. BROADDUS; JOHN W. (D.C. No. 1:08-CV-01065-ZLW)
SUTHERS, The Attorney General of
the State of Colorado,
Respondents-Appellees.
ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE
OF APPEALABILITY
Before LUCERO, MURPHY, and McCONNELL, Circuit Judges.
Proceeding pro se, Paul Chayne Williams seeks a certificate of
appealability (“COA”) so he can appeal the district court’s dismissal of the
habeas application he filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c)(1)(A) (providing no appeal may be taken from a final order disposing
of a § 2254 petition unless the petitioner first obtains a COA). In his application,
filed on May 21, 2008, Williams raised nine claims related to his 2001 Colorado
securities fraud conviction. Respondents argued, inter alia, that the § 2254
application was untimely because it was filed more than one year after Williams’s
conviction became final. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) (setting forth a one-year statute
of limitations for § 2254 applications). The district court dismissed Williams’s §
2254 application as untimely, concluding it was not filed within the one-year
limitations period and further concluding Williams was not entitled to equitable
tolling.
To be entitled to a COA, Williams must make “a substantial showing of the
denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To make the requisite
showing, he must demonstrate “that reasonable jurists could debate whether (or,
for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different
manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to
proceed further.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003) (quotations
omitted); see also Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 474, 484-85 (2000) (holding that
when a district court dismisses a habeas petition on procedural grounds, a
petitioner is entitled to a COA only if he shows both that reasonable jurists would
find it debatable whether he had stated a valid constitutional claim and debatable
whether the district court’s procedural ruling was correct). In evaluating whether
Williams has satisfied his burden, this court undertakes “a preliminary, though
not definitive, consideration of the [legal] framework” applicable to each of his
claims. Miller-El at 338. Although Williams need not demonstrate his appeal
will succeed to be entitled to a COA, he must “prove something more than the
absence of frivolity or the existence of mere good faith.” Id. (quotations
omitted).
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This court has reviewed Williams’s appellate brief and application for
COA, the district court’s amended order, and the entire record on appeal pursuant
to the framework set out by the Supreme Court in Miller-El and concludes that
Williams is not entitled to a COA. The district court’s resolution of Williams’s
habeas application is not reasonably subject to debate and his claims are not
adequate to deserve further proceedings. Accordingly, Williams has not “made a
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right” and is not entitled to a
COA. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).
This court denies Williams’s request for a COA and dismisses this appeal.
Williams’s request to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal is granted.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Michael R. Murphy
Circuit Judge
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